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# SPECULUM RELIGIONIS

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
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Claude G. Montclair

*Claude G. Montclair, N.J. photo*

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SPECULUM RELIGIONIS

BEING ESSAYS AND STUDIES IN  
RELIGION AND LITERATURE FROM  
PLATO TO VON HÜGEL

*With an Introduction by*  
F. C. BURKITT, F.B.A.

NORRISIAN PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN  
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

*Presented by*  
MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF  
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE  
SOUTHAMPTON  
*TO THEIR PRESIDENT*  
CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE  
M.A., D.D., D.LITT.

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Gratulamur tibi, Praeses Illustrissime, annis septuaginta tam feliciter completis; simul hoc parvum donum offerimus, ex eis studiis contextam corollam, quae, cum tua ipsius cura ingenioque et tractata et illustrata sint, tibi praecipue cordi esse scimus. Non est certe cui rectius tale donum deferamus, cum hoc Collegium Hartleense sic et opibus et consilio foveris ut tanquam alterius conditoris tua laus hodie nobis celebranda esse videatur, non annorum tantum eheu fugacium seriem reputantibus, sed etiam tua erga omnes, qui cum hoc collegio coniuncti sumus, beneficia, nunquam e memoria hominum lapsura. Nunc igitur tibi gratis animis hunc libellum, qui, si vix tuae famae diuturnitatem adaequabit, in praesentia tamen omnium Hartleensium caritatis et amoris praestabit testimonium,  
D. D. D.



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## CLAUDE MONTEFIORE

## AN APPRECIATION

THERE is an account given by Godwyn of William Gray, Bishop of Ely, which has a certain appropriateness when applied to Dr Claude Montefiore. Of Bishop Gray (who died in 1478) we read that his friends perceived in him "a notable towardnesse and sharpnesse of witte", and so "He was brought vp in Baylioll Colledge in Oxford. Hauing spent much time there profitably, and to very good purpose, in the study as well of Diuinitie as Philosophy . . . he grew very famous; and no maruaile, for to see a gentleman of great linage, hauing maintenance at will, to become very learned, especially in Diuinity, is indeede a woonder, and seldome seene".

All this, including "Baylioll Colledge", is true of Dr Montefiore, and it is not only true but significant. He has done a work for Religion and for Learning in our days for which the circumstances of his life have particularly fitted him: had the circumstances, including the influence of Dr Jowett of Balliol, been different, I do not think this particular work could have been done.

It is happily not yet time to write Montefiore's "Life", and the following data do not go behind *Who's Who*. From that useful publication any one may learn that Claude Joseph Goldsmid-Montefiore was born in 1858,—the year, we may remark in passing, in which *Essays and Reviews* saw the light,—that his father was Nathaniel Montefiore and his mother a daughter of Sir I. L. Goldsmid (the first Baronet), that he married Therese Schorstein who died in 1889 and was the mother of his son, and that later he married a daughter of the late R. J. Ward. We learn that he was educated first "privately" and then at Balliol, getting a first in Lit. Hum. in 1881. He was Hibbert Lecturer in 1892, and "has identified himself with educational and philanthropical work; President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, and devotes much time to communal affairs". It is not necessary to give at this place a list

of the books he has written, but it is pleasant to add that in 1927 his old University of Oxford recognised his merits by making him an Honorary D.Litt.

That a young man descended from old and wealthy Jewish families should be sent to Oxford, and afterwards devote much of his time and talents to the betterment of others and especially of his co-religionists, is happily not so rare as to be extraordinary: but, as in the 15th century C.E., that such a person as Montefiore should also like Bishop Gray "become very learned, especially in Divinity" remains "a wonder and seldom seen". I have not brought all this forward merely as a quaint parallel, but because (as I said above) I think it is just these circumstances of Montefiore's position—religious fervour combined with the Oxford training and an inherited place in the great world—that have enabled him to be both a liberalizing influence to his own people and an interpreter of Judaism and the Rabbinic Religion to Christians.

## I

Let us first consider Dr Montefiore as a champion of the Rabbinic Religion. The book that specially here comes before us is his *Hibbert Lectures* on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews, published in 1892. The first three-quarters of this book, comprising the first seven out of the nine Lectures, form an excellent survey of Old Testament history and its literature from Moses to Nehemiah. It is very nearly up-to-date now after the lapse of a whole generation, and in 1892 it must have seemed almost alarmingly up-to-date. It was fully abreast of contemporary German literature: Montefiore had whole-heartedly accepted the Graf-Wellhausen position, that the Prophets came before the written Law, and his whole account is based on that position. In all this he comes before the reader as one of the new band of Modernists, taught by the new light from Germany to put the Old Testament in its proper perspective.

The new light had come from Germany, from Protestant Christian Germany, and to say that means that it came from a region

where the spirit of Martin Luther was, and is still, a great and somewhat restless influence. Luther had been brought up in an environment in which the ritual and the accepted observances of medieval Catholicism had been regarded as the normal method of securing peace of mind, deliverance from the evil impulse, deliverance from a too-vividly imagined Hell. This no doubt is not the true Catholic Christianity, but it was the sort of view of it in which Luther and many of his contemporaries had been trained. Luther found that ritual and observances did not give him the interior peace that he needed; he found it in what he called Faith, that is, in an attitude of mind towards God. This attitude he acquired by reading the Bible (especially such parts of the New Testament as the Epistle to the Romans and the Gospel of S. John) and by consequent meditation and consideration of the love of God as exhibited in Jesus Christ. That was his, Luther's, way to inward peace: it is not surprising that he distrusted and minimized all other ways. More especially the current Catholic observances, which he had practised without benefit, were to him a burden, and commands to practise such observances seemed to him a slavery. Luther's whole attitude to religious Laws, whether Catholic or Jewish, was that put in Acts xv 10 into the mouth of Peter—"a yoke upon the neck which neither we nor our fathers have been able to bear".

Protestant orthodoxy came and has gone, and the German Professors who throughout the 19th century forced the pace of Old Testament investigation with such triumphant success can hardly be called orthodox Christians, but in one respect they maintained a most orthodox standard. A religion of ordinances, they seem to declare with almost entire unanimity, must be a religion of slavery. A Yoke to them was not a convenient machine for carrying the pure milk of the Word, it was in their eyes an emblem of subjection. And therefore the Jews, who from Nehemiah's day have been notoriously subject to the Law of Moses,—a written code of ordinances and of pains and penalties,—*must* be professing a religion of slavery.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Montefiore's chief examples of this view are drawn from Prof. H. Schultz and from

This is the view that Montefiore set himself to rectify in his last two Lectures. His pages are curious and instructive reading for an Anglican Christian, who knows the emotional value and appeal of his own fixed forms of prayer and worship. Montefiore himself is quite aware of the most obvious parallel. He speaks of the danger of hypocrisy and superstition that may dog the footsteps of a religion which allows positive merit in the sight of God to human "good deeds", or which tends to attribute a magical effect to the mere external performance of almsgiving. "We can see," he says, "that superstitions such as these, from which, if the written religious teaching of the Rabbis is not entirely free, we may be certain that the religion of the average worshipper was far less exempted, were precisely similar to those Romanist doctrines against which the fresh Pauline teachers of the Reformation so loudly and so rightly protested."<sup>1</sup>

The *Apologia* for the Rabbinic Religion, which occupies the whole of Lecture IX, is a fine performance, very well executed. But the more I read it, the more I see how "Baylioll Colledge" had fitted Montefiore for his task. I do not forget the influence and the writings of Schechter and Abrahams, whom Montefiore so loved and admired, and whose help he everywhere appropriately acknowledges.<sup>2</sup> But Abrahams in 1892 was a youngish man unknown in Academic circles, and Schechter notwithstanding his excellent style was known nowhere else. It needed a combination of the Oxford point of view with adequate knowledge of Religion as really lived and practised by Jews past and present to stand up against the conclusions of the most approved German Professors and convict them of serious misrepresentation based on ignorance, and to do this with urbanity and in a readable way.

Moreover the line of argument needed one who was not only a "liberal" Jew, who stood far enough away from the strict orthodoxy

Schürer's well-known History. Characteristic quotations from each are to be found in the *Lectures*, p. 532.

<sup>1</sup> P. 528.

<sup>2</sup> See e. g. Schechter's interesting dictum, given on p. 534, note.

of Rabbinical observance to view it objectively. It also needed one who was "liberal" and "advanced" enough in his view of the Old Testament not only to give the right relative dates to Prophets and the Law, but also to be free to judge them both where required. It was new to Christians to hear from Montefiore that the religion of the Rabbis was in many respects higher than that of the Old Testament. To quote his own words: "Thy law is my delight: thy commandment is exceeding broad. Thy law do I love: great peace have they which love it.' Now this loving enthusiasm for the law is commonly allowed to the author of the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm; why is it denied to the Rabbis who felt it a thousand times more keenly and proved it on a thousand scaffolds by the sacrifice of their lives? But Prof. Schultz says, the main bulk of the law is ceremonial, and the ceremonial law can only be observed out of fear of punishment or hope of reward. Here we have the logic of theory at variance with the logic of facts."<sup>1</sup>

So much perhaps might have been conceded by an old-fashioned Anglican or Romanist. But when Prof. Schürer had maintained that Pharisaic Judaism resembled servants who serve for the sake of their reward, Montefiore can rejoin: "It is curious that these critics are apt to excuse the eudæmonistic and utilitarian motive in Deuteronomy, while they emphasize it onesidedly in the Rabbis. They are at pains to show that it is not the only motive to be found in Deuteronomy, while they assure us that it constituted the sole motive of Pharisaic Judaism. Whereas the truth is exactly opposite. The eudæmonistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy; it is weakest with the Rabbis. . . . In the priestly code we hear less of the motives of hope and fear than in Deuteronomy. In it, the prevailing motives are rather the honour and glory of God. . . . In the hymn of the Law (Psalm cxix) the hope of extended reward and the fear of punishment occupy a still smaller space; and in the Rabbinical literature the thought emerges triumphant that the essence of observance lies in itself and not in its external rewards."<sup>2</sup>

To Christian students of the Bible, including what were called

<sup>1</sup> P. 534 f.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 533, 548 f.

the "Higher Critics", this was a new claim. They were accustomed to place the climax of Old Testament religion in the uncompromising morality of Amos and the universalist aspirations of Isaiah xix, and to regard the ritualism and legalism of post-exilic Judaism as a sad falling-off. This was partly due to the literary medium. Amos and Hosea have a literary charm which is lacking in Haggai and Malachi. It needed someone who had sympathy with the post-exilic Religion to do justice to the post-exilic Books; above all it needed some one who was independent of the masterful thought of St Paul to do justice to the Religion of the Law.

## 2

It is extremely difficult to characterize in a few words the writings of Dr Montefiore which are directly concerned with the New Testament. It was once said of him, so he tells us (*Liberal Judaism*, p. 313), by an orthodox Christian that, in spite of certain supposed advances towards a due appreciation of the teaching of Jesus, there was no one further from Christianity, no one more fixedly rooted in bigoted and one-sided Judaism, than he! There is a sense in which this verdict is true, and if I may say so it is just this that makes his writings so valuable to Christian scholars. But we may omit the adjectives "bigoted and one-sided"—unless (which comes to much the same thing) we accept them for ourselves, as the natural concomitant of convictions strongly held and cherished for a lifetime.

There are some very good remarks on p. 299 ff. of this same book *Liberal Judaism* about the amount of agreement between modern Judaism and modern Christianity in modern England. Montefiore points out that it is because there is so much in which the two Religions agree that Jews can feel themselves to be one with the nation at large and not aliens. But for all that there is a real difference between Judaism, even Liberal Judaism, and Christianity, even Modernist Christianity. And I think Montefiore has helped some of us Modernists to see exactly wherein the difference lies. It is not merely that the Jews "reject Christ", to use an ecclesiastical

phrase: Montefiore explains to us in our own theological vocabulary how it is that they get on without Him. "Whereas," he says (*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 540), "some Protestant theologians have laid it down that present communion with God was made impossible by the law, the Rabbis believed that it was veritably the law which made such communion a full and actual possibility. Was I not justified in saying that the law, as the mediating link between God and man, fulfilled something of the same office as the person of Christ in the various phases of Christianity? . . . In the pictorial language of the Midrash, before the law was given heaven and earth were still separate and apart; but at the season of its bestowal Moses went up to heaven, and God came down upon the earth."<sup>1</sup>

Well, then, we Christians will not make the mistake of trying to praise Dr Montefiore's works on the Gospels and their Hero for the wrong thing, for their being very nearly Christian. Their interest lies exactly in this, that they are not Christian. And there is something in them quite different from the wistful looking back, the not yet quite abandoned loyalty to a former Master and Lord, that meets us in so many modernist-christian studies of Jesus. Like several Jewish writers who in these days have come to the study of the Gospels he views the scene with glasses of a different focus from the Christian's. The background is clear and familiar, it is the central figure that is strange and uneven. Or rather, to express the idea more accurately, it may be said that the Jewish investigator begins his reaction to the pictures presented to him by the Gospels with the background: it depicts something already familiar to him, and while to the Christian it is merely background, the Jewish investigator feels it to be something like a caricature of a well-known scene.

Further, while the Christian has been taught that the teaching in the Gospels is all true and mostly new, there has been in the past a tendency for the Jew to say that some of it is true but not new,

<sup>1</sup> The parallel is not invented by Montefiore. The curious exegesis of Psalm lxxviii 18, which in Ephesians iv 8 is made to refer to Christ, is applied in the traditional Jewish interpretation to Moses who brought down the Law to men.

while what is new is not true. The interest of what Montefiore writes is that he does see that some of the things in the Gospel are true *and* new.

Dr Montefiore has written a great Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels in two volumes, a work which has reached, as it deserved, a second edition (1927). It is a work of great learning,<sup>1</sup> fully abreast of current criticism, German and other, and it marks, as a second edition should mark, a more mature judgement and a fuller knowledge than the first. But to get in a moderate compass and in the freshness of a first formulation of independent impressions I venture to think one should go to the little book called *Some Elements of the Religious Teaching of Jesus*, published in 1910, "to hear", as he himself puts it (p. 9), "what a Jew, with all his prejudices and prepossessions, may, nevertheless, have to say".

Montefiore sees Jesus as before all things a Prophet—a prophet rather than a reformer. "For the Prophets did not feel impelled to speak, simply because there were social or religious evils around them; they opened their mouths because, in their opinion and belief, something was going to happen. It was going to happen because of human wickedness. There was danger ahead—special danger to the sinner and the unrepentant. There was, indeed, redemption ahead too—doom, in fact, was threatened to the wicked, deliverance was promised to the suffering good. Given this impulse to speak—the conviction that something big was going to happen, which they foresaw and foretold—the Prophets became teachers and reformers, sometimes also consolers and comforters, always and in every aspect of their work convinced of divine inspiration, conscious of a message to deliver, and unresting till they had delivered it."

The quotation is to be found on p. 15, and a note tells us that this conception of the Israelite Prophet is based on Wellhausen. No doubt: but it also shows the influence of what I have called

<sup>1</sup> Montefiore is inclined to deny this; but see Abrahams' testimony to the *Hibbert Lectures* (Synoptic Gospels, vol. ii, p. 663, note 1), to which testimony I beg leave to subscribe.

elsewhere in this essay "Baylioll Colledge". It is the voice of Shem who has dwelt in the tents of Japhet, has indeed more or less been brought up there. There is an ease, a discarding of what is unnecessary, an inclusion and recognition of essential features, an accurate idealization of the type, which is by ultimate derivation neither Jewish nor English but Greek, the product of the study of that humane literature and philosophy which Montefiore learned from Benjamin Jowett.

To come back to the Gospels, let us take some account of the problems that Montefiore finds there. First comes the Law: this is the first problem for him, the critical view of the Old Testament documents makes no difference. "When Amos and Hosea and Isaiah spoke, there was no universally recognized Divine and Mosaic Law. When Jesus spoke there was. Hosea said, in God's name, 'I desire lovingkindness and not sacrifices'. There was no possible retort—'But in the Law of God, which you, like everybody else, acknowledge to be perfect, immutable, and divine, sacrifices are required in large numbers'." <sup>1</sup> And so, in Montefiore's opinion, the conflict between the Law and the new authority of Jesus "was therefore almost inevitable". In the conflicts between Jesus and the Rabbis about the Sabbath Montefiore has sympathy with both sides. Dialectically the Rabbis were in the right, but Jesus was in the right too, and "his right was higher and more permanent than the dialectical right of the Rabbis. Jesus seems fighting for a principle which he can hardly enunciate or formulate: either, that deeds of love and charity must never be put off for the sake of ritual enactments; or, perhaps, that the rule and rest of the Sabbath must be interpreted by its spirit, and by the higher law of righteousness and compassion" (p. 43).

The business of this essay is not to write a commentary on Montefiore's commentary. I quote the above extract mainly to illustrate his attitude to the Gospel data, and particularly its double

<sup>1</sup> P. 40. It is worth notice here that Johanan ben Zakkai's famous quotation of Hosea vi 6 was made on the occasion when the sacrifices came to an end by *force majeure*, not while they were still being offered.

aspect of independence and sympathy. No one has quite the same right to that attitude as a cultivated and learned Jew: in a Christian, even an emancipated Christian, it easily turns into an attitude of patronage and superiority. And therefore Montefiore's utterances on the Gospel are so valuable and instructive to Christians. To borrow a simile used by Dr Salmon, it is like observing the Sun in an eclipse: it is only when the central Light is temporarily and legitimately cut off that we can study the corona and so many other instructive phenomena.

## 3

Besides the Gospel there is another side to Christianity which is conveniently summed up in the name "St Paul". Here again Montefiore's work is very instructive to the Christian investigator. *Judaism and St Paul* is the name of a little book published by Montefiore in 1914. It consists of two essays, of which the second discusses the use that may be made by the Liberal Jew of the Pauline Epistles even to-day. This does not directly concern us now, but the other essay does. It is in the main a discussion of the sort of Judaism which was the religion of Paul before his conversion to Christianity. It seems to me, from some points of view, the most original contribution to Biblical study that Montefiore has made. He begins by describing the general characteristics of the fully-developed Talmudic Judaism of 300 to 500 c.e., its unsystematized doctrine of God, Who was both the Giver of the righteous Law, which was to be and could be obeyed, and at the same time the kindly and loving Father, delighting in repentance and always ready to forgive. God was near to the Rabbinic Jew; he needed no intermediary. And the Jew had joy in the Law, the Law was a delight, for it was the Jew's privilege to perform what was commanded in it. This, says Montefiore, is very far from being the picture of the Law and its operation as given by Paul; it cannot, therefore, have been the religion from which Paul was converted. He suggests that this religion was not the Rabbinic religion, that he did not learn this religion from Gamaliel, but that Paul's religion

was Hellenistic Judaism, "Diaspora Judaism" (p. 93). Montefiore does not deny that Saul of Tarsus may have studied for a time—a short time—under Gamaliel at Jerusalem, but if so it was no more than an episode. We Christians have been too much inclined to regard Paul as having been a very great Rabbi, interpreting Galatians i 14 in that sense:<sup>1</sup> Montefiore questions his academical distinction, and still more his intimacy with the atmosphere of Rabbinical piety.

According to Montefiore the Diaspora Judaism of Paul had a wider outlook, a more systematic thought, but at the same time a darker and less paternal theology than that of the Rabbinical Judaism which is known in such detail and which survives to this day. In this book, as elsewhere in his writings, there is a continued protest against the view, so often expressed by scholars, especially in Germany, that the Rabbinical Religion was mean and gloomy, producing in its votaries either boastful self-satisfaction or despair and anxiety of soul. Both these characteristics are deduced from St Paul's picture of the Law and its effects: Montefiore claims that the actual effects, as deduced from Talmud and Midrash, are different, different both from St Paul's picture and that of modern Protestant scholars.

The point is well made, and Christian investigators should always bear it well in mind. Further, it was very well that the point should be made by one who has few misgivings about the matter: the protest was needed, and it has been effective. But I venture to think that, for a final verdict in the matter, Montefiore treats too lightly the question whether the Judaism of 300 to 500 was much the same as the Judaism of 30 to 50.<sup>2</sup> Suppose—to take a fanciful example from another religion,—suppose the Church of England disestablished by a hostile, perhaps communist, State, with all the cathedrals and churches and funds confiscated. Suppose further

<sup>1</sup> It may be remarked that Paul himself only says *προέκοπτον*, i. e. that *he was getting on* beyond many of his contemporaries, a modest claim which really does not imply any acknowledged "academical distinction".

<sup>2</sup> See e. g. p. 24.

that all the bishops were killed or imprisoned till they died, with many of the other clergy, so that the apostolic succession was quite cut off and no valid absolution or Holy Communion could be given. Suppose nevertheless that after seventy years of catastrophe congregations of High Anglicans were still to be found, determined to be faithful, so far as in them lay, to the High Anglican ideal, and indeed persisting indefinitely, would there not have been a great change in the mental outlook of these people from the High Anglicans of the present day? Yet this is, *mutatis mutandis*, what actually befel the Jews between 70 and 135. If my fanciful picture of persecuted Anglo-Catholicism be for the moment accepted, several other inferences can be made. Not all these priestless Anglicans would survive as Anglicans. Apart from those who may have been killed or exiled by persecution, many I am sure would (in the circumstances I have imagined) go over to the Roman Catholics or lapse from religion altogether. The faithful remnant would consist almost entirely of the sort of person for whom the restricted Anglicanism now possible for them had attractions: *they* would enjoy such rites and observances as were still open to them to practise.

It must have been the same with the Jews after the Destruction of Jerusalem in 70 and the Revolt under Bar Cochba in 135. How many were killed or exiled! How many became Christians? Some at least. How many lapsed? Many I am sure: some altogether, of whom we have no knowledge or report; some more or less, some perhaps only to the extent of grudging their tithe to the priests, now "unemployed". The faithful had the reward of fulfilling a command; they discovered more commands and liked it.

But in Paul's day, in the days of Jesus, things were different. There were Rabbis—the Gospels mostly call them "Scribes"—and *their* interests may have been much the same as those of a later day, though there may have been some whose teaching Johanan ben Zakkai did not wish to perpetuate. But besides the Rabbis there were all the various types of politicians, ecclesiastics, visionaries, men of the world, that make up the active population of a living

State. And the majority of them were so visionary and so discontented that they boiled over in a hopeless revolt against Imperial Rome. That was the Judaism, or (as Montefiore himself says several times) the Judaisms, of 20-70 C.E. We have hints in the letters of Paul of how this religion looked to one young man, who had lived both among Gentiles in Tarsus and also at Jerusalem. I am not surprised that his sketch does not tally with the stabilized Judaism of the Talmud, a religion modified to fit a quite altered state of things.

But however this may be, there can be no doubt of the debt we Christian scholars owe to Montefiore for warning us so conclusively and so urbanely that we must not identify the Judaism depicted by St Paul with the Judaism as taught by the Rabbinic schools that survived the great catastrophes into another and a different world.

## 4

There is a third side to Christianity which is neither "Gospel" nor "St Paul", something which may be conveniently called "the Church". Dr Montefiore has written little on this, it does not come in his way. But those who, like the present writer, have often heard him speak at informal discussions on Religion in a private Society will always associate him with a very curious and delightful type of discourse. On almost every type of question concerning Christian doctrine or organization or present-day difficulty I can hear him, towards the end of the meeting when most of us have given our views, saying: "Look here, you know, of course I have no right to pronounce any opinion on this interesting subject and no doubt there is a good deal to be said on both sides, but what interests me is that something which involves very similar principles is, or has been, discussed inside our Jewish Community"—and then follows a most curious and always illuminating parallel. I wish I could give an actual specimen, however indiscreet, but no notes are taken and I cannot quote. But the general effect is analogous to Dr Montefiore's writings on the Gospels and St Paul: it is the curiously instructive revelation that comes from an unexpected side-light. Such side-

lights require skill and sympathy for their display. Montefiore is consciously what he calls a universalist. I don't like the word myself: it seems too often to mean one who is so general and wholesale in his views, that they lose all colour and picturesqueness. But Montefiore's universalism is different: it is not that he wants all men to dress alike, but that he recognizes under the Christian vestment and the Jewish gabardine very much the same sort of human being, and as he has learned to see the meaning and the profundity that often underlies the Jewish gesture he is quite ready to believe that there may be a worthy meaning in some of our Christian prejudices and peculiarities.

I do not feel competent to write about Dr Montefiore's position and activities as a Liberal Jew. I do not know whether the movement within Judaism with which he is specially connected is likely to increase and multiply or to wither. But he has set a model to all liberal reformers of sympathy and understanding of what is old and was good, even if it be now old-fashioned, of enthusiasm for what is old and is still good, whereas so many reformers are more conspicuous for impatience at what in their opinion is now useless. As I say, I cannot have an opinion about the future of Liberal Judaism, I cannot say whether it is "in the name of a command" (or "of heaven"). But another word out of *Aboth* I do think Montefiore's career brings to our mind. R. La'zar ben 'Azariah said (iii 26): "Without culture there can be no understanding of the Law, without understanding of the Law there can be no culture."<sup>1</sup> If I have laid perhaps undue stress upon "Baylliol Colledge" and the abiding influence, intellectual and religious, of Dr Jowett, let this saying from *Aboth* be my excuse. I would add the rest of the contrasted pairs of qualities in thinking of Montefiore—reverence as well as wisdom, good judgement as well as erudition.

שלשה כתרים הן כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות

וכתר שם טוב עולה על גביהן :

F. C. BURKITT.

אם אין תורה אין דרך ארץ אם אין דרך ארץ אין תורה <sup>1</sup>

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F. C. BURKITT.



## ORPHISM AND THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY

HAPPILY there cannot exist in this world a Philosophy without a Philosopher. The distinction between Thought and Thinking Subject is in the last resort unreal; and a philosophy is always the result, more or less direct, of all the myriad forces and influences that from birth onwards have played upon the philosopher's mind, which is already finite and qualified by the processes of natural progeniture. The eternal questions of philosophy indeed abide; but the answers to them, nay, even the realization of the questions themselves in a form that is pertinent for human thought, are conditioned by the differing experiences and the differing personalities of the individual philosophers.

Unless above himself he can  
Exalt himself, how poor a thing is man.

Of Plato it is supremely true that 'he was not simply a Professor of Philosophy only to be understood of his colleagues'. Be the artistic mask of the dialogue-form of his works never so impenetrable, it cannot fully conceal the physiognomy of the creating mind, but ever and anon gives hints of a character rich in individuality. The spirit of the man broods on the printed page.

It is for this reason that neither philosophers nor philologists<sup>1</sup> will ever be finally content to accept the view that a genetic study of the Platonic philosophy is impossible.<sup>2</sup> It is not for nothing that such study has been characteristic of Platonic scholarship for a century: for the nature of the subject-matter demands it, and the attack must ever be renewed. Hence there has been and must be

<sup>1</sup> I use the word in its continental sense.

<sup>2</sup> For this view see Dr. Ernst Hoffmann, in Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 2nd vol., 1st pt. (5th ed.), Anhang, pp. 1059 ff.; 'Was also der Forschung möglich ist, ist gerade nicht eine Darstellung der Entwicklung Platons, sondern eine Darstellung seines Systems' (p. 1063).

much talk of influences. The Socratic question is a notorious case in point. Religious influences, however, have not hitherto been stressed. Two of the greater modern students of ancient religion have indeed seen Persian influences behind some passages of the dialogues,<sup>1</sup> and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has collected evidence to show that the simple religious observances of his own home must have attracted the youthful Plato.<sup>2</sup> Yet it remains broadly true, that for Plato religion as such seems to play not too large a part in the scheme of things. It is useful for the masses, and must be regulated, if it is not to be pernicious in the state. Yet Plato was certainly not the ancient equivalent of a modern 'practising Christian' in the sacramental and ritualistic sense of the term. It is no accident, therefore, that the religion which seems to have attracted him most was one which, though it may never have been organized to any extent on the side of practice, was peculiar in the Greek world in so far as it possessed a definite dogmatic system of its own, founded upon an inspired poem or poems.<sup>3</sup> Whether there was any organized body which can legitimately be termed an Orphic sect, is extremely doubtful, in spite of the apparent certainty of many scholars.<sup>4</sup> But so far as Plato is concerned the question can be dismissed: for it is abundantly clear that to him Orphism was a

<sup>1</sup> F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* (1st ed.), p. 386.

R. Reitzenstein, 'Plato und Zarathustra,' in *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, Bd. IV (Teubner, 1927).

<sup>2</sup> *Platon*, vol. i, pp. 38-40 (2nd ed.).

<sup>3</sup> There is no detailed account of Orphism in all its aspects. The best complete treatment is perhaps the short one of M. Boulanger: (*Orphée*, Paris, 1925, in the series 'Christianisme' published by Rieder). In so far as they fell within his ambit, Orphic beliefs were amply treated by Rohde, in *Psyche* (Eng. trans. Kegan Paul, by W. B. Hillis); O. Kern, *Die gr. Mysterien der klassischen Zeit* (Berlin, 1927) gives an interesting non-technical treatment. For a bibliography see Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 345-50.

<sup>4</sup> Gruppe contested the sectarian nature of Orphism, and has never been adequately refuted (see e. g. his article on 'Orpheus' in Roscher, *Lex. Myth.* iii, 1105 ff.). H. P. Nilsson (*A History of Greek Religion*, trans. Fielden, 1925, p. 218); O. Kern, (*Orpheus*, p. 39 and *passim*); Robert (*Gr. Heldensage*, i, 401 f.) and Burnet (*Thales to Plato*, p. 31), along with others, seem to uphold the opposite view.

system of belief, and a particular 'mythology': a παλαιὸς λόγος.<sup>1</sup> As can be seen from the *Phaedo*, his references to it are of a dogmatic, a theoretical order, such as would have been impossible even of any other mystery-religion,<sup>2</sup> not to mention public cults. He does indeed refer slightly to those 'beggars and prophets' who gained a livelihood by performing for pay certain rites supposed to free a man from the results of his ill-doing and claimed to base their practices on the words of Orpheus and Musaeus. Yet he does not imply either that such mendicants were the missionary priests of a sect, or were legitimately making use of real Orphic poems.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato (I) prefaces direct quotations with 'Orpheus says', e. g. *Phil.* 66 c; (2) refers to a παλαιὸς λόγος: e. g. *Laws*, 715 e; (3) speaks more simply still of τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν (*Laws*, 701 c).

<sup>2</sup> So A. E. J. Rawlinson, in a lecture 'Eleusis and the Mysteries' printed in the *Proceedings of the Hellenic Travellers' Club* (1928), can say (p. 32): 'It is not probable that they (i. e. the initiates at Eleusis) were taught any particular doctrine or provided officially with any particular theoretical interpretation of the Mysteries. . . . They were *not* taught what to believe. Ancient pagan religions were not usually credal.' Gercke, on the other hand, believes that Plato may have learnt his Orphism from his youthful experience of the Eleusinian mysteries (*Einleitung in die Aleriumswissenschaft*, 3rd. ed., ii. 395).

<sup>3</sup> *Rep.* ii, 364 b, ff. The passage is usually considered as a *locus classicus* for the work of Orphic priests, and the missionary character of the Orphic sect. It fulfils, I am convinced, neither function. There is no hint in Plato that the quacks have any notion of serving any one but themselves: their only connexion with Orphism is that they appeal to some literature which Plato describes as βίβλων δὲ ὁμαδὸν . . . Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως. It should be remembered that Orpheus in his capacity as general founder of Mysteries had had fathered on to him many religious poems, doubtless of very varying character. When Eleusis and Samothrace claimed Orpheus as the founder of their mysteries and author of their hymns, there is no need to be surprised if wandering quacks did likewise; and there is certainly no need to imply that their teaching or practice was 'Orphic' in any official sense. That some men did practise an 'Orphic life' is true: that some may have done so in local communities is possible: in either case appeal would be made to certain 'works of Orpheus'—though the works might be different in every case: and the interpretation, too. That in these circumstances those who attempted to make money from the foibles or uneasy consciences of their fellows should appeal to the 'works of Orpheus' is very probable. And Plato's own words βίβλων ὁμαδὸν rather make me suspicious that he knew the literature of these quacks to be in every sense of the term spurious. When Gruppe claims (Rosch, *Myth. Lex.* (iii. 1147) 'dass Platon nirgends

They are simply examples of the third of what he considered to be the three chief heresies; that there are no gods: that the gods 'do not care for' mankind: that the gods can be turned from their purpose, that of just retribution, by prayers or sacrifice.<sup>1</sup> The agents in this case he considers as quacks with a private practice, not as the genuine representatives of an important religious movement.

So far as Plato is concerned, therefore, Orphism should be regarded chiefly as a literature: for Plato mentions Orphic books just as Euripides does,<sup>2</sup> he makes definite quotations from Orphic poems, and he speaks of their myths or λόγους. In form, this literature was poetical, being written in hexameter verse. Critics have been much divided in their opinions, when they have considered whether or not the Orphic poems which Plato read were the same as those from which fragments have been preserved for us by the neo-Platonists.<sup>3</sup> The discussion, however, has tended to centre around the direct quotations to be found in the Platonic text: and a large number of passages which, though less directly indebted, are none the less Orphic in their conception and imagery, have not been taken fully into account.

The poem which is principally in question is what is known as the Rhapsodic Theogony, from which the majority of our frag-

das Vorhandensein anderer, von ihm nicht zitierter Orphica andeutet', this phrase might give him pause; and at any rate that Plato did not refer to literature that he had not read is not remarkable: nor can it prove anything.

It is worth observing in conclusion that the whole speech of Adeimantos from which the passage comes is characterized by a definite lack of sympathy with the views and practices he is describing. It is the extravagant and bizarre which he selects for presentation: in reality holding up to ridicule what he pretends to defend; just as if to-day one were to say: 'what an excellent thing to be a Catholic; you can commit a murder one day and be forgiven in the confessional the next, provided you will kiss Peter's toe.'

<sup>1</sup> *Laws*, 885 b ff., 907 b; but the same list is already found in *Rep.* 365 d-e.

<sup>2</sup> *Eur. Hipp.* 953:

Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων

βάκχευε πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοῦς·

<sup>3</sup> See especially O. Kern, *de Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogoniis quaestiones criticae*, Berlin 1888; Gruppe, in xvii. *Supplementband d. Jahrb. f. class. Philol.* (1890); and F. Weber, *Platonische Notizen über Orpheus* (München, 1899).

ments are derived.<sup>1</sup> It is most reasonably to be dated c. 500 B.C.;<sup>2</sup> though much later dates have been assigned to it. It is consequently quite possible that Plato read this poem, for the poem is noticeably uninfluenced by Plato and the later Greek philosophers.<sup>3</sup> Until the history of Orphic literature is better known, however, it is always possible that the literature which Plato knew was an earlier form, and that the later poems incorporated much of the earlier.<sup>4</sup> If so, then the Rhapsodic Theogony will still be a guide, at least in its broad outline (and it is difficult to recover much else from the fragments) as to the Orphic beliefs which Plato learned from his reading. He himself describes well enough the architectonics of such a poem: εἰσὶν ἡμῖν (sc. Ἀθηναίοις) ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι, οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν (sc. τοῖς Κρήσι) οὐκ εἰσὶ δι' ἀρετὴν πολιτείας, ὡς ἐγὼ μανθάνω, οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων, προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολλὴ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠμίλησαν.<sup>5</sup>

The Rhapsodic Theogony begins with the birth of a bi-sexual deity<sup>6</sup> from an egg: from this god Phanes there derive eventually

<sup>1</sup> For the fragments, see the recent collection by O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, Berlin, 1922, nos. 60-235.

<sup>2</sup> This is the dating of Gruppe (Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* iii. 1149) and A. B. Cook (*Zeus*, ii. 2. 1023).

<sup>3</sup> A. B. Cook, loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> This is the opinion of Kern, *Fragmenta*, p. 141: 'quamvis multo ante Neoplatonicorum aetatem factum esse negem, tamen veterum carminum vestigia in eo conservata esse mihi extra omnem dubitationem positum est.'

<sup>5</sup> *Laws*, 886 b-c.

<sup>6</sup> It is probable that the bi-sexual character of Phanes has influenced the Aristophanic account of the origin of love in Plato's *Symposium*. At any rate in one very suggestive particular Phanes resembles the Aristophanic man before he is reshaped after his splitting in half. Plat. *Symp.* 191 b: ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλλην μηχανὴν πορίζεται, καὶ μετατίθῃσιν αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν—τέως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτὸς εἶχον κ.τ.λ.

Compare Suid., s.v. Phanes (= Kern, frg. 80 = Nonn. Abb. ad Gregorii Orat. in Julian. i. 141, n. 78 (Migne, xxxvi. 1028)): περὶ Φάνητος καὶ Ἑρκεπαίου. ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ποιήμασιν εἰσηχέθη τὰ δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα μετὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν· ὧν τὸν Φάνητα εἰσφέρει αἰδοῖον ἔχοντα ὅσιω περὶ τὴν πυγὴν.

The bibliography quoted in Kern, ad. loc., is unfortunately at the moment impossible for me to consult: but it may be worth while suggesting—if this has not already been

the gods of the Greek pantheon. The chief differences from the accepted view which the theogony exhibits are the egg, and the emphasis on Dionysus. Dionysus is one of the many names given to the first deity, Phanes. Zeus, when his turn comes to rule, swallows Phanes, and all else, and fashions a new system of things. He then gives the governance of the world into the hands of a young god, his son Dionysus, called Zagreus. He is torn in pieces by the Titans, and from his remains somehow there is produced a third Dionysus. The Orphic system is also peculiar in so far as it issues in an anthropogony, which is the necessary logical foundation for those eschatological beliefs which Plato has freely used in his myths.

The Orphic was imbued fundamentally with the notion that after death there is a distinction between the fate of the 'righteous' and that of the 'unrighteous', though the connotation of this 'righteousness' was probably vague: moral to some extent,<sup>1</sup> and perhaps (with those who, singly or, it may be, in communities led an 'Orphic life') institutional. This eschatological distinction was necessarily accompanied by that heightened significance of the idea of 'soul', which is characteristic of Orphism. Moreover, since

done—that just as Kern, *de Theogon.* 44, has (if I remember rightly) shown that in the sequel the equivalation of Ἑρικεπαῖος with ὁ πάντας καταπίνων θεός (which the passage questions) is an example of a forced etymology of the difficult title Ericēpaios; so αἰδοῖον ἔχοντα ὀπίσω περὶ τὴν πυγὴν = Phanes, is just such another etymology. Phanes is the 'obvious' deity, who 'exhibits' his privy parts—an interesting addition to the list of the explanations of this name to be found in Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* iii. 2255 f.

It may be observed that just as the swallowing of deities was to be found in the Rhapsodic Theogony, so here, the etymologizing use to which the physical description of the god is put, does not mean that the description was invented *ad hoc*. This too was in the Theogony. It is much too clever to have been invented by any one less than Aristophanes or Rabelais, and in this connexion it is farcical to think of neo-Platonists.

For other Orphic elements in Aristophanes' speech see A. E. Taylor's *Commentary on the Timaeus*, p. 652 ff.

<sup>1</sup> There is a certain amount of moral feeling behind the picture of the three great sinners in *Odyssey*, Bk. XI, and the account of Polygnotus' painting of the underworld in Pausanias, Bk. X. Both of these probably represent Orphic belief. See also O. Kern, *Griechische Mythen der klassischen Zeit* (1927), p. 52 f.

'righteousness' and 'unrighteousness' must both exist potentially somewhere in the human being, the soul was looked upon as divine, deriving from the god Dionysus Zagreus, and the body as evil, deriving from the Titans: for men were born from the ashes of the Titans who, having eaten the young Dionysus Zagreus, were struck by the thunderbolt of Zeus. The soul is the righteous principle. The body is at best an irksome tomb or prison house for the soul: at worst, it becomes its corrupter. Hence the system of transmigration, which, by grading the bodies which the soul inhabited, enabled it ultimately to free itself from all that is bodily, and to achieve re-union with the divine—its privilege in virtue of its origin. Some who lived well, might do so more quickly than others who lived ill.

Such are the main lines of Orphic dogmatics. They must always attract the attention of the modern student of the ancient world, because it is here that he finds conceptions which approach more nearly to the religious feeling of the modern mind than anywhere else in Greek religion. Their originality—their superiority to the rest of Greek religious beliefs—is very largely derived from their realization of the implications in the fundamental concept of 'soul'. In the moral sphere, they recognize the existence of something very like 'sin': in the psychological, it is clear that they must have understood what we mean by temptation: in the metaphysical, the Orphic Zeus is a magnificent pantheistic conception, and 'the divine' in its full significance takes its place in the world-system as creator and sole source: <sup>1</sup> in the religious they introduced the idea of 'redemption', and the realization of the essential kinship between the human being and his god.

Small wonder, therefore, if Plato was attracted by this creed, as it was presented to him in Orphic literature. That group of great dialogues, the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic* are generally admitted to make use of Orphic notions, and to adapt Orphic eschatological pictures into 'myths'. Whatever may have

<sup>1</sup> The Ionic philosophy indeed spoke of gods, but only in a sense in which the word was emptied of its actual and its real meaning.

been the strength of the Pythagorean influence upon him, it is impossible to suppose that the Orphic literature which he read was not itself responsible for his knowledge of Orphic imaginings and his interest in Orphic doctrine. The fact, moreover, that in Plato Orphism is mainly at any rate a *literary* influence, renders unnecessary any theories which posit either Orphic communities in Athens, or actual contact between Plato and any men who may have put into practice an Orphic type of faith.

Plato as a young man had three chief interests. The supreme one must have been artistic and literary: for his dialogues are numerous, and the earlier among them predominantly literary in purpose. Secondly, he must have been developing that theoretical cast of mind that led him to become a professed philosopher. His faculties of analysis, his imagination with its power of synthesis, must have been early operative. Hence the form of his literary work. Having attempted dramas in verse, and having failed (perhaps because he tried to philosophize in them, and realized that, as in Euripides, the philosophy spoilt the drama and the drama hindered the philosophy), he adopted a prose-form and historical personages for his dramas, to enable him to philosophize at ease.<sup>1</sup> Lastly, there must have been present, and to an ever-increasing extent active in him, that zeal for communication through the living word, which made him the first great educationalist.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Some such explanation of the dialogue-form is necessary, over and above the desire Plato may have had to imitate a Socratic conversation, or to get into his writings that spirit of the living word, whose value he so prized. The dialogue was a *literary* form: and reproduces to a surprising extent the stichomythia and the long speeches of tragedy, while the myths may serve as the choric element. W. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, p. 140 f., makes this connexion between the dialogues and the dramatists clear from another point of view.

<sup>2</sup> Windelband-Goedeckemeyer in Müller's *Handbuch*, v. 1 (4th ed.), 115-16: presumes that an interest in philosophic discussion must have been characteristic of Plato before he founded the Academy. Indeed, his friendship for Dion is a case in point. This is important because it shows the background of practical experience which is rationalized into his psychology of learning—his distrust of the written word (*Phaedrus*—e. g. 277 e, f.: 276 a: Ep. 7, 341 c) and his analysis of the ladder of contemplation in the *Symposium*. It was this habit of mind that led him eventually to conceive the Idea

Such a mind would welcome new literature: and—what is more important—would have the faculty of selecting from the Orphic books their kernel of truth, and of putting it to new uses. When Plato has to speak of the psychological aspects of learning—and at such times he *must* be describing and rationalizing *his own experience*—he treats the matter in a fashion strikingly similar in most respects to the treatment of von Hügel: knowledge of realities is ‘not clear, but vivid; not simple, but rich, not readily, irresistibly transferable to other minds, but only acquirable by them through a *slow self-purification* and a humble loving observation’. Such knowledge is ‘fruitful’: ‘it leads us to further knowledge of the realities thus known, or of other realities, even when these lie apparently quite far away.’<sup>1</sup> Plato would have added, that this illumination of other fields of reality by the light of knowledge already acquired, comes as a flash: a spark that kindles the mind.<sup>2</sup> It is the psychology of rational contemplation.

It is not difficult to see how Plato found Orphic teaching ‘fruitful’. The chief driving force of his early philosophic activity was of a political, social character. He was a member of a family of politicians, at a time when other members of that family had helped to make Athenian confusion more confounded. He could not enter political life, because none of the political parties satisfied him in the least.<sup>3</sup> Hence a personal ‘problem’: and hence a vivid realization of the evils of his city. His energies were therefore directed towards an examination of the political virtues—the virtues of a politician: of a citizen: of a state. He travelled in order to gain comparative social knowledge, to see how different men administered different of the Good. The facts, therefore, show a man with a not unmystical frame of mind, who might well be attracted by religious thought of a high order.

<sup>1</sup> *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, 1st Series, p. 100, § 2, of ‘Preliminaries to Religious Belief’.

<sup>2</sup> ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζήν, ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει. *Ep.* 7, 341 c. The same sudden character of ‘illumination’ is emphasized in *Symposium*, 210 c: *Ep.* 7, 344 b.

<sup>3</sup> The most important text is *Epistle* 7.

constitutions. His questionings crystallized under the prevailing influences of his day, such as sophistry and rhetoric, into an ethical form. He attempted to analyse logically the nature of the ethical conceptions of his age. His aim was still political,<sup>1</sup> but the personal aspect of the matter appealed to him, and he wished to find out what virtue was, and what the parts of virtue, justice, courage, and the rest. At first the *external* nature of his ethical thought is very marked. The virtues are not discussed from the subjective standpoint. There is no psychology, such as would have been a necessary preliminary to such a treatment. It is virtue in action rather than in the soul which he conceives of: and the only directing energy is an externalized knowledge—a rational analysis of situations as they arise. This is not the method of later works, like the *Republic*. There, a full psychological scheme is found, and the virtues, both in the individual and in the state, are seen as the results of the interplay of the various component elements of character or soul. Between the two conceptions stands the *Phaedo*, with its discussion of the soul's immortality, and the *Symposium* with its description of the soul's activity as a receptive and contemplative organ, the object of whose inquiries is a supra-cosmic entity that is 'beauty by itself' and that dominates all that is beautiful.<sup>2</sup>

This richer, fuller conception of soul, which intrudes itself into

<sup>1</sup> Constantin Ritter stresses the same idea with reference to the *Journeys: Platon* i. 98 ff. 'Der sittlich politische Zweck, was er draussen erlebte und lernte, anderen Menschen und am liebsten eben seinen Mitbürgern zu Nutz zu machen, stand gewiss von Anfang an für ihn im Vordergrund.' That this was his aim in the early dialogues also, in so far as they are philosophical, and not merely 'porträtierende Szenen in Prosa'. (Hoffmann, *Anhang zu Zellers Philosophie d. Griechen*, 2nd vol., 1st pt. (5th ed.), p. 1058), is my conviction. Überweg-Praechter, indeed (12th ed. 1926, p. 239) roundly denies this in so many words: but the view that sees in the earlier dialogues merely *logical* discussion with ethical examples 'ohne Stellungnahme zu den grossen praktischen Fragen der Gegenwart' has been led sadly astray, probably as a result of the Socratic problem with its Socrates who seeks to define. Plato's work cannot begin with abstract thought on subjects in which he is not principally interested.

<sup>2</sup> Ritter, *Platon*, i. 529, notes that the *Symposium* is remarkable as showing for the first time Plato's interest in psychology.

the Platonic scheme of things, brings with it as concomitant another innovation: a literary form, the myth, which serves the dialogue as choruses serve a tragedy by giving the author an opportunity of expressing poetically and *sub specie aeternitatis* the subjects of the action. That this conception of soul as the essential part of man, and its concomitant, the myth, are tinged deep in the Platonic presentation with Orphic belief and Orphic expression, is generally admitted. Orphic too in its machinery is the explanation of learning as a memory of things seen by the soul before it came into the world: <sup>1</sup> for as the South Italian grave-tablets have made abundantly clear, the Orphic system entailed a spring of memory and of forgetfulness.<sup>2</sup> On its entry into heaven the soul must drink of memory, that it may find itself at home in the country of its birth: in the Platonic myth of Er, the soul, on its incorporation in a new body, must drink of the spring of forgetfulness, lest it remember all it has seen. Some drink more, and some drink less:<sup>3</sup> but those who drink too deep, cannot even be reminded of the verities of that celestial region they have left.

The content of the heavenly vision was therefore to Plato true knowledge: and the theory of ideas is the ontological counterpart of this epistemology. The theory of ideas, however, was in its inception probably not motivated by direct desire for a metaphysic of being or knowledge, but by the self-same social outlook which was chiefly responsible for Plato's early philosophy. 'Dazu kam er durch einen logischen Prozess, aber das Ziel war der Inhalt, denn um die Moral, die praktische Tugend war es ihm ja zu tun.'<sup>4</sup> Somehow—and the manner of it is a mystery, for it was the prime stroke of the Platonic genius—Plato discovered his virtues pre-existent in a supra-celestial heaven: and he found that the visible

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, p. 43, and ind. s.v. Reminiscence.

<sup>2</sup> For the tablets, see the edition of Olivieri in Lietzmanns *Kleine Texte*, i, no. 133 (Bonn, 1915).

<sup>3</sup> This detail, which is logically necessary to complete the 'theory of Reminiscence', is taken from *Rep.* 621 a.

<sup>4</sup> Wilam.-Moell., *Platon*, i. 346.

world of sense and the inner world of thought were all dependent on this higher realm of the things that really are.

To connect the Platonic philosophy of Ideas in any essential way with Orphism has been entirely out of fashion since neo-Platonist times. The later neo-Platonists, in the interest of their mysticism and their schemes of systematization, were wont to explain the Platonic philosophy in terms of certain Orphic poems, and vice versa; and in both they found more or less allegorically expressed some abstruse doctrines of their own invention. Yet their excesses need not necessarily be supposed to be entirely detrimental to their thesis. Rather, a conservative criticism should find food for thought in the neo-Platonist approximation of Orphism to Platonism; if such an approximation was possible for many scholars<sup>1</sup> who had the Orphic poems before them,<sup>2</sup> it is clear that the approximation had some degree of plausibility, and did not rest entirely on irresponsible allegorical interpretations.

It is difficult to determine how much of the theory of reminiscence most explicitly stated in the *Meno* is meant to be taken as myth or *au pied de la lettre*.<sup>3</sup> However that may be, the theory was fully incorporated into his mythology. For Plato it was really true that the soul finds its goal, which is knowledge, by sloughing off the body. Naturally, therefore, room must be found, at least in the heaven of Platonic philosophy, for that Beauty which in the *Symposium* is the object of search for the human soul: and the disincorporated soul must be allowed glimpses of the true knowledge, which in its next incorporation, granted that it does not drink too deeply of the Lethean spring, will be to it as a forgotten dream to be recalled in part by experience and right education, to be kindled into flame by the leaping spark of intuitive apprehension. In other

<sup>1</sup> E. Bréhier: Plotin, *Ennéades* I (Paris, 1924): Introd., p. xxviii f., for the academic character of neo-Platonic philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the neo-Platonist works on the Rhapsodic Theogony, see Rohde, *Psyche*, Appendix IX (Eng. trans., p. 596 f.) and O. Kern, *Orpheus*, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> C. Ritter considers it essentially mythical (in the Platonic sense): see e. g. *Platon*, i. 572 ff., 576; ii. 54-5, 298. Like all the Platonic myths it is to be regarded as 'bloss zum Schmuck der Wahrheit verwertbare Rhetorik'.

words, the soul of ordinary religious perception, was translated by the Platonic rationalization into terms of intellect, and the eschatological conception of the soul's existence after death became for Plato a mythical, if not an actual, explanation of the phenomena of mind.<sup>1</sup> The question remains, therefore, since the Platonic conception of soul was largely a rationalization of the Orphic presentation—a rationalization which he has adequately recognized by the Orphic colouring of his mythology—was the Platonic conception of the objects of the soul's knowledge, the Ideas, influenced at all by Orphic conceptions? The Ideas (as is evidenced at once by the earlier Platonic dialogues, and by that school of Platonic criticism which, basing itself on Aristotle, talks of the reification of concepts) are apprehended most easily by the human mind as abstracts, about the kind of whose existence Plato was much concerned. With this thought in mind, it is at least striking to find that in the Orphic theology there were many 'abstractions'. It is not indeed in the details of Orphic eschatology that these are to be found in an obvious guise, but in the Orphic Theogony and Cosmogony.

Phanes, the bi-sexual deity who was born from the egg and who contained in himself the seeds of all that is, begat Nyx (Night), and

<sup>1</sup> *Phaedrus*, 246 d-e, for the idea in semi-mythological terms: πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα ἢ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ, κεκοινώνηκε δὲ πη μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον· τούτοις δὲ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. I believe that the conception of the soul as a winged creature is in itself near allied at any rate to Orphism. The Orphic tablets of S. Italy have

κύκλο <υ> δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλείοι :

and in the details of S. Italian and Adriatic local beliefs (which have not yet been adequately considered as the background of these tablets in particular and of Orphism and Pythagoreanism in general) birds representing souls are to be found. (a) Companions of Diomedes are so metamorphosed, and exhibit exactly the same *tameness* as is characteristic of certain animals in sacred groves in S. Italian belief—e. g., in the grove on the Lacinian promontory; (b) *Μελεαγρίδες* are evidenced for the Adriatic by Strabo 5, § 215: see Rosch. *Myth. Lex.*, Sp. 2588; (c) the Veneti had a cult of birds, Theopompus in Antig. Car. clxxiii, Keller (*Rerum Naturalium Scriptores*, Teubner, 1877). See M. Mayer, *Apulien* (Teubner, 1914), p. 385; (d) the bird-motif is prominent in Euripides *Hipp.* chorus which probably represents Adriatic mythology (*Hipp.* 732 ff.).

by her, Gê (Earth) and Ouranos (Heaven), Rhea and Cronos, Hera and Zeus. Zeus eventually becomes in his turn Demiurge, swallows Phanes, and within him are fashioned the rest of the gods. For the coarse machinery of the later part of this evolutionary sketch, it is impossible to suppose that Plato had any great liking. 'For the existence of such gods as could be the theme of a "chronique scandaleuse" he held no brief.'<sup>1</sup> But in a passage of Hermias' commentary on the *Phaedrus* there is some account of the state of the divine system while Zeus was still young. The passage is a commentary on *Phaedrus* 248c, (θεσμός τε Ἀδραστέας ὅδε), and describes Adrasteia as ἡ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν νόμων τὰ μέτρα ἐνιαίως ἐν ἑαυτῇ συλλάβουσα καὶ συνέχουσα. She is the daughter of Melissos and Amaltheia, and has a sister Eidê or Idê. After giving forced etymologies for the names of Adrasteia and her parents, the passage continues: διὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἄντρου τῆς Νυκτὸς ἡχεῖν λέγεται·

παλάμῃσι δὲ χάλκεα ῥόπτρα  
δῶκεν Ἀδρηστεία.

ἐν τοῖς προθύροις γὰρ τοῦ ἄντρου τῆς Νυκτὸς ἡχεῖν λέγεται τοῖς κυβάλοις, ἵνα πάντα αὐτῆς τῶν νόμων κατήκοα γένηται. ἔνδον μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ τῆς Νυκτὸς κάθηται ὁ Φάνης· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἡ Νύξ μαντεύουσα τοῖς θεοῖς· ἡ δὲ Ἀδράστεια ἐν τοῖς προθύροις πᾶσι νομοθέτουσα τοὺς θεῖους θεσμούς. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ Δίκης ὡς νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐκεῖ Δίκη θυγάτηρ λέγεται τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ Εὐσεβείας, αὕτη δὲ ἡ Ἀδράστεια ἐκ Μελίσσου καὶ Ἀμαλθείας οὖσα (i. e. according to previous etymologies of Melissos and Amaltheia, Adrasteia is the personification of τῆς προνοίας τῆς ἀκλινοῦς) περιεκτικὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ Νόμου. αὗται δὲ καὶ λέγονται τρέφειν τὸν Δία ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ τῆς Νυκτὸς κ.τ.λ. From the point of view of the searcher after origins, this account is interesting chiefly because of its connexions with the early religion of Crete, which has lately been brought into such prominence by the archaeologist. Melissos, Amaltheia, Idê, are originally Cretan figures: so is Zeus in the guise of a child who must be nursed; and it is impossible to dissociate the cave and the nursing from the cave-sanctuaries of Crete, and

<sup>1</sup> C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology* (Oxford, 1925), p. 87.

their ritual which is unfortunately all too little known. From another point of view, however, it is both expedient and legitimate to forget these origins; for whatever sources the Orphic theogony drew upon, it certainly reshaped them to fit its own purposes. A closer view of the system which this poem imposed upon its deities, urges one primarily to consider what is meant by the commentator's phrase which he uses when introducing Adrasteia: ἡ δὲ Ἀδράστεια μία ἐστὶ καὶ αὕτη θεὸς τῶν μενουσῶν ἐν τῇ Νυκτί.

With Adrasteia must be closely connected ἡ ἐκεῖ Δίκη and τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ ἐκεῖ. The poet seems to have had in mind a group of deities, closely connected with Nyx, and in some way separated from the other deities. Adrasteia stands at the entrance to the cave in order to attract the attention of the other gods to her orders—a conception more fully expressed in Proclus:<sup>1</sup> παρ' Ὀρφεί δὲ καὶ φρουρεῖν λέγεται (sc. Adrasteia) τὸν ὅλον δημιουργόν, καὶ

χάλκεα ῥόπτρα λαβοῦσα  
καὶ τύπανον † αἰγῆκες,

οὕτως ἡχεῖν ὥστε πάντας ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς αὐτὴν τοὺς θεούς. So Nyx herself acts to the outside deities as the prophetess of Phanes, whom the darkness of her cave enshrines. It would seem probable therefore that Dikê and Nomos too, in view of their connexion with Adrasteia, both in Hermias' words (who said they were 'there'), and also in their significance—for they clearly must have some part in the imposition upon the outside world of that order which it was the function of Adrasteia to announce—were considered as normally resident in the cave: the assistants presumably of Night in her duties as intermediary between the gods and Phanes. Nor can Eusebeia, the wife of Nomos and mother of Dikê, be separated from them. Hence a certain schematization of the divine world. Phanes, the source of all that is, exists enshrouded by Night, who with the help of Adrasteia, Dikê, Nomos, and Eusebeia conveys the will of Phanes to the lower, third grade of divinities. In some verses

<sup>1</sup> *Theolog. Plat.* iv. 6, p. 206/4=Kern, frg. 152.

quoted elsewhere by Hermias<sup>1</sup> it is the same impression of three ranks of divinities that is given:

Πρωτόγονόν (i. e. Φάνητα) γε μὲν οὐτις ἐσέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν,  
εἰ μὴ Νυξ ἱερὴ μούνη· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι ἅπαντες  
θαύμαζον καθορῶντες ἐν αἰθέρι φέγγος ἀελπτον  
τοῖον ἀπέστραπτε χροὸς ἀθανάτοιο Φάνητος.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible to fix the cosmic position of this cavern of Night more closely. Proclus speaks of an *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* . . . *ὡς δ' ἂν οἱ Ὀρφικοὶ φαίεν, ἄνωθεν μὲν ὀριζόμενος τῷ Αἰθέρι, κάτωθεν δὲ τῷ Φάνητι—*

<sup>1</sup> In *Plat. Phaedr.* 247 c, p. 148/5 = Kern, frg. 86.

<sup>2</sup> It might be possible to trace an original Cretan influence in the second half of this fragment: for fire was said to issue from the cavern at the birth of Zeus every year—Anton. Lib. 19: ἐν δὲ χρόνῳ ἀφωρισμένῳ ὁρᾶται καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος πλεῖστον ἐκλάμπον ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου πῦρ. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεσθαι μυθολογοῦσιν ὅταν ἐκξῇ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως αἷμα. Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (1926), i. 143–4: see also p. 70), compares a detail of the Eleusinian mysteries, and comments: 'der göttliche Knabe erstrahlt im reinen Glanze des Feuers, das von der ewigen Sonne stammt.' I would also compare Aristotle, *Mir. ausc.* 122, where it is said of a temple of Dionysus at Thracian Kras-tonia that at the (? yearly) festival, ὅταν μὲν ὁ θεὸς ἐνετηρίαν μέλλῃ ποιεῖν, ἐπιφαίνεσθαι μέγα σέλας πυρός, καὶ τοῦτο πάντας ὁρᾶν τοὺς περὶ τὸ τέμενος διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δ' ἀκαρπίαν, μὴ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἐπέχειν τὸν τόπον ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας. This is an interesting passage in so far as it provides a close parallel with the Eleusinian fire, which was also part of a festival connected with the fruits of the earth. The transfer of the story from Zeus to Dionysus is easier than might appear: for Dionysus, especially in Thrace, was probably in some sense a younger Zeus (see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 271 ff.). So in the Orphic rhapsody he sits on the throne of his father, though still a child, and wields the lightning, the thunder, and the rain. On a vase-painting we see him standing on his father's knee wielding two torches: Zeus holds the sceptre and the thunder-bolt, while Hera expostulates before him (see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 273, note 3 for bibliography). Dionysus is here termed ΔΙΟΣ ΦΩΣ and although Kretschmer turned down the interpretation 'Light of Zeus' as being too poetical, it is easy to see, in view of the evidence quoted above, how such an appellation could be given to the young Dionysus (in this form in the Orphic cosmogony he never grows old), especially as he holds torches in his hands. In fact, the vase-painting would seem to be directly descriptive of the Orphic conception of the young Dionysus-Zagreus (though he has not the horns which Nonnus gives him) and his connexion with his father. The expostulatory attitude of Hera is also corroborative: for it was she who eventually caused the Titans to dismember the child.

πάντα γὰρ τὰ μεταξύ τούτων συμπληροῦ τὸν νοητὸν διάκοσμον.<sup>1</sup> What place is it that is the supercelestial heaven, between Phanes and Aither? Damascius gives us the information that Night was beyond the Aether: Ὁρφεὺς Νύκτα αὐτὴν (sc. τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν) προσηγόρευεν ὡς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐμφανῆ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐκείνου μαρμαρυγὴν.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the same conception is found in another account,<sup>3</sup> which may be derived from the same poem as the above fragments:<sup>4</sup> Phanes sprang from the egg, and thereby set the world in motion: αὐτὸς δὲ ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἀκρωρείας οὐρανοῦ προκαθέζεται καὶ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις τὸν ἄπειρον περιλάμπει αἰῶνα. So the robe of Night in the seventh Orphic hymn is braided with the stars:

αὐγάζοντες αἰεὶ Νυκτὸς ζοφοειδέα πέπλον,  
μαρμαρυγαῖς στίλβοντες.

The main conception behind these fragments seems to be that of an intense divine light Phanes hidden by darkness out beyond the stars. The light is bound up with the Universe: it is the source of things, the active primal Demiurge:

ταῦτα πατὴρ ποίησε κατὰ σπέος ἡεροειδές,<sup>5</sup>

and the rest of the theogony and anthropogony that follows seems to be chiefly concerned to elucidate the intimate connexions of Phanes with gods and men alike. Such seems to be the chief reason for the crude metaphor whereby Zeus swallows Phanes before he can reshape the Universe, beget Dionysus the new world-ruler, and so lead on to the creation of men. And yet, for all its crudities, and in spite of the difference, as it were, in religious temperature

<sup>1</sup> *In Plat. Crat.* 396 b, c.; p. 60/26 Pasquali = Kern, frg. 90.

<sup>2</sup> *De Princ.* ii. 13 = Kern, frg. 100.

<sup>3</sup> Apion *ap. Clem. Roman. Homil.* vi. 6 (ii. 202 Migne) = Kern, frg. 56.

<sup>4</sup> O. Gruppe, in Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* iii. 2253/46 ff., claims that Abel had not sufficient grounds for including this fragment as part of the Theogony of Hieronymus and Hellanicus, since in matter it agrees just as well with the Rhapsodic Theogony from which the above account has been taken.

<sup>5</sup> Orphic frg. 97, Kern.

between then and now, there are many analogies in modern mystics to the conception of Phanes and Night.

There is in God (some say)  
A deep, but dazzling darkness; as men here  
Say it is late and dusky, because they  
See not all clear;  
O for that Night! where I in Him  
Might live invisible and dim.

It is in this supercelestial heaven that these 'abstract' divinities, Dikê, Nomos, Eusebeia, have their being, along with Adrasteia and the rest.<sup>1</sup> Such deities as these would be most easily explained to a modern mind, removed from the religious context in which they took their place, as real abstractions personified into deities by the inventive mind of an individual or a people. Yet the sailing is not quite so plain as this. Some of these 'abstractions' and 'personifications' seem to be too highly personified and too deeply rooted in popular cult ever to have started life in such a fashion. Rather, it was left for a later and rationalizing age so to interpret them. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff is surely right when he insists that in such conceptions as Nikê or Erôs there was present in the Greek consciousness no process of hypostatization, but rather the unreasoned recognition of forces superior to mankind that must, because they are superior, be due to the exercise of divine power, an exercise which necessitates a divinity.<sup>2</sup> Hence such sentiments as

<sup>1</sup> It is possible indeed that there were more inhabitants in the cave of Night, if it is true that Claudian *de Consul. Stilichon.*, ii. 426 ff., was written in imitation of an Orphic source. See Dieterich, *Nekyia*, 159, note 1: with the note ad loc. in the Nachträge.

<sup>2</sup> Wil.-Moell. *Platon*, i. 348 f. Wilamowitz uses this Greek attitude of mind very effectively to explain what he considers to be Plato's conception of the Ideas.

O. Gruppe in Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* iii. 2262/40 ff., in acknowledging the 'abstract' character of many Orphic deities (e. g. Chronos and Chaos) is influenced in his explanation of this by his view of the early Orphic poems as consciously semi-philosophical. 'Der Dichter des Mythos betrachtet nämlich nicht allein alles Wirkende, sondern überhaupt alles Wirkliche als Materiell, und da alle Abstraktionen und auch die Denk- und Anschauungsformen auf diese Stufe natürlich als real angenommen werden, so werden auch sie körperlich vorgestellt.' In this, there is much to remind one of the traditional view of the Ideal Theory.

δικαιοσύνας τὸ χρύσειον πρόσωπον,  
οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑφός οὕτω  
θαυμαστός.<sup>1</sup>

Hence too, perhaps, may be derived in some measure the Platonic Ideas—Ideas which are separate from things and from mind, and which are nevertheless not adequately to be explained as 'reified concepts'; for in very truth the reification of concepts is a step before which even the most hardy of rebellious and heretical minds would pause.<sup>2</sup>

So natural indeed was it to the Greek mind to recognize the influence of divinities when he thought of abstract concepts, such as Justice and Law, that even concrete elements were often considered under the guise of deities. For Empedocles, Fire was Zeus, and Earth was Hera,<sup>3</sup> while his deity for water, Nestis, 'the Limpid One',<sup>4</sup> is very instructive apropos of these 'personifications'. Photius and Eustathius describe her as a Sicel goddess who may therefore be supposed to have had an actual existence in

<sup>1</sup> Eur. frag. 486, as once restored by Meineke; see Nauck, ad loc.

<sup>2</sup> When Aristotle says (*Met. M.* iv. 1078 b., 30 ff.) ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· οἱ δὲ ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν κ.τ.λ. he is not giving a simple historical statement of fact, but an *interpretation* of the facts from the point of view of a critical historian of philosophy. He does not mean to say that Plato considered 'universals' as 'universals' in contradistinction to particulars, and having consciously so recognized them, proceeded consciously to hypostatize them; he simply means that (for one who has grasped the notion of 'universals' *qua* universals) that is what Plato in the theory of Ideas is actually seen to have done, unconsciously. Aristotle's words are themselves a criticism: not a simple statement of fact. It has nothing to do with the origin of the doctrine of Ideas: it is a criticism of that doctrine in its final form—a criticism which, by a convenient contrast, brings into high relief the peculiarity and essential nature of the ideal theory as Aristotle conceived it.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. Laert. viii. 76: ἐδόκει δ' αὐτῷ τάδε· στοιχεῖα μὲν εἶναι τέτταρα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἀέρα· Φιλίαν τε ἢ συγκρίνεται καὶ Νείκος ᾧ διακρίνεται. φησὶ δ' οὕτω·

Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρῃ τε φερέσβιος ἦδ' Ἀἰδωνεύς,  
Νῆστις θ' ἢ δακρυοῖς τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

Δία μὲν τὸ πῦρ λέγων, Ἥρην δὲ τὴν γῆν, Ἀἰδωνέα δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, Νῆστιν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ.

<sup>4</sup> See Preller-Robert, *Gr. Myth.* i. 2. 555, note 1: from *nāw*, *nāros*, parallel to *Nηρεύς*.

cult.<sup>1</sup> Certainly in the case of another goddess, Lagesis, whom Photius and Hesychius<sup>2</sup> describe also in just the same way as a Sicel goddess, such a cult existence is proved in South Italy by a local inscription.<sup>3</sup> Kretschmer convincingly equivalates Lagesis with Lachesis. She is the goddess of men's 'lot', and found her place in Orphic eschatology, which shows many traces of South Italian influence. Nestis, Lachesis, Dikê, are all 'personifications':<sup>4</sup> and just as Lachesis was not a mere personification but a very real divine personality, so were the goddesses of the Moist and the Just.<sup>5</sup>

A new concept requires a new deity. Where possible, as can be seen from Empedocles, an existing cult-deity was adapted: where not, a name must be coined for the new divinity—a name which will naturally be 'abstract' on occasion, like Empedocles' Philia and Neikos for the forces of Attraction and Repulsion. In either case, the deity is not a mere personification of the concept, but a 'real existent', because the ordinary religious sentiment of Greece instinctively thought of a real divinity acting as lord over the force or element in question.

There were many other 'abstractions' in Orphic theology. Erôs,

<sup>1</sup> Phot. *Lex.* 299/11; Eustath. *ad Il.* 1180/14.

<sup>2</sup> Phot. *Lex.* 201/10; Hesych., s.v.

<sup>3</sup> For a full treatment see P. Kretschmer, 'Messapische Göttinnen', *Glotta*, xii. 278 ff. The inscription gives *logetibas*, a dat. pl. of Mess. *logetis* = *lagesis* = *lachesis*. To explain the plural form, Kretschmer relies on *Od.* vii. 197: pl. *Κλώθες* = all the Fates. There is a Spartan inscr., however, (*C. I. Gr.* 1444) which contains *Μοίραι Λαχεσεις*, so bearing out his thesis. It is interesting to note also that several interpreters of an Orphic (?) tablet found at Thurii have adopted *vñstus* as a reading; if this is correct, it shows that the word was at least used in S. Italy, whatever the sense. (See A. Olivieri, *Lamellae Aureae Orphicae* (1915), pp. 22 ff.)

<sup>4</sup> It is possible that many of the *names* of Greek gods and goddesses may be abstract, or semi-abstract, in form because of the necessity of translating the names of pre-Greek deities into another language. In some cases, e. g. Rhadamanthys, they were more or less transliterated: in others doubtless they were described in terms of function—'the limpid one', and so forth. This is a line of interpretation which I believe to be most important for Greek Religion, but unfortunately, until the nature of pre-Greek religion is better known, it is impossible to apply it fruitfully.

<sup>5</sup> For a similar argument about Nemesis, see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 273 ff.

the earlier name for the primal divinity, the First-born, who was sprung from an egg. What personified Love was ever born from an egg? Night, too, the first offspring of Erôs; she is his mouth-piece, and adviser in chief to all the gods. Eunomia, Eirene, Euphrosune are to be found: and Themis, who is connected with Dikê in the story of how the sophist Anaxarchos soothed the grief of Alexander after his murder of Cleitos: οὐκ οἶσθα, εἶπεν (sc. Ἀνάξαρχος) ὅτι τὴν Δίκην ἔχει πάρεδρον ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ τὴν Θέμιν, ἵνα πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θεμιτὸν ᾖ καὶ δίκαιον;<sup>1</sup> This figure of Dikê may well be brought to the fore in any discussion of Platonism. Justice was one of the social virtues which his early political experience made him most anxious to understand: and to its study he devoted his finest dialogue.

It is interesting to find, therefore, that Plato was probably familiar with the goddess in her Orphic guise. In the *Laws*, at any rate, he speaks of her with a reference to the 'old tale' which he customarily uses when referring to Orphic beliefs: ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός κ.τ.λ.<sup>2</sup> In this passage, it is not merely ὁ θεός who is described in Orphic terms,<sup>3</sup> but Dikê too. Nor is it merely the adaptation of a line from the Orphic Rhapsody

τῷ δὲ Δίκῃ πολύποινος ἐφέσπετο πᾶσιν ἀρωγός<sup>4</sup>

which is important: but the whole conception of Δίκη as closely allied with Zeus in his work of regulating the world. Νόμος too must be included: for Proclus twice connects these three with reference to the Orphic Rhapsody: ἐπειδὴπερ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου Δίκη συνέπεται τῷ Δίῳ (πάρεδρος γὰρ ὁ Νόμος τοῦ Διός, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ὀρφεύς): and, with direct reference to this very passage of the *Laws*: καὶ τὸν Νόμον αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ Δίῳ) συγκαθιδρύων, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ὀρφεύς. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 52: cf. the shorter and more sober account of Arrian, *Anab.* iv. 9. 7, where Themis is omitted.

<sup>2</sup> Plat. *Laws*, iv. 715 e.

<sup>3</sup> See the scholiast ad loc., and the other material collected in Kern, frg. 21 and 21 a.

<sup>4</sup> F. M. Cornford in Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 2. 1033, note 1.

ὑποθήκας τῆς Νυκτὸς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνῳ πάρεδρον ποίεται τὸν Νόμον· ἔτι δὲ τὴν Δίκην ὅλην ὁπαδὸν αὐτοῦ τιθέμενος ἐν Νόμοις (loc. cit., *supra*), ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος.<sup>1</sup> The piece of information which Proclus gives, that it was in accordance with the precepts of Nyx that Zeus made Dikê and Nomos his followers, gives a very definite reference to the place in the Rhapsodic Theogony where this collocation of gods was found. It must have closely succeeded the picture of the cave of Night and the conception of Night as the mouthpiece of Phanes directing the young Zeus how to order the world: for Hermias, as has been shown above, mentions all these deities together with reference to that picture. Nor is Plato the only Greek author who seems to have been influenced by the passage. It has already been shown that the historians of Alexander knew of it. In the first speech against Aristogeiton in the Demosthenic corpus—a speech which, though not written by Demosthenes, is probably not to be dated more than half a century later than Plato's death<sup>2</sup>—the same metaphor of Dikê seated on the throne of Zeus is used and referred to Orpheus by name: καὶ τὴν ἀπαραίτητον καὶ σεμνὴν Δίκην, ἣν ὁ τὰς ἀγνώτατας ἡμῖν τελετὰς<sup>3</sup> καταδείξας Ὀρφεὺς παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς θρόνον φησὶ καθημένην πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφορᾶν.

<sup>1</sup> Kern, frg. 160.

<sup>2</sup> Maass, *Orpheus*, p. 197: Maass asserts that the pseudo-Demosthenes passage is derived from the Orphic hymn to Dikê still extant (no. 62 in the corpus). This can scarcely be the case, even if O. Kern is right in contending that Plat. *Rep.* ii. 364 e βιβλων δὲ ὁμαδὸν . . . καθ' ἧς θυηπολοῦσι necessitates the idea of hymns sung at sacrifices—in which case Orphic hymns must have been known in the form in which we now possess them, in the 4th cent. B.C. (*Hermes*, lii. 1917, 149–50). The characteristic *πάρεδρος*—a word which occurs in Sophocles (see below), Arrian, Plutarch, Plotinus, as well as twice in Proclus—cannot be accidental in this connexion, but necessitates a common 'source' which employed the word; and this is not to be found in the hymn. The consistent use of this word likewise makes it impossible to regard all these examples as simply imitations of the Hesiodic

Δίκη . . .

αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθηζομένη Κρονίωνι

(*Works and Days*, 256, 259). See Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 396.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to the Eleusinian mysteries: see the beginning of the parabasis in the *Birds* of Aristophanes.

The same reference, containing the same word as was used by Proclus, Plutarch, and Arrian, *πάρεδρος*, is finally found in Sophocles and Plotinus.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Orphic poetry spoke of *ὁ θεῖος νόμος* just as Plato does in the *Laws*:

φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε, βέβηλοι,  
φεύγοντες δίκαιων θεσμούς, θεῖοιο τεθέντος  
πᾶσι νόμου.<sup>2</sup>

Fully in accordance with this evidence, Plato speaks of *Adrasteia* twice, and so does pseudo-Demosthenes in an Orphic context;<sup>3</sup> and *Adrasteia* is in the Orphic poem part of the same scheme as *Dikē* and *Nomos*. Lastly, it is probable that in the closing words of Plato's unfinished dialogue, the *Critias*, there may be a hint of the same Orphic picture.

A consideration of this evidence leads to the conclusion that Plato knew the passage of the Orphic Rhapsody in question. It was certainly known by pseudo-Demosthenes and the Alexander historians not many years later: and probably by Sophocles before Plato's day.<sup>4</sup> If this be the case, the similarity between the Orphic deity *Δίκη* and the Platonic Ideas is sufficiently striking. She is a self-existent Justice, outside the universe. She took a leading part in the regulation of the world, and left her traces everywhere within

<sup>1</sup> Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1381:

εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος  
*Δίκη*, ξύνεδρος *Ζηνὸς* ἀρχαίοις νόμοις

Plotin. *Ennead.* v. 8. 4: καὶ ἡ αὐτοεπιστήμη ἐνταῦθα *πάρεδρος* τῷ νῷ τῷ συμπροφαίνεσθαι, οἷον λέγουσι κατὰ μίμησιν καὶ τῷ *Διὶ τὴν Δίκην*. It is of course quite possible that Plotinus had not taken the figure from the Rhapsody itself: but at least he is taking it from some one who in his turn was familiar with the general wording, as the presence of *πάρεδρος* shows: nor can this have been Sophocles (as H. F. Müller argues in *Hermes*, lii. 1917, 151, without adducing the other references), because that author seems to have changed the expression to suit his line.

<sup>2</sup> Kern, frg. 247.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. *Phaedr.* 248 c; *Rep.* 451 a; [Dem.] *Or.* XXV. § 37.

<sup>4</sup> It is impossible here to enter into the discussion as to the date of the Orphic Rhapsody: nor is it really essential, for Plato may have derived his knowledge from an earlier Orphic source, though the circumstantial evidence does not to my mind point in this direction.

it—in fact, she is one of the principles of the world order. Around her are Nomos, Eusebeia, and Themis, and in the same heaven exist other ‘personifications’ of the virtues. The question inevitably forces itself forward: if Plato read of this system and understood it, may it not have seemed to him, as he struggled to comprehend the nature of the ‘abstract’ ideas or ideals of ethics and their relations to particulars, that here in the ‘old book’ was some fiction but much truth? If indeed, ‘the primary aim of the Platonic theory of Forms or “Ideas” is to provide for the inner world a law to save the individual will from the nightmare of unlimited freedom’: and if, in consequence, ‘Justice and the other moral conceptions . . . must be eternal objects, to be known by thought, though not by sense’<sup>1</sup>: these Orphic deities would seem to be particularly pertinent to the needs of his spiritual interpretation of the Universe. Suspicion becomes more certain with the realization that in the magnificent machinery of metaphor which must for ever veil Plato’s thought on the Idea of the Good—the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή of the whole teleological universe—there are striking resemblances to the very picture of the cave of Night which is the background to the figure of Dikê. The only place in which Plato speaks in his dialogues of the Idea of the Good as such, is at the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh books of the Republic. The pictorial imagery of the passage is governed by one conception, that of light shrouded in darkness. It is a conception which on the one hand is closely connected with the intuitive *spark* of enlightenment which illumines the mind of the patient searcher after that ultimate knowledge which is the key to the universe,<sup>2</sup> and on the other cannot well be dissociated from the worship of the sun in the religious scheme which in the tenth book of the Laws Plato propounds as the state religion of the second city of his dreams.<sup>3</sup> Indeed it has long been realized that behind the simile of the sun in the sixth book of the Republic there was a religious feeling of some strength. ‘Im Son-nengleichnis ist die Idee der Ideen ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, ein nicht

<sup>1</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, vol. vi, p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Leg.* x. 899 a., cf. xii. 950 d.

nur Meta-Logisches, sondern Meta-Ontisches (eine Vorstellung, die wahrscheinlich letzten Endes angelehnt ist an uraltes, mythisches Denken, dem die Sonne als einziges Urzeugendes im Gegensatz zu allem Gezeugten stand).<sup>1</sup> This feeling of the commentators lends force to the supposition that Plato had in mind the picture from Orphic literature that has been described above.

One definite point of similarity between the two accounts is, not so much the presence of a cave in both—though, in a passage where thought is consciously rendered in pictorial imagery, that is much—but the darkness which shrouds the light of the Highest from the gaze of lesser mortals. In the Orphic poem not even the gods can bear to gaze on the light of Phanes, and he is hidden in his cavern of Night beyond the stars: ‘as it were on the topmost peak of heaven.’ So in Plato, it is only after the philosophic soul has climbed the steep ascent through the cavern of darkness, and accustomed his eyes to look upon the other occupants of the supracosmic place, that it may ultimately gaze on the light of the Sun which is the Good, ‘beyond the realm of Being’. It is the memory of this Light that enables the philosopher to order the affairs of men: just as it is the commands of Phanes mediated through Night that enables Zeus with the help of Dikê and the rest to order the universe. This is the divine counterpart of the doctrine of Reminiscence which appears here too, and which in all its forms is directly derived from Orphic belief. Thoroughly Orphic, too, is the picture given in the Platonic metaphor of the cave, of the position of the generality of mankind: they are in bonds—bonds which it is painful to loosen; just as in Orphic belief the body was called the tomb of the soul: its prison house, as the *Phaedo* teaches. Orphic also in all probability is the thought that some of those who penetrate to the supra-celestial heaven must return into the prison to teach their fellows the way to live: to tell of what they have seen ‘on the other side’, and to popularize those largely ascetic practices which shall eventually free the soul from the dominance of the body.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Hoffmann, op. cit. *supra*, p. 1087; see also Adam, on *Plat. Rep.*, 509 b.

<sup>2</sup> The argument cannot here be displayed in detail. Broadly, it takes the following

It is probable, therefore, that in this metaphor of the cave Plato is using a picture familiar to him from the Orphic poems. Nor was he merely making use of a literary device. The whole framework of the Orphic system here displayed, of a heaven of deities which, with abstract titles, are the mainsprings of the universe, is peculiarly similar to the Platonic conception of the Ideas that lie behind phenomena. However much Plato may have rationalized and re-interpreted this framework: however much ethical, logical, and metaphysical problems may have been the essentially determining factors of his thought: yet it seems unnatural and uncritical to deny to Orphism some influence on his thought as reflected in the theory of Ideas. Even a minimal view of this influence should probably allow that Orphism helped him to schematize his conception of the Universe.

It is not only, however, the picture of a primal light shrouded in darkness that is common to Orphism and Plato's presentation of the Idea of the Good. The figure of the sun, which Plato chooses as the representative of that Idea in the visible universe, was represented by the Orphics as being directly created by that very deity of brilliance, Phanes, who from another aspect exists outside the universe, as has been shown. τοῦτον (sc. Ἥλιον) γὰρ ἐπέστησε τοῖς ὅλοις ὁ δημιουργός (sc. Φάνης).

καὶ φύλακ' αὐτὸν ἔτευξε κέλευσέ τε πᾶσιν ἀνάσσειν

ὥς φησιν Ὀρφεύς.<sup>1</sup> Just so Plato in introducing his metaphor of the sun calls it τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Socrates

lines: Orphic literature contains a κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου, and Orpheus, as is well known, went down to Hades and returned. So did many another hero and teacher. Ultimately, this idea seems to have been employed to lend the authority of autopsy to descriptions of the life after death; and should be connected with the parallel machinery of the temporary flight of the soul from the body and of Rip van Winkelian disappearances (e.g. Epimenides, Aristaeus, &c.). If these collocations are correct, this mythical explanation of 'inspiration' may be considered as an element in the popular religious background from which Orphism sprang: the motif of Orpheus' descent into Hades will be original to Orphism; and fully expressed in the Orphic poems.

<sup>1</sup> frg. 96 Kern; Proclus in *Plat. Tim.* 41 c.

could not describe, nor could his hearers understand 'the good itself': but the sun they have all seen, and the sun is ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . . . καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ.<sup>1</sup> The very name Phanes, which was only one of the titles of the Orphic divinity,<sup>2</sup> was interpreted as referring to a sun<sup>3</sup> whether supracelestial or cosmic. The distinction between these two does not seem always to have been strictly observed, and our fragments are scanty. So in the case of those Orphic verses preserved by Macrobius<sup>4</sup>—verses in which the sun figures more prominently than elsewhere in Orphic remains—it is difficult to disentangle the various fragments in such a way as to decide to which Orphic deity they were originally devoted, Phanes the First-begotten, the pantheistic Zeus, or the young Dionysus in his first or second form. It is possible that the excerptors<sup>5</sup> may have been confused by the similarity in name of the various successive personifications of 'Dionysus' (whom Macrobius calls Liber) and, having fallen into the error of presuming that this deity was always one and the same, may have brought together as descriptive of him verses only really applicable to certain of his forms. On the other hand it may be that the poem from which the verses were taken was a hymn, similar to those Orphic hymns that have survived intact. If so, the authors themselves, under the general syncretistic influences of Hellenistic times, may have been responsible for the fusion of aspects referred to above. Macrobius was himself much impressed with the power of 'the sovran Sun', and accordingly quotes the verses as showing that Orpheus believed 'Solem esse omnia'. This they cannot be said to do, but at least they make it clear that Phanes at his first appearance was regarded as in some sense a sun, for the title ἀνταύγης ἀρίδης there given him

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* vi. 506 d–507 a.

<sup>2</sup> For an elucidated list of these names see Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 2. 1024 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Gruppe in Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* iii. 2255 f.

<sup>4</sup> Kern, *frg.* 236–42.

<sup>5</sup> Macrobius' source is said to be Cornelius Labeo, who in his turn is said (more doubtfully) to have taken the verses from Porphyry, who may have excerpted the original.

can imply nothing else.<sup>1</sup> The lines

κέκλυθι τηλεπόρου δίνης ἑλικαύγεα κύκλον  
οὐρανίαις στροφάλιξι περίδρομον αἰὲν ἐλίσσων,  
ἀγλαὲ Ζεῦ Διόνυσσε, πάτερ πόντου, πάτερ αἴης,  
Ἥλιε παγγενέτορ πανταίολε χρυσεοφειγγές,<sup>2</sup>

however, do not fit in with Phanes under this aspect, but rather—if they are not merely the results of an artificial syncretism<sup>3</sup>—with that connexion between the young Dionysus (child of Zeus and sixth regent of the world) and the sun of which Olympiodorus speaks: τὸν Ἥλιον ὃς πολλὰν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσσον κοινωνίαν διὰ μέσου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος κατ' Ὀρφέα.<sup>4</sup> This connexion may be exemplified in the theogony by the commission given to Apollo by Zeus to collect the scattered limbs of Dionysus: Apollo being by the Orphics closely connected with the sun.<sup>5</sup> The connexion of sun and Dionysus is also referred to by Proclus in a passage in which, as his own references show, Orphic teaching is conflated with other and later beliefs: καὶ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἥλιου καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ θεῶν, τὸν ἐκεῖ Διόνυσσον ὑμνοῦντες “Ἡελίοιο πάρεδρος ἐπισκοπέων πόλον ἄγνόν”, τὸν Δία τὸν ἐκεῖ, τὸν

<sup>1</sup> These fragments are especially obscure but must be discussed here because, according to the exposition of Macrobius, they are the most definite testimony we have of the connexion of Phanes-Dionysus and the sun. The direct appellation

κέκλυθι τηλεπόρου δίνης ἑλικαύγεα κύκλον  
οὐρανίαις στροφάλιξι περίδρομον αἰὲν ἐλίσσων

seems to imply a hymn-form: so does the emphasis on the plurality of his titles, for it was important that a hymn should be correctly addressed. The lines in *Saturnalia*, i. 18. 12 seem to refer to Phanes as the ‘first begotten’, and in this sense I have used them as testimony above.

<sup>2</sup> *Saturn.* i. 23. 21.

<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to notice that there is a late inscription from a Βακχεῖον in NE. Thrace with a dedication θεῷ Διὶ Διο[νύ]σω. (Kazarow, *Jahrb. deutsch. arch. Inst.* 1915, 30, Anzeiger 87–9. See also *Am. Journ. Arch.* 1916, xx. 228.) The existence of such a divinity in the cult of this part of the world may be of importance for the question of Orphic origins.

<sup>4</sup> frg. 212, Kern.

<sup>5</sup> Wilamowitz: *Platon*, i.<sup>2</sup> 420, note 3, supposes that the common τέμενος of Hêlios and Apollo in *Laos*, 945e reflects Orphic belief.

\* Οσιριν, τὸν Πᾶνα τὸν ἡλιακόν, τοὺς ἄλλους ὧν αἱ βίβλοι πλήρεις εἰσὶ τῶν θεολόγων καὶ τῶν θεουργῶν.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear then that the Orphic Phanes, the First-begotten, resembles the Platonic Idea of the Good in much. He is the sole source of all that is, yet he himself is not to be confounded with his emanations: he is distinct, shrouded in darkness, incomprehensible even to the Gods because of his brightness. Just so, the Good is beyond being; οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. The Idea of the Good is not merely the source of all being and beyond it, but the source of knowledge, too. Just so, Phanes is the light beyond the darkness of this world, and is even said in the sixth Orphic hymn to remove that darkness from the eyes of men

πρωτογόνον καλέω . . . .

ὅσων ὃς σκοτόεσαν ἀπημαύρωσας ὁμίχλην.

Just as the good is for Plato the teleological ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή, the reason why 'it is best for things to be as they are'—the teaching of the *Phaedo*—so the Orphic Phanes was the inspiration which enabled Zeus to order the universe. Lastly, just as Phanes is the supracelestial brightness whose offspring and regent is in close connexion with the sun, so too in Plato the Idea of the Good in the simile of the cave is a brightness hard to see, and his offspring and representative in this world of seeming, according to the first and simpler simile, is the sun, the giver of sight and being.

The similarity is close enough to warrant the assumption, that just as the 'abstract' deities, Nomos, Dikê, Eusebeia, and the rest appealed to Plato's mind as it sought anxiously to give being and body to the concepts of ethics and politics, so too the Orphic presentation of the figure of Phanes appealed to him when he considered the nature of his supreme teleological principle.

The evidence here displayed does not warrant any judgement on the relative importance of the Orphic contribution to Plato's thought as compared with the other major influences of his life. That would

<sup>1</sup> Procl. in *Plat. Tim.* 40 b.

necessitate a thorough and detailed examination of the dialogues wherever they concern themselves with the human soul and with the Ideas. Above all, the myths would have to be scrutinized more closely than has as yet been done. Until this foundation has been soundly laid, and until critical opinion on the date of the surviving Orphic fragments, and the form of the Orphic works which Plato read, has become more unanimous, until moreover the main lines of the development of Plato's thought have been elucidated from other angles, the debt of Plato to Orphism cannot be estimated. One thing, however, may be suggested. If in the main, it is correct to hold that Plato was influenced as well by the sense of the Orphic poems as by their figures, if they made an appeal to him which was not simply and solely aesthetic, then it may be that here is the explanation from the historical, the genetic point of view, of the vexed question of the separation of the Ideas from particulars. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has already suggested that this feature of Platonic thought owes not a little to the general context of Greek religious feeling. May it be that the Orphic deities in especial were chiefly responsible for this influence?

G. W. DYSON.

### III

## THE ENTOMOLOGY OF THE BIBLE

THE number of insects mentioned in the Bible is very small. All are enumerated here. Small though this number is, it includes three members of the Insecta especially important in conveying disease to man. These are (1) the flea, carrying the plague from rat to man and from man to man; (2) the dainty mosquito transmitting the malaria parasite from man to man, and (3) the house-fly, the conveyor of typhoid and infantile diarrhoea.

Canon H. B. Tristram, F.R.S., organized his expedition to the Holy Land in 1863-4. The popular account of his results was published as *The Natural History of the Bible* in 1867 and the third edition (1873) of this work has been used as the basis of this paper. During the past fifty years our knowledge has greatly increased, and, needless to say, the nomenclature has correspondingly changed with it. The present writer has no knowledge of Hebrew, but has used in his quotations the Authorized Version, with which he has compared the recent translations of the Old Testament by the Rev. Prof. Moffatt.

No attempt has been made to enumerate every occurrence of the insect mentioned. Selected passages alone have been taken with a view to showing the results of scientific investigations later than Canon Tristram's time.

All the Invertebrates are grouped under the Hebrew term meaning 'creeping things'. With the exception of locusts, insects seem to be mentioned in the Old Testament merely incidentally. For example, 'the moth shall eat them up like a garment and the worm . . . like wool' (Isa. li. 8) refers to the larva of the clothes-moth (*sas*); the manna-bred worms (Exod. xvi. 20) are maggots (*tola'im*); 'the worms shall eat them' (grapes) (Deut. xxviii. 39) indicate grubs that ruin the vines, probably the young of the vine-weevil; 'the worms shall cover them' (Job. xxi. 26) are larvae (*rimmah*) feeding on corpses. The worms that ate Herod Agrippa (Acts xii. 23) were

σκόληξ—a like fate befalling Antiochus Epiphanes (2 Macc. ix. 9) and also Herod the Great according to Josephus.

1. LICE (*kinnim*, σκνίφες, *sciniphes*) are mentioned only as the third plague of Egypt (Exod. viii. 16, 17) with a reference to this event in Ps. cv. 31. Though it has been contended that gnats (mosquitoes) are here meant, lice agree best with the context: 'smite the dust of the land that it may become lice . . . lice in man and in beast . . . lice upon man and upon beast.' It must not be forgotten that the idea of the spontaneous generation of lice from dust, flies from filth, such as putrid flesh, &c. has been held throughout the ages until comparatively recent times. As Tristram remarks, p. 305, 'the Egyptians had by no means the Arabs' indifference to vermin'. Further they were ceremonially polluted if touched by lice, while mosquitoes had no such effect. Since gnats (mosquitoes) arise from the waters and not from dust they would more naturally come rather under the plague of flies. A note by Canon Harford in *Peake*, however, says under 'swarm': 'In Autumn when much water is standing in the rice fields, swarms of mosquitoes, like clouds of dust, arise from their breeding-grounds. Both renderings (i.e. lice and gnats) can plead ancient authority, but both scholarship and experience favour the second.' Moffatt in his recent translation of the Old Testament, in Exodus prefers mosquitoes, but curiously enough in the reference to this plague in Ps. cv. renders the same Hebrew word as lice.

The Lice (Anoplura) according to the *Cambridge Natural History*, vol. vi, pp. 599–601 include some forty species with three parasitic on man viz.: *Pediculus humanus capitis* (now *P. humanus humanus*), *P. corporis* (now *P. humanus corporis*), and *Phthirus inguinalis* (now *Ph. pubis*). These are popularly called the head-louse, body-louse or clothes-louse, and the crab-louse respectively. Exanthematic typhus, the disease that ravaged Serbia during the Great War—in February 1915, 500 people died per day—was proved to be conveyed by the clothes-louse and possibly by the head-louse as well. The prevention of typhus fever is therefore largely dependent on exterminating lice. Even to-day lice can at times be

a serious menace to public health. Typhus fever is carried by lice and by lice alone. Trench fever is also carried by the faecal dust of the lice, and the same is true of relapsing fever.

True lice are found only on Mammals. Up to some eighty years ago these disgusting creatures were the constant companions of even the upper classes in Britain—as Burns's poem 'To a Louse' reminds us:

Oh! wad some power the giftie gi'e us  
To see oursel's as others see us!  
It wad frae monie a blunder free us  
And foolish notion:  
What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us,  
And e'en devotion!

Most of us forget that these well-known lines were inspired by the poet's seeing a louse on a lady's bonnet at church.

And again he writes

What of Earls with whom you have supped  
And of Dukes that you dined with yestreen!  
A louse, sir, is still but a louse,  
Though it crawl on the curls of a Queen.

To-day, luckily, the presence of lice merely indicates insanitary conditions, as among the troops during the Great War, when on one occasion ten thousand lice, and at least as many nits, were counted on a single army shirt!

2. FLEA (*par'osh*, ψύλλος, *pulex*) is mentioned twice. 'After whom dost thou pursue? after a dead dog, after a flea' (1 Sam. xxiv. 14) and further on, in xxvi. 20, 'for the king of Israel is come out to seek a flea, as when one doth hunt a partridge in the mountains.' Tristram (p. 305) when commenting on the first passage above quoted gives an excellent account of the fleas in a Bedouin camp. Moffatt agrees with the Authorized Version for the first passage, but following the Septuagint correctly renders the second (i, p. 341) as 'the King of Israel is come out to seek my life like a vulture hunting a partridge on the hills'.

Compared with the loathsome lice the fleas, these nimble and elusive parasites, may be regarded as merry and bright insects. Yet they are well known to transmit the dreaded bacillus of bubonic plague, from which disease millions of Hindus have died during the past thirty years. The *Cambridge Natural History*, vi. 525 notes the Fleas (Aphaniptera or Siphonaptera) as having one hundred species with the common flea, *Pulex irritans* (L.), as nearly cosmopolitan except in arid desert regions. Post in *Hastings* makes the Palestine flea *P. irritans*, which he declares is universal in warm climates. By 1915 some five hundred kinds of fleas had become known to science.

3. BEETLE (*hargol*) is mentioned only once (Lev. xi. 21, 22) as a clean animal. 'Yet these may ye eat, of every flying creeping thing that goeth upon all four, which have legs above their feet, to leap withal upon the earth . . . the locust after his kind . . . the bald locust . . . the beetle . . . and the grasshopper.'

Here 'flying creeping thing' is not contradictory. As before stated 'creeping thing' means any invertebrate, so that the flying creeping things are the flying invertebrates which are the insects alone. It is quite clear, however, that the word *hargol*, from a root meaning to leap, has been mistranslated 'beetle', for no beetle has 'legs to leap withal'. Thus beetle being definitely ruled out, some kind of Orthopteran (locust, grasshopper, or cricket) is intended. Possibly a flight of locusts may even be meant. There is no clue towards correctly identifying any definite insect here, as Tristram notes (p. 310). The Jewish writers prefer grasshopper as the correct rendering.

The other three insects in verse 22 besides beetle are locust, bald locust, and grasshopper which Moffatt, i, p. 121, gives as 'migratory locust of any species, bald locust, dropping locust and grasshopper'. The bald locust (*salam*), so called from its having a smooth head, is mentioned in this passage only, and Tristram identifies it with the genus *Truxalis*.

The Coleoptera (Beetles in the real sense), according to the *Cambridge Natural History*, vi, p. 184, numbered over 150,000

different species in 1900; some 3,500 occurring in Great Britain alone. During the last thirty years this great total has been very considerably increased.

4. LOCUST (*ἀκρίς* N.T.). No fewer than nine Hebrew words have been employed to denote this insect or its larval stages, including those variously translated into English as cankerworm, caterpillar, bald locust, and palmerworm, the Old English name for caterpillar. Following Tristram, pp. 306-18, we have the following arrangement for this insect, which is by far the most important as well as the one most mentioned in the Bible.

(1) '*arbeh*, from a root meaning to multiply, is translated locust in the following passages. It is also the term most often used.

Exod. x. 4-6, 13-15, &c., as one of the plagues of Egypt; Lev. xi. 22, as clean and fit for human food; Deut. xxviii. 38, 'the locust shall consume it' (here Sir George Adam Smith, in his *Deuteronomy*, prefers locust swarm); 1 Kings viii. 37, 'if there be in the land . . . locust', and the same passage 2 Chron. vi. 28; Ps. lxxvii. 46, 'He gave their labour unto the locust'; Ps. cv. 34, 'He spake and the locusts came' (Moffatt, ii, p. 107, gives grasshoppers); Joel i. 4; 'that which the palmerworm hath left hath the locust eaten, and that which the locust hath left hath the cankerworm eaten, and that which the cankerworm hath left hath the caterpillar eaten.' The locust ('*arbeh*) occurs here with palmerworm (*gazam*), cankerworm (*yelek*), and grasshopper (*chasil*), denoting either different creatures or more likely different stages of growth. Moffatt, ii, p. 430, gives lopping locust, swarming locust, leaping locust, and devouring locust: Joel ii. 25, 'I will restore to you the years that the locust hath eaten, the cankerworm, and the caterpillar and the palmerworm, my great army which I sent among you.' Moffatt here uses the same 'lopping, swarming, leaping and devouring locusts', ii, p. 433.

There are, however, passages where '*arbeh* is translated grasshopper: Judges vi. 5, 'they came as grasshoppers for multitude'; here Moffatt prefers 'swarming like locusts', i, p. 277. Judges iii. 12, 'like grasshoppers for multitude'; Moffatt, i, p. 280, gives 'in swarms, like locusts': Job xxxix. 20, 'canst thou make him (the

horse) afraid as a grasshopper?'; Moffatt, ii, p. 34, renders 'do you make him leap forward as a locust?': Jer. xlv. 23, 'more than the grasshoppers . . . innumerable'; Moffatt, ii, p. 317, 'they outnumber locusts'.

Here in each case Moffatt rightly translates locust meaning the migratory locust, the *Acrydium peregrinum*, *A. lineola*, and *Oedipoda migratoria* of Tristram, who records these as still destructive at times. *O. migratoria* in 1748 did considerable damage in the Bristol area.

Some authorities hold that 'arbeh refers rather to the locust's destructiveness than to its rate of multiplication, the two outstanding features of any locust swarm being their enormous numbers, and secondly the terrible devastation wrought by them on the plants and crops of the district. Numerous instances are known of the destruction caused by locust swarms from very early times. The *Cambridge Natural History*, v, p. 298 records *Acridium peregrinum*, now known as *Schistocerca peregrina* as probably the locust of the plagues of Egypt (Exod. x. 4-19); this same insect found in Britain in 1869; obtained on board ship 1,200 miles from the nearest land on 2 Nov. 1865, and an eyewitness's account of a locust swarm at the Vaal River. The genus *Schistocerca* is probably American in origin and has flown over to the Old World for all its relatives are to-day American.

A writer in *Nature*, 1889, p. 253, estimated a flight of locusts that passed over the Red Sea in November of that year to cover an area of two thousand square miles in extent. However that may be, a friend of mine, a sea-captain of long experience in African waters, tells me that he remembers once steaming for fifty miles in the Red Sea through locusts struggling in the waves so thick as to resemble seaweed. On another occasion he saw a swarm of these insects flying from north-east to south-west extend for a distance of seventeen miles from Inyak to Reuben Point in Delagoa Bay. In appearance this mighty host formed a cloud like a fog-bank but reddish in colour. After a disastrous attack by locusts on his sister's estate in Nyassaland he found that every green blade had been eaten, except,

curiously enough, tea and tobacco, the two staple crops in that district. Both these introduced plants to that region were left untouched.

Over five thousand million egg-cases of the locust were said to have been deposited in the Island of Cyprus in 1883. While in India heavy mail-trains are repeatedly stated to have been stopped, because the crushed locusts made the rails so slippery that the wheels were prevented from gripping them.

(2) *sol'am*, ἀττάκης, *attacus*, rendered bald locust only once in Lev. xi. 22 as mentioned above;

(3) *hargol* (beetle), meaning perhaps galloper; ὀφιομάχης, *ophiomachus*, in the same passage;

(4) *hagab* (grasshopper, from a root meaning to devour). It may also mean a concealer (of the sun?), ἀκρίς, *locusta*. Lev. xi. 22, 'the grasshopper after his kind'; Num. xiii. 33, 'we were in our own sight as grasshoppers'; Isa. xi. 22, 'the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers.' In one place only is *hagab* translated locust: 2 Chron. vii. 13, 'if I command the locusts to devour the land'; and in a very difficult passage, Eccles. xii. 5, 'the grasshopper shall be a burden,' very different renderings have been suggested. Principal A. J. Grieve in *Peake* says, 'perhaps the reference to the "grasshopper" is to the bent and halting gait of old age, or even to sexual intercourse, an interpretation which gains some support from the use of the caperberry as an aphrodisiac.'

(5) *gazam* (palmerworm), κάμπη, *eruca*, often translated by old writers as caterpillar. The name palmerworm has been said by Post to refer more likely to the resemblance between the hairy caterpillar and the fuzzy catkins of the willow boughs carried in England instead of palms on Palm Sunday and popularly termed palms. The usual explanation given, however, is that the palmerworm refers to the pilgrims or palmers alone, because of its wanderings. Thus Topsell in A. D. 1608 speaks of them: 'there is another sort of these caterpillars who have no certain place of abode, nor yet cannot tell where to find their food but like unto superstitious pilgrims, do wander and stray hither and thither . . . these have

purchased a very apt name amongst us Englishmen, to be called Palmerworms, by reason of their wandering and roguish life, for they never stay in one place but are ever wandering' (O.E.D., s.v.).

The passages in which the palmerworm is mentioned in Joel i. 4 and ii. 25 have already been noted. There remains Amos iv. 9, 'the palmerworm devoured them,' and here Moffatt gives locust, ii, p. 428.

(6) *yelek* (cankerworm), probably meaning lopper, ἀκρίς, βροῦχος, *bruchus*, indicates very likely the larval stages of the locust. Nahum iii. 15, 'eat thee up like the cankerworm': Nahum iii. 16, 'the cankerworm spoileth'; Ps. cv. 34, 'He spake and the locusts came and caterpillars'; Jer. li. 14, 'I will fill thee with men as with caterpillars': Jer. li. 27, 'cause the horses to come up as the rough caterpillars'. In all these cases Moffatt gives locusts, the last passage reading 'cavalry swarming like locusts', ii, p. 326.

(7) *zelazal* (locust), ἐρυσίβη, *rubigo*. This word in the Hebrew means 'the tinkler', with reference doubtless to the well-known stridulation of the wings. Deut. xxviii. 42, 'all thy trees and fruit of thy land shall the locust consume'; Moffatt, i, p. 232, says insects. Job xli. 7, 'canst thou fill his (leviathan's) skin with barbed irons?' or as Moffatt has it (ii, p. 37), 'Can you plant harpoons in his skin?' Leviathan is undoubtedly the crocodile, and the reference is probably to the mouth parts of some biting fly, such as the tsetse type in South Africa, as Tristram suggests in his Appendix, p. 496. Isa. xviii. 1, 'Woe to the land shadowing with wings', does not seem very clear. Moffatt gives 'Ah! land of winged fleets', while Tristram suggests, 'Ho to the land of the gadfly beyond the rivers of Ethiopia,' meaning the country of the Abyssinians, whose word 'tzaltzala' indicates a blood-sucking fly of some kind or other.

(8) *geb* (locust), ἀκρίς, used only in the plural, means the creeper, and so probably indicates the young stages. Isa. xxxiii. 4, 'the running to and fro of locusts'; Moffatt here gives grasshoppers (ii, p. 216): Amos vii. 1, 'he formed grasshoppers'; Moffatt, ii, p. 440 renders 'brood of locusts', Nahum iii. 17, 'Thy crowned are as locusts.'

(9) *hasil* (caterpillar), meaning the finisher, ἀκρίς, βροῦχος, ἐρυσίβη, *rubigo*.

Ps. lxxviii. 46, 'He gave their increase unto the caterpillar'; Isa. xxxiii. 4, 'Your spoil shall be gathered like the gathering of the caterpillar,' where Moffatt (ii, p. 216) gives locusts. The Latin *rubigo*, meaning rust or mildew, used in the Vulgate, certainly does not help us to locate the insect.

The best description of locusts in the Bible is undoubtedly that given by the prophet Joel in chapters ii. 2, 7-9. In the October number of the *Natural History Magazine* a brief and popular summary of our present knowledge of the locust problem is given in an article 'Locusts and their Control', by S. P. Uvarov, Senior Assistant, Imperial Bureau of Entomology. From this account we are indebted for the following facts, the desert or Bible locust is illustrated as *Schistocerca gregaria*. Locusts in the strict sense of the word mean such members of the family Acridiidae, order Orthoptera, as are gregarious, and form large migrating swarms. The nearly allied grasshoppers have not these habits. There are no means of distinguishing a grasshopper from a locust—small wonder that the ancients could not succeed!—except in habits, for locusts when not many in number behave as grasshoppers.

The young locusts called 'hoppers' have but rudimentary wings. After repeated moults, however, these hoppers become adult as locusts and obtain the two pairs of strong wings capable of long and sustained flight. The hoppers tend to collect into dense groups or bands (Prov. xxx. 27, 'the locusts have no king yet go forth all of them by bands'), which pass the night on plants, and when wakened by the sun in the morning feed on them. When the sun becomes too hot, the hoppers take to the ground, are restless for a time and then as a band start off, all the insects going in one and the same direction. If band meets band they join up and go in the direction of the larger band. Eventually in this way a band may be formed stretching for miles and marching blindly onwards. Such movements of hoppers, which are very destructive to plant life, are certainly due to the influence of high temperature and they may

often leave their food plants and move right away into the open desert.

When these hoppers become adult and obtain wings they can fly—but never against the wind—over enormous distances as immense swarms. These may not infrequently leave rich vegetation to take to the desert or even to the open sea where all miserably perish. Such migrations have been proved recently to be necessary for the ripening of the reproductive organs. Pairing follows and then the laying of the eggs.

Thus locusts have swarming (gregarious) and non-swarming (solitary) forms. Externally the differences between these are so great that specialists have even named them as different species! The same insect may appear thus at one time as a typical grasshopper, when few in numbers, or again, when very abundant, as a swarming locust. Both these solitary and swarming phases have now been obtained for almost every species of locust.

The Desert Locust (*Schistocerca gregaria*) above mentioned, has its breeding grounds in the sandy deserts of North Africa, Arabia, Persia, and elsewhere.

Before leaving the subject of locusts we may note that the word translated 'bat' (Deut. xiv. 18) is considered by some scholars, including Sir George Adam Smith, to be rather some kind of locust. The word locust, with which curiously enough the word lobster is connected in its origin, has been said to refer to fire, indicating the clean sweep as if by fire made by locusts of everything plantlike, but the Latin word *locusta* means the 'hopper'.

5. CRIMSON WORM (*tola ath*, where *tola* means worm or insect, κόκκινος, *coccinus*). Tristram, p. 319, clearly states that not the animal but the dye from it is usually intended; cf. Isa. i. 18, 'though your sins be as scarlet . . . though they be red like crimson.' In early times scarlet and crimson were not evidently differentiated as different shades of red, for both were extracted from the same insect (*Coccus ilicis*), from the female of which the colour is obtained. This animal has largely been supplanted by the closely allied *Coccus cacti* introduced into the East from Mexico. Another species,

*Coccus (Gossyparia) mannifera*, according to the *Cambridge Natural History*, vi, p. 597, secretes its honeydew, which was the manna of the wilderness, and which, tasting like honey, is still the 'man' of the Arabs to-day, whose name for the brilliant red dye is *kirmiz* from which our crimson has come. The genus *Coccus* belongs to the order Homoptera. *Coccus mannifera* lives on *Tamarix* in many places within the Mediterranean basin.

6. ANT (*nemalah*, μύρμηξ, *formica*) is twice mentioned in Proverbs viz.: vi. 6-8, 'Go to the ant thou sluggard . . . which provideth her meat in the summer and gathereth her food in the harvest.' Here the ant's industry is noted, and no one has questioned it. In the second passage, however, xxx. 24, 25, 'they are exceeding wise; the ants are a people not strong yet they prepare their meat in the summer', the wisdom and foresight have been questioned. Here undoubtedly the harvesting ant of Palestine is meant. It belongs to the genus *Messor* akin to *Aphenogaster (Messor) arenarius*, the harvesting ant of the deserts of Algiers and Tunis. 'Exceeding wise' as applied to the ants is borne out by the careful investigations of Lord Avebury and many other naturalists, and is shown among other things in the architecture of the nests, the entire system of the community of the hive, and the keeping of aphids as cows.

7. HORNET (*zirah*, σφήκία, *crabro*). Four species of this insect are noted by Tristram (p. 322), who states that there is no question about the translation. He found his species 'all very common but not identical with our hornet'. Yet hornets may be real or metaphorical. Of the former both *Vespa crabro* and *V. orientalis* are common in Palestine, but probably the latter is the more usual for it has a wider geographical distribution than *V. crabro*.

'Moreover, the Lord thy God will send the hornet among them' Deut. vii. 20. Here, according to Sir George Adam Smith, real hornets are certainly meant. Exod. xxiii. 28, 'And I will send hornets before thee.' Though we have no details of any pest of or attack by hornets in Scripture, we know that these formidable insects have driven horses and cattle to madness, and even to death. Thus metaphorically their attacks may signify panic and terror, much as

*Oestrus*, the gadfly or horse-fly, the mere approach of which causes consternation to the animals, may also come to mean the frenzy of a prophet or poet as well as inspiration and enthusiasm.

Some 200 species of *Crabro* are known to-day, about forty in England.

8. BEE (*deborah*, μέλισσα, *apis*). Deut. xxxii. 13, 'to suck honey out of the rock'; 1 Sam. xiv. 25, 'there was honey upon the ground'; Ps. lxxxii. 16, 'honey out of the rock'; Jer. xli. 8, 'treasures in the field . . . of honey.' Thus always in the Old Testament the wild honey is intended. 'A land flowing with milk and honey' would certainly have many bees both domesticated and wild. Palestine with its dry climate and abundant flora, rich in aromatic labiates such as mint and thyme, was a country well suited for bees, just as Mount Hymettus near Athens with heights clothed in thyme and heather yielded a far-famed honey.

Ps. cxviii. 12 'they compassed me about like bees'; Deut. i. 44, 'the Amorites . . . came out against you, and chased you, as bees do'. Here the wild bee is certainly meant. In India these insects build in rocks and cliffs in the open or may affix their combs to big buildings such as the justly celebrated Taj Mahal at Agra, or in caves as at the famous Ajanta and Ellora Caves near Bombay. About 1840 the cave-paintings at Ajanta were fairly complete and wonderfully fresh considering that they had resisted climatic conditions for at least fifteen centuries. Since then, however, the bees and the bats, as well as barbarians, have done much to obliterate what was then almost perfect.

Many stories are current in India regarding the ferocity with which this wild bee attacks both man and beast. On one occasion at least they are known to have stung to death a young tiger. The venom in the sting is said to be more deadly in hot weather, and when the blood is in bad condition badly stung Europeans may even die. The various jungle tribes apparently do not suffer much in this way, for members have been seen with many stings in their bodies yet to all appearances quite unconcerned.

Matt. iii. 4, 'his meat was locusts and wild honey'; Mark i. 6, 'he

did eat locusts and wild honey'—both these being desert products ready to hand. So far as we know there was no bee-keeping in Palestine in the Old Testament times. Tristram, p. 324, reports bees to be far more numerous in the Wilderness of Judaea than in any other part of the country. 'However extensive,' he says, 'are the bee colonies of the villages the number of wild bees of the same species is far greater.' This species he gives as the *Apis fasciata* (Latr.).

Judges xiv. 8, 'a swarm of bees and honey in the carcase of the lion.' As stated by Roman writers, including the poet Virgil and the practical husbandman Varro, in ancient times it was a common belief that a swarm of bees arise from the putrid carcase of an ox. In fact the Greek adjective *βοηγενής* as used in Greek anthology means ox-produced. As Tristram suggests, p. 324, it is obvious that a swarm of wild bees must have taken up its abode in the mummified corpse of the lion—a condition reached within a few hours after death through the active attentions of jackals, dogs, and vultures, as well as ants.

Deborah (Judges iv. 5) was evidently a woman's name, a 'favourite and appropriate one' according to Tristram. Perhaps it may be ungallant to remember that the busy bee can also sting!

9. MOTH (*ash*; *ἀράχνη*, Ps. xxxviii. 39; *χρόνος*, Isa. li. 8; *παραχή*, Hos. v. 12, and *σής* elsewhere). Job xxvii. 18, 'He buildeth his house as a moth'; Isa. l. 9, 'they all shall wax old as a garment; the moth shall eat them up'; Matt. vi. 19, 'where moth and rust doth corrupt'. In these and other passages in Holy Writ the clothes-moth larvae are evidently intended. These belong to the family Tineidae. The *Cambridge Natural History*, p. 430, gives two clothes-moths prevalent in Palestine. *Tinea (Tineola) bisiliella* whose larvae form neither cases nor galleries, and *Tinea pellionella* whose larvae do form portable cases, to which reference may be made in the passage first quoted. As Tristram points out, however, (p. 326) the reference may be simply to one of the many leaf-rolling larvae belonging to this family.

10. FLIES (1) (*'arob*, *κυνόμυια*, *omne genus muscarum*), men-

tioned but once only in the plague of flies (Exod. viii) and in its reference Ps. lxxviii. 45. By 'flies' popularly are meant only the two winged flies comprising the order Diptera, and especially the family Muscidae of which the common house-fly, *Musca domestica* (L.), is the best-known example. It alone may be intended in this passage. It is also probable and more likely that there is indicated a mixture of many different kinds of flies belonging not only to the Muscidae but also to many other families. Driver, however, argues that some definite insect is evidently meant and renders dog-fly (κυνόμυια) after the Septuagint. Unfortunately nobody knows which fly is intended by dog-fly. Excessive numbers of the common house-fly can be disagreeable enough as residents in India sometimes know to their cost. This insect, common yet insignificant in England, may appear in such incredible numbers that, as has been truly said, 'it is quite impossible to sit or stand, eat or sleep, think or even swear with any degree of comfort!' If to this invasion were added numerous midges, gnats, and other blood-sucking flies such as *Hippobosca*, *Tabanus*, and the like, then indeed there would be a grievous torment.

The role of the house-fly as a carrier of infection, the spreader of ophthalmia, the contaminator of food, and infector of sores and wounds is now well known, and can be watched any day in progress in any Indian bazaar where the food-stuff may often be seen black with them. For the European it is an object-lesson not soon forgotten to watch the crowds of flies passing from the open sewer below to the native sugar (*jaggari*) on sale above to the public who do not mind in the least!

The well-known pertinacity with which the house-fly returns again and again to the same spot in spite of opposition and even attack was perhaps the reason, as Major Austen thinks in his '*Housefly*', why in Ancient Egypt successful generals were rewarded with a golden collar bearing colossal silhouettes of house-flies. The following quotation from the *Iliad* bears out the same idea:

ἐν δὲ βίην ὤμοισι καὶ ἐν γούνεσσιν ἔθηκε,  
καὶ οἱ μύτης θάρσος ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐνήκεν,

ἡ τε καὶ ἐργομένη μάλα περ χροὸς ἀνδρομέοιο  
ἰσχανάα δακέειν, λαρόν τέ οἱ αἷμ' ἀνθρώπου·

'And she (Athene) put might into his (Menelaus') shoulders and his knees, and in his breast the courage of a fly, which though driven off again and again from the skin of men, is still eager to bite, and sweet to him is the blood of man.'

People at home here often complain during the summer months of having been bitten by the common house-fly, which however cannot bite. On examination their blood-sucking fly turns out to be a very similar insect, the stable-fly (*Stomoxys calcitrans*), which is rather more sturdy in build and carries a distinct shining black proboscis which is always visible in front of the head. *Musca domestica* is common both in Palestine and in Egypt. In fact it is almost cosmopolitan—a familiar but dangerous creature, equally at home in the tropics or in the temperate regions. *Stomoxys calcitrans* also occurs in Palestine.

The *Cambridge Natural History*, vi, p. 514, considers that on the whole the Muscidae do beneficial work for they are very effective scavengers, and one Algerian fly (*Idia fasciata*) is said to kill great numbers of the dreaded Migratory Locust (*Schistocera peregriana*) for its larvae eat the locust's eggs which are laid below the surface of the ground, and there the female *Idia* penetrates to lay her eggs beside the desired food.

Notwithstanding this opinion we hold that a very good case has been made out against the Muscidae as blood-suckers and contaminators of human food. Their fondness for filth is appalling. In India over 4,000 house-flies have been reared from one-sixth of one cubic foot of soil taken from a latrine. They have been proved to travel for a distance of one mile, and have been caught 80 ft. up in the air. Their range of harmful activities is thus pretty wide, and we have no hesitation, from the evidence given on all sides against them as noxious pests, in supporting the 'Swat that fly!' campaign everywhere throughout the world.

(2) *zebhubh*, *mwā*, *musca*, occurs but twice in the Old Testament. Eccles. x. 1, 'Dead flies cause the ointment of the apothecary to

send forth a stinking savour,' or as Moffatt, ii, p. 174, renders it, 'a poisonous fly makes perfume putrid'; and again in the strange passage in Isa. vii. 18, 'The Lord shall hiss for the fly that is in the uttermost parts of the rivers of Egypt', which Moffatt, translates 'The Eternal whistles for fly'.

Tristram (p. 327) considers *zebub* to refer to some large blood-sucking fly, a gadfly, the Arab 'athebab' common in the Jordan Valley and also in that of the Nile. But against this interpretation may be urged the fact that to-day *dhubab* is the Arab name for the house-fly. The Phoenicians found this fly such a pest that they invoked against it the help of their god whom they named Baal-zebub, the god of flies. It is not impossible that *zebub* may mean the *Stomoxys calcitrans* above mentioned as strongly resembling the common house-fly but biting badly in addition.

II. GNAT (κῶνωψ in New Testament only once). The gnats or mosquitoes compose the family Culicidae. Here any mosquito (*Anopheles*) or gnat (*Culex*) may be intended. It is interesting to note that our word 'canopy' derived from the Greek word used above signifies literally 'a mosquito-net'.

Matt. xxiii. 24, 'Ye blind guides which strain at a gnat'. In this well-known passage 'strain at' should read 'strain out', indicating the extreme care taken to be cleanly in taking food. 'Strain at' is a misprint occurring first in the edition of 1611 for 'strain out' (Revised Version). Mayhew in the *Bible Glossary* gives 'Ye blynde gydes which strayne out a gnat', Tindale, and so also Cranmer and Geneva.

Gnats or mosquitoes, so important as carriers of the malaria parasites in the tropics, may well have been among the flies of the plagues of Egypt. Curiously enough the biggest swarms of mosquitoes have been noted outside the tropics. The *Cambridge Natural History*, ii, p. 468, records one in New Zealand three-quarters of a mile long, 20 feet high, and 18 inches thick. Probably the most mosquito-infested area in the world to-day is over Lapland, Finland, and Siberia. Many authorities hold the opinion that malaria destroyed the civilization of ancient Greece, helped to bring about the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and kept Africa

practically a closed continent for twenty centuries. About one thousand different kinds of mosquitoes are known to-day and over twenty occur in our own land. Every country of the world is inhabited by them. The most serious obstacles to the settlement of the tropics by white races are undoubtedly the diseases prevalent in those regions. Of those diseases malaria is the commonest, though yellow fever, dengue fever, and elephantiasis are by no means unusual. All these four maladies have been proved definitely to be mosquito-borne by species of the genus *Anopheles*. Some one hundred different kinds of *Anopheles* are recognized to-day by specialists and three live in Great Britain all of whom have been proved to be able to carry malaria. This ailment, ague, was endemic in our land in certain areas, such as the Fen district, until modern methods of field drainage did away with accumulations of standing water, and thereby destroyed the breeding-places of the gnats whose larvae live in water.

In recent years Hayling Island, off the coast of Hampshire, has been freed of gnats through the work of J. F. Marshall, Esq. He found, on taking up his mosquito control work there, that one species of mosquito, *Aedes detritus*, has its larvae living in stagnant sea-water, a unique feature not known before. From the labours of the Mosquito Control Station at Hayling Island that area has been rid of the gnats which, during the summer and autumn months at least, proved a veritable plague both to natives and to holiday visitors alike.

Not strictly included within the Insecta—though often popularly regarded as such—is the class Arachnida, containing scorpions, spiders, ticks, and mites. Members of all these four groups must be abundant in Palestine. The last two being usually very minute were naturally unnoticed until the invention of the microscope. Within the present century much has been learnt about them and many diseases, affecting man and his animals, which in the past were thought to be due to the action of evil spirits are now known to be caused by mites or by ticks, which often harbour and transmit minute Protozoan parasites. The first two animals mentioned, the scorpion and the spider, are known to all.

12. SCORPION (*akrabh*, σκορπίος, *scorpio*). Deut. viii. 15, 'who led thee through that great and terrible wilderness wherein were . . . scorpions'. Scorpions are typically dwellers in arid regions though Tristram, p. 303, records them from moist situations as well as dry. He notes them as specially abundant in the Wilderness of Sinai where five different kinds have been obtained. He gives eight from Palestine but the number is now twelve, while fourteen have been reported from Egypt by Hirst. Warburton gives 300 species known (*Camb. Nat. Hist.* iv, p. 306).

Ezek. ii. 6, 'though briars and thorns be with thee and thou dost dwell among scorpions' refers to their fondness for desolate places and ruins. 1 Kings xii. 11, also 2 Chron. x. 14, 'my father hath chastised you with whips but I will chastise you with scorpions.' This probably purely figurative passage may, as Tristram suggests, however, refer to a special scourge armed with iron points. Luke x. 19, 'Behold I give unto you power to tread on serpents and scorpions.' To this day in the East the habit of the natives to go about barefoot causes both snake bites and scorpion stings to be common enough while the shod European escapes injury. The immunity here promised the Apostles in this respect is a matter of practical importance and of real value.

Luke xi. 12, 'if he shall ask an egg will he offer him a scorpion?' In this passage Christ is said by Tristram to be adopting a Greek proverb 'a scorpion instead of a perch' (which unfortunately I am unable to trace), signifying something dangerous and repulsive instead of something useful and eatable. There is also the large family of the Scorpaenidae including the genus *Scorpaena*, σκόρπανα, the scorpion-fish or sea-scorpion of the Mediterranean, ugly and unfit for human food, but it is not very likely that such is intended.

Rev. iv. 5, 'as the torment of a scorpion when he striketh a man'. The pain resulting from the introduction of the poisonous fluid from the sting is well known to be severe. But as in most things the personal element comes into play. Tristram, p. 303, instances the case of a man who to his knowledge died from the sting of a scorpion in the throat. During my eight years' residence in Madras and

South India I failed to get from my students one authentic case of a human life being lost in this way, and my predecessor in the Chair of Zoology, the late Dr. J. R. Henderson, C.I.E., with a thirty-three years' experience of the country was no more successful.

It is possible that the poison entering the system of an unhealthy person might set up results that might prove fatal, but no robust adult need fear any serious consequences. The prompt application of ammonia—even Scrubb's Household Ammonia—to the puncture is sufficient to relieve the pain at once and stop it within a short time. My laboratory peon in Madras was quite immune to scorpion venom. He used to let the hideous South Indian *Palamnaeus swammerdami*—a form much larger than the common house-scorpion *Buthus tamulus*—sting him freely with impunity. He felt merely the prick of the sharp sting.

Though adults are usually safe from fatal effects, children in various parts of the tropics, especially in Mexico, have been reported to succumb frequently to scorpion poison. The Mediterranean genus *Androctonus* has been given this name signifying 'man-killer' so much is its sting dreaded.

Tristram records scorpions swarming everywhere in Palestine even in the moist places. In the hot places he says there is sure to be one under every third stone! Curiously enough he never refers to the fact that as they are nocturnal animals you seldom see any by day. They are cryptozoic, avoiding daylight by lurking in the shade under stones and rocks or in the shelter of houses.

In one statement Tristram is quite wrong, and that is with regard to the scorpion's being able to sting itself to death if in a tight corner as, for example, when surrounded by fire. Many years ago Prof. Bourne of the Presidency College, Madras, sent home to London, to Sir Ray Lankester, common South Indian scorpions so that this experiment might be done. The animals made no attempt to sting themselves. The fact is of course that any venomous creature is naturally quite immune to its own poison, however fatal that venom may be to others.

13. SPIDER (1) *akkabish*, ἀράχνη, *aranea*. Job viii. 14, 'whose trust shall be a spider's web': Isa. lix. 5, 'they . . . weave the spider's web'. Here the reference is to the web—probably as an emblem of frailty and sudden destruction—that characteristic feature of most spiders. Though all spiders make silk, all do not spin webs. The spider means in fact the spinner.

Tristram (p. 304) notes the number of spiders in the Holy Land as almost countless. Great Britain many years ago had well over seven hundred different kinds; while the total number known to science at present exceeds twenty thousand. The late Rev. O. Pickard-Cambridge gave a general list of the spiders of Palestine and Syria in the *Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London*, 1872—a paper unfortunately long out of print—wherein he enumerates about three hundred species. The late M. Eugène Simon of Paris in his great work *L'Histoire Naturelle des Araignées*, covering the whole world, describes over 2,000 genera without attempting to deal with species at all!

(2) *semamith*, from a root meaning poison, a word found only in Prov. xxx. 28, 'the spider taketh hold with her hands and is in Kings' palaces'. Moffatt here gives, 'the lizard you may lift in your hand but it will push into a palace' (ii, p. 165).

The Septuagint gives *καλαβωτής* probably meaning the gecko. As Tristram points out, p. 304, the spider may be meant here for it can be nimble enough on its web by means of the exquisite claws at the tips of its legs—an apparatus delicate as hands. If, however, the Hebrew word be translated lizard, then the particular lizard is the gecko, whose peculiarly lamellated digits enable it to run up walls or across ceilings with the greatest ease.

The gecko (*'anakah*, μυγαλή, *mygale*), as a translation is of course conjectural. *Anakah* mentioned as an unclean creeping thing (Lev. xi. 30) is wrongly translated ferret. The Greek *μυγαλή* is the shrew-mouse (*Sorex*) with five species in Palestine. From the context the word must most likely refer to some reptile, and as it is said to mean 'something that groans' the only lizard with a voice is the gecko. In fact the name gecko is the actual cry of the animal.

In the Holy Land the common gecko seems to be *Ptyodactylus hasselquisti* (Schneid.).

In his article on 'the Hebrew Genius as exhibited in the Old Testament', his contribution to *The Legacy of Israel*, p. 15, Sir George Adam Smith refers in the nature poetry of the Hebrews to the 'tender feeling for the gentler forms of the world's life as well as its occasional humour or playfulness about animals as in certain of the Proverbs'. And the same distinguished author in the Appendix to his *Deuteronomy* in the Cambridge Bible for Schools series, regarding clean and unclean animals rightly points out that it is impossible to equate names of the animals with single species. The Hebrew names are generic only and also popular. They give proof often of close observation of the structure and habits of animals, but many errors occur.

It may seem quite unnecessary to discuss a subject very old indeed, and one about which competent authorities have disagreed for centuries, but a fresh statement of the case may prove not uninteresting. When we consider those passages above quoted where there is difficulty in choosing between spider and gecko, bat and locust, the difficulty of getting a satisfactory insect for *zebug*, and the exact meaning of the different words used to indicate locust or grasshopper—to name only a few—we feel that the last word in deciding such matters lies rather with the philologist than with the zoologist.

W. RAE SHERRIFFS.



#### IV

### THE RELIGION OF THE GALLO-ROMANS

**H**UGE dumb stones bear witness, if not to a faith, at least to an organized society, when Neolithic Man dwelt in that area which was to be called Gaul, and it is difficult to disassociate these monuments from the idea of a widespread litholatry testified to by the *lapidarium* embedded in the work of the elder Pliny and by the stones discovered in early tombs. At the character of the worships of the Bronze and early Iron Ages we may make conjecture from the numerous archaeological remains, less safely from the religions of primitive peoples of our own time and from survivals into later days. Evidence may be extensive, but knowledge is small and the searcher must await the light, fitful at the best, of historical times before he may venture with any certainty into this dim region.

Such testimony as we have, has led scholars to reconstruct an extensive animism, a profusion of nature-cults, of animal-worships, of gods of agriculture and fertility, trade and commerce as the thickly forested regions west of the Rhine received their new-comer Celts. Solar symbols abound in tombs, phallic symbols are not rare, but the gods of independent Gaul had no statues and the secrets of the gods were oathbound by the Druids, who, whatever their origin, alone were granted knowledge of the deities.

*solis nosse deos et caeli numina uobis  
aut solis nescire datum . . .*

Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i, 452, 453.

The notes of the inquisitive conqueror Caesar are the first evidence worthy of close examination and with his findings we shall deal in due course. The conquest once achieved and organization in progress, written and graven evidence is for the first time available in quantity. With Roman civilization, the Gauls adopted Roman religious devices; the shapeless gods of Druidic days took upon themselves the forms of men. The removal of the Druidic

system, in no sense a measure of religious oppression, but rather designed to suppress a judicial system which might prove disturbing to the *pax Romana*, set aside at the same time that priestly taboo against anthropomorphism which the Druids maintained.<sup>1</sup> Temples replaced those groves where

... simulacra . . . maesta deorum  
arte carent caesisque exstant informia truncis.

Lucan, *Phars.*, iii, 412, 413.

and the new plastic gods flourished, perhaps because the worshipper now enjoyed a hitherto unknown intimacy with them, because he could see them, talk to them, offer them his gifts, drive bargains with them without the presence of the Druid, whose assistance at all religious functions had been essential before the coming of the Italian.

Such pre-Roman cults as survived the conquest may best be studied in their new guise, and to them much of this essay is to be devoted, but first a rapid review may be made of the purely Graeco-Roman gods who found worshippers in the Three Gauls, for Narbonensis, that 'prolongation of Italy', is a province apart. The Roman invaders, whether soldiers or traders, carried their gods with them beyond the Alps, and the wise administrators who organized the new territory laid down at the same time the political and the religious lines along which Gaul was to develop. In Rome itself, religion and politics had been intimately related, and it was no stroke of genius, but an obvious prudence, that led the officials of Imperial Rome to encourage the worship of deities with whose very names the glory and majesty of Rome was commingled. These official cults, as we may term them, assumed a multiplicity of disguises, but the *imperium* of the Eternal City shone through them all. Inscriptions abound to *Urbs Roma Aeterna*, to the divinized

<sup>1</sup> Lucan's positive statement (*Phars.*, iii, 415-17), sometimes discredited as poetic fiction, agrees entirely in spirit with other information about the Druids and their monopoly of religious power. For the necessity of Druids' attendance at religious functions, see Caesar, *B. G.*, vi, 13; *id.*, 16; Strabo, iv, 4, 5; Diod. Sic., v, 31.

Emperor and to the *Domus Divina*, to the Genius of the Emperor and to numina closely associated with it (*Victoria, Fortuna, Salus Imperatoris*) and to the Capitoline Trio, especially Jupiter Optimus Maximus.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the political significance of these cults. In 12 B.C. Drusus convoked an assembly of the notables of Gaul, and on a carefully selected and extra-territorialized site near Lyons the Altar of Rome and Augustus was set up. There met the Diet of the Three Gauls; there was celebrated the great feast of Rome and Augustus on August 1, the day on which a solemn Celtic feast, to which we may find a parallel in the Irish *Lughnasadh* held on the same day, had formerly been solemnized. By this clever stratagem a feast of a native god, perhaps a national protector or a guardian of prosperity, was transformed into a feast of Augustus the protector, the human Mercury.<sup>1</sup> This national celebration and the meeting of the Diet conferred upon Gaul a unity which, while still perhaps more apparent than real, was such as the land had never known before. While Italy was hesitating to adopt a whole-hearted Imperial cult, the provinces accepted it enthusiastically, and the living<sup>2</sup> Emperor was soon the recipient of dedicatory inscriptions. The institution of the *Augustales* furthered the same objects; and in the municipalities, where Romanization was most rapid, *flamines* and *sacerdotes* are found attached to the Imperial cult,<sup>3</sup> while numerous private devotees made personal dedications to the Imperial deities.

The Capitoline gods had no lack of worshippers. At Autun was a Capitol, *ipsos oculos ciuitatis . . . Apollinis templa atque Capitolium*,<sup>4</sup> and inscriptions to the Trio, whether together or as individuals, are common in Gaul, though the military Rhine region has left

<sup>1</sup> A coin of Lyons shows the head of Augustus with a caduceus in the background.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 1691 mentions a *sacerdos ad templ(um) Ro(mae et) AVGGG*; that is, the Three Augusti, Septimius Severus, Caracalla, and Geta; after the fall of Geta, the third G was erased.

<sup>3</sup> *id.*, 412, 445, 602, and *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> Eumenius, *pro rest. schol.*

more. Jupiter Optimus Maximus is found alone, frequently bearing epithets which denote his benevolent protectorship: *Conservator, Auctor Bonarum Tempestatum, Salutaris, Depulsor*.<sup>1</sup>

There were gods worshipped in Gaul who, though less clearly important in a political sense, are of greater interest to the student of religious development. It was not a Roman characteristic to suppress the gods of the peoples whom they conquered, unless those gods possessed mischievous political powers or potentialities. Indeed they had assimilated to their own Italian deities the gods of Olympus, welcomed the gods of the East with equal readiness, and they now adopted the Gaulish horse-goddess Epona with as little reluctance as they had received the Magna Mater. The Gaulish gods lived and thrived, sometimes assimilated to gods of the Graeco-Roman Pantheon, sometimes in strange mysterious forms not without a crude and uncouth beauty. This *natio admodum dedita religionibus*<sup>2</sup> was not prepared to yield up its native numina, but preserved them more or less merged with the intruding gods as they found in the latter the characteristics of their ancient deities. A study of the civilization of Roman Gaul can lead to but one conclusion: the Gauls became Roman eagerly and, as time passed, completely. This spirit of imitation was the motive force in the development of Gallo-Roman religion, as the absence of an impeding principle, such as a combative monotheism or an authoritative priestly class, was the passive agent. The desire to earn the good graces of as many gods as possible stimulated the tendency; Graeco-Roman and Celtic gods cohabited and then fused, in nomenclature and in plastic representation.

The affinities existing between the Gaulish gods and the Graeco-Roman had been apparent to Caesar, and the assimilation of the former to the latter deities may be said to have begun with the *Commentaries* of the great commander, whose passage on the gods of Gaul merits quotation *in extenso*:<sup>3</sup>

*Deum maxime Mercurium colunt; huius sunt plurima simulacra, hunc omnium*

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 6, 240, 1673, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, *B. G.*, vi, 16.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vi, 17, 18.

*inuentorem artium ferunt, hunc uiarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque habere uim maximam arbitrantur; post hunc Apollinem et Martem et Iouem et Mineruam. De his eandem fere quam reliquae gentes habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere, Mineruam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere, Iouem imperium caelestium tenere, Martem bella regere . . . Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant.*

Assimilation by nomenclature is here evident, while, in the realm of plastic art, sculptors brought from the Mediterranean to carve or mould such statues as the colossal Mercury Vassogalatus<sup>1</sup> completed the process in terms of three dimensions. Let us leave aside those gods of the Graeco-Roman Pantheon who appear to have hidden no Gaulish deity beneath their stereotyped exteriors and proceed to a survey of those gods who, like their worshippers, could now say: *duae nobis patriae sunt.*

In that part of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* devoted to the provinces of Lugdunensis, Belgica, and Aquitania (Volume XIII) are to be found over three hundred dedications to Mercury. Many of these bear names of Gaulish origin appended to the simple dedicatory formula **DEO MERCVRIO** and distinct from epithets which might be found commonly in other parts of the Roman world (*Cultor, Domesticus, Mercator, Negotiator, Nundinator, Viator*, though these titles are interesting in the light of Caesar's assertion quoted above).<sup>2</sup> The popularity of Mercury in all parts of Gaul is the salient feature of the Gallo-Roman religion, so that Caesar's words seem almost too weak to fit the case. Were Caesar's *plurima simulacra* the shapeless trunks of Lucan or more finished images due to the slow infiltration of Mediterranean ideas through the Provincia? It is difficult to say; but Caesar found the Gauls worshipping a god who protected trade; who should this be but Mercury? If the Gaulish god was not nameless before the conquest, the name was probably known to the Druids alone, and when a name was needed for a votive inscription or for any other purpose, that god of the invaders who was obviously akin to him in function and probably

<sup>1</sup> The artist was Zenodorus. Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxiv, 6, 18.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 5849, 6476, *et passim.*

already hazily known through the infiltration of ideas from the Romanized south would clearly lend his name and possibly his plastic shape to his anonymous and amorphous fellow-deity.

Early in the days of Roman dominion, Mercury appears as the tutelary of the potters of Lezoux. His image is ugly and stiff, that of

A sordid god; down from his hoary chin  
A length of beard descends uncombed, unclean.

Arrayed in tunic and breeches, he is quite unlike the swift messenger of classical mythology, but he bears the calceus and the petasus and upon his body is the inscription **MERCVRIO ET AVGVSTO SACRVM**.<sup>1</sup> Epithets attached to Mercury are sometimes apparently tokens of his equation to topical gods. He is coupled in ex-votos and dedications with certain female deities, especially the Maiae and Rosmerta,<sup>2</sup> who is possibly a doublet of Mercury himself. The recurrence of the syllable *smer* in the name of this consort and in the epithets accorded to the god would suggest this, while the possible interpretation of the syllable as 'brilliant' has led scholars to identify Mercury with Ogmios, the Irish god of the Shining Face or Ogma Grianainech, who taught writing to the Irish, and with the smiling and eloquent Ogmios of Lucian.<sup>3</sup> Under the epithet *Moccus* perhaps lies an old boar- or pig-cult, while in connexion with the epithet of Cultor has been cited a dedication to Mercurius *Artaius*, which Rhys connected with the Welsh *âr* (ploughland).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Reinach, *Idées générales sur l'art de Gaule*, *Revue d'Archéologie*, 1905, ii, 306-13.

<sup>2</sup> Maiae, C. I. L. XIII, 1769; Rosmerta, *id.*, 4192-5, &c. Merc. Adsmerius, *id.*, 1125; Atesmerius, 3023.

<sup>3</sup> Rhys, *The Gaulish Pantheon* (Hibbert Lectures, 1886), London, 1892, pp. 13 ff.; cf. Anwyl in *Celtic Review*, July, 1906-April, 1907, p. 39. For other interpretations, Holder, *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*; D'Arbois de Jubainville in *Revue Archéologique*, 1908, xi, p. 422.

<sup>4</sup> Rhys, *op. cit.*, p. 6; C. I. L. XII, 2199. Jubainville connects Artaius with bear-cult; cf. Dea Artio, C. I. L. XIII, 4113, 5160, &c., Andarte, among the Vocontii, the Big She-bear; cf. also Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1920 ff., vol. vi, p. 47.

Other epithets abound and have given rise to much learned debate, which space will not allow us to discuss here. Most striking, however, of all the characteristics of Mercury is that which makes him appear as the national god of Gaul; only among the more bellicose peoples north of the Seine had he a serious rival in the person of Mars, who, as we shall see, may have been but the war-like aspect of a god whose cultural aspect was personified as Mercury. In central Gaul, Mercury was master, and his chief temples stood on the high places, on the Mont-de-Sène, the Mont Donon, and on the Puy-de-Dôme, where he was revered as *Mercurius Arvernus*<sup>1</sup> in the vast temple of Vassogalatus. Jullian sees in this Mercury the Teutates of Lucan, the 'God of the People'.<sup>2</sup>

Dedications to and plastic representations of Mercury come from all over the Three Gauls; many of his worshippers bear Gaulish names and were hence drawn from the humbler classes. Not a single Imperial dignitary figures among the private devotees and few possess the *tria nomina* of Roman citizenship. The cult of Mercury may then be considered as a superficially Romanized native worship. The Romanization was progressive; gradually the god took upon himself more and more of the signs of the classical Mercury-Hermes. His beard disappeared, he was rejuvenated, stripped of his tunic and breeches, and now he never forgot his caduceus, his hat, his purse, or sandals (or possibly a cornucopia); but he was accompanied by a cock, a ram, a goat, a tortoise, the last three of which are said to represent some chthonian trait in the god. Mercury-Teutates may have been the Dispatier from whom the Gauls claimed descent and who, like the Gaulish man, donned Roman dress and Roman manners.

Mercury's most serious rival was Mars, to whom some two hundred inscriptions are to be found in the thirteenth volume of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. He was particularly congenial to

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 1522, 7845, 8164, &c; *Arvernoricus*, *id.*, 6603. For the temple, Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Fr.*, i, 32.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, pp. 118-22; vi, 28-32, 50 ff.; *Vercingétorix*, Paris, 1920, p. 21 ff.; cf. Lucan, *Phars.*, i, 445.

the Belgae and Armoricans, in whose territory his worship tended to oust that of the culture god, to whom on the other hand he yielded place in the more peaceful and civilized south. In Bordeaux, the cult of Mercury excluded that of Mars; at Bourges, as at other places, the gods were rivals and both took the epithet *Visucius*.<sup>1</sup> In the north, Mars' temples were rich, as those of Mercury were in the south. His native epithets appear mainly to indicate the war-like character of the god: *Caturix* (King in battle); *Camulus* (the Strong); *Segomo* (the Upholder?); *Dunates* (God of the Hill-Fort, *dunum*), but two inscriptions are more significant. These apply to Mars the epithets *Smertullos* (? *Smertutius* or *Smertrios*? The *smert* is certain) and *Smertrios*, names which contain that syllable which we have seen closely connected with Mercury and his consort.

May it not then be concluded that Mars and Mercury are but alternating aspects of one vague god? Generally speaking, in any district, the number of Mercury's temples is in indirect ratio to the number of the shrines of Mars; the two gods take the same and similar epithets; both frequently become topical gods;<sup>2</sup> both are personal tutelars;<sup>3</sup> both drew the majority of their worshippers from the lower strata of society, for whom, no doubt, these deities were but shaped and named representatives of the shapeless and nameless gods whom they had adored aforetime.

Caesar called Apollo a healer of diseases, and as a healer, indeed, we find him in the dedications made to him by the Gallo-Romans; but this sanative character is intimately connected with his aspect as a sun- or warmth-god, for his cult is found centred round the thermal springs and on his monuments occurs from time to time the solar wheel.<sup>4</sup> His cognomina are sometimes descriptive of this character: *Grannus*,<sup>5</sup> which Rhys connects with a Celtic word

<sup>1</sup> Mercury, C. I. L. XIII, 6118, 6347, 577, &c.; Mars, *id.*, 5991, 6404, &c. Meaning 'the Wise'? Jullian, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 118. *Smert...* names, C. I. L. XIII, 4119, 11975.

<sup>2</sup> Mars Vorocius, C. I. L. XIII, 1497. Cf. village Vorocius in Peutinger Table; Mars Vicinnus, *id.*, 3150. Cf. stream Viciniona > Vilaine. For Mercury, see above.

<sup>3</sup> **MARTI SVO**, *id.*, 1353; Merc. Domesticus, *id.*, 7276, 7757.

<sup>4</sup> e. g. *id.*, 5025, near Lausanne.

<sup>5</sup> *id.*, 2600, 6462, &c.; Rhys, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

meaning 'gleam, brightness', and compares with Dacian inscriptions to *Bonus Puer Posphorus Apollo Pythius*; *Bormo* or *Borvo*, latinized forms of some name connected with the modern Welsh 'berw, berwi' (boil, bubble, seeth), singularly applicable to a god of thermal springs.<sup>1</sup> When he has the epithet *Maponus*,<sup>2</sup> he is a spring-god, for he appears frequently with a goddess Sirona or *Dirona*, who is represented as a matronly figure bearing fruit or corn and possessing a marked resemblance to the *Matronae* of Eastern Gaul; now these *Matronae* were undoubtedly earth-, spring-, or fertility-deities, and *Maponus*, on the other hand, can hardly be unconnected with the Welsh 'Mabon mab Modron' (Mabon son of Modron) who figures in the ancient Welsh legend of 'Kulhwch and Olwen'. It would seem, then, that Apollo *Maponus* was *Maponus* son of *Matrona* or *Sirona*—that is, the spring, issue of the Earth. The intimate association of Apollo with thermal springs is shown in place-names; *Aquae Granni* became Aix-la-Chapelle; in the Vosges are the *Eaux Grannes* of Plombières; names such as *Bourbonne-les-Bains*, *Bourbonne-Lancy*, abound, while the family name of the Bourbons was supposed to justify the claim of the *Roi-Soleil* to be descended from the Sungod.

In one inscription, Apollo is given the title *Toutiorix*,<sup>3</sup> which would seem to mean 'King of the People' and which carries our mind back immediately to *Teutates*. Is then Apollo but another aspect of the great Celtic national deity? It would seem probable. A few of his worshippers bear the *tria nomina*, but most, like those of Mercury and of Mars, were humble folk. In geographical distribution, Apollo's inscriptions correspond fairly closely to those of Mercury, but this is perhaps due rather to the absence of hot springs in the north than to preference on the part of the worshippers. It must be added that Apollo is found, especially in the Rhine districts, bearing the conventional names of *Sol*, *Pythius*, *Invictus*, and the like.

If, as Caesar tells us, the Gauls claimed descent from *Dispater*,

<sup>1</sup> *id.*, 2805-8, &c.

<sup>2</sup> *id.*, 5924, cf. C. I. L. VII, 218, for Britain.

<sup>3</sup> *id.*, 7564.

we might expect to find numerous dedications to him in Roman Gaul. Such is not the case, and though the natural disinclination to erect altars or temples to the infernal gods may account to some extent for the lack of votive inscriptions, we may perhaps more rightly infer that Caesar's application of the name Dispater to some chthonian god was purely arbitrary and based upon some superficial resemblance. There is cause to see in the hammer-bearing and the horned gods, whose images are numerous in Gaul, the qualities of a Dispater or of a Jupiter, but the identification must remain hypothetical.

Neptune was worshipped chiefly on the Rhine and in some spring localities, where the name of Apollo might have been expected; while in Armorica, where the sea obtruded itself continually on the senses, Neptune is not to be found. He would appear to veil but thinly some watery god of the Celts. Where *nautae* had their *canabae*, there the vigorous old smith-god Vulcan is found, and it is probable that he represents a constructive god, who may be identical with the axe-god Esus of Lucan's Triad, whom we shall meet again. Silvanus was adored in the Rhine region, but he was also invoked by the *fabri tignarii* of Forum Segusiavorum, perhaps as a timber-god<sup>1</sup> and he is coupled with the mountain deities by his devotees in Iberian Aquitania.<sup>2</sup>

Juno was but little worshipped in Gaul and then chiefly as the Capitoline goddess, but the cult of Minerva stretched from the Pyrenees to the Rhine—the cult of Minerva, that is, as distinct from her worship as a member of the Capitoline group. On the Rhine she was Pallas; she is found in the Three Gauls as *Regina*, but the fact that in Gaul her worshippers were members of the lowlier classes suggests that she disguised a pre-Roman deity. Near the Pyrenees she is named *Belisama*, an epithet which, if connected with Belatucadrus, makes of her a Pallas rather than a Minerva, a warrior rather than a protectress of peaceful pursuits. Caesar's Gaulish equivalent of Minerva is definitely an initiator of crafts, and, since Aquitania was a district of energetic miners and workers, it is

<sup>1</sup> *id.*, 1640.

<sup>2</sup> *id.*, 38.

likely that Belisama Minerva was their patron. It is almost certainly as a peaceful goddess that she was worshipped at Notre Dame d'Alençon, where silver vases were dedicated to her.<sup>1</sup>

The pre-Roman forest-infesting spirit was generally in Roman times equated to Diana, who was associated with Silvanus and assimilated to Abnoba of the Black Forest.<sup>2</sup> She appears with a dog, as a huntress, and she is invoked by *ursarii*.<sup>3</sup> At Trèves, an inscription to her is cut in the living rock among wooded hills,<sup>4</sup> while in Auvergne some sort of a cult-circle, the *Dianenses*,<sup>5</sup> possibly a *collegium funeraticium*, possibly a group of hunters or, as has been suggested, a society of occultists, gathered round her. Luna and Hecate are found in Gaul but rarely; as a heavenly body, Diana was associated with Apollo,<sup>6</sup> while the classical tradition of the goddess as protectress of women in travail was apparently perpetuated.<sup>7</sup>

The hero-god of greatest popularity in Gaul was Hercules, to whom legend attributed the foundation of Alesia and the slaying of a monster, a Gaulish equivalent of Geryon.<sup>8</sup> He was everywhere a benevolent god invoked as a tutelar of roads, quarries, factories, and homes. Some of his epithets are of doubtful meaning, but *Saxsanus* would appear to be a god of quarrymen, imported perhaps from Tibur, where great quarries were worked and Hercules was especially worshipped.<sup>9</sup> Most interesting of all his cognomina is that of *Oglaios*,<sup>10</sup> which recalls Lucian's assimilation to Hercules of a Celtic Ogmios, a culture god who appears to have been at bottom more akin to Mercury. Lucian describes a smiling old man of gracious aspect, carrying a club, while from his tongue stretch chains

<sup>1</sup> *id.*, 3100.

<sup>3</sup> *id.*, 5243, at Zurich.

<sup>5</sup> *id.*, 1495.

<sup>7</sup> Greg. of Tours, *H. Fr.*, viii, 15; *de mir. beati Andr. apost.*, 25.

<sup>8</sup> Diod. Sic., v. 24; Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Jullian, *op. cit.*, vi, p. 34; C. I. L. XIII, 4623-5, &c., cf. XIV. 3543.

<sup>10</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 11295; cf. XII, 5710. Lucian, *προλαλία ὁ Ἡρακλῆς*. See also Dottin, *La religion des Gaulois*, Paris, 1898, p. 5. For the Ogmios-Hercules-Mercury equation, cf. C. I. L. XIII, 3020, if Mercurius Clavariatis is a club-bearer.

to the ears of many people who follow him. Wisdom and urbanity are symbolized by smiling age, and to the quality of eloquence have been given the signs of attachment and of force; the club alone was sufficient to make any Mediterranean author call the figure Hercules.

Isolated dedications are to be found to other deities of the Graeco-Roman Pantheon, but they appear to be unconnected with any widespread cult and may be passed over. We may terminate our review of the Graeco-Roman gods assimilated to Celtic deities with a mention of the Nymphs, who, except in the Rhine region, where they are coupled with Apollo and Diana, have possibly no classical character apart from their mere name. In Aquitania, the region which, after the Germanies, has yielded most traces of their worship, we may see in them water-sprites, now perhaps for the first time bearing a distinct generic name.

It may be said, from a study of those Gallo-Roman gods who bear a classical name and plastic form, that underneath this thin disguise lurks the spirit that the independent Gauls adored; nor is it too venturesome to suggest that at least three of these gods, known to us as Mercury, Mars, and Apollo, are but personifications of particular aspects of a dimly perceived deity whose all-embracing character was known to the Druids alone before Caesar's arrival. The ready assimilation of native to intruding gods is perhaps chiefly due to the fundamental resemblances existing in the religious conceptions of the peoples of Gaul and of Italy.

But there are gods who, by their crude forms, their strange postures, and unfamiliar names, proclaim their essential difference from the Olympians. Around these ugly and unheeding figures learned debates have raged and rage still; these ungainly mannikins are still much of a riddle, and in an essay of this length it would be both impracticable and tedious to detail the theories to which this weird Pantheon has given rise.

Certain reservations must at once be made. Dottin has sagely remarked <sup>1</sup> that not all of these figures are of necessity gods. Few,

<sup>1</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 9.

if any, of them are older than the Roman conquest of northern Gaul; some have no distinct divine attributes, but meanings have been read into the circles and crosses which adorn their simple dress. Are we worshippers of the Olympians or of Buddha because classical statuettes and oriental knick-knacks are found in our houses? Are mystic meanings to be read into the stripes and checks of our coats and trousers? Moreover, the list of 'gods' is for ever lengthening. An ingenious attempt has been made to include in the Gaulish Pantheon our hearty friend Gargantua, on the strength of a gloss: *Gurguntius filius nobilis illius Beleni*,<sup>1</sup> while it has been a commonplace amongst scholars to attempt to explain the Gaulish gods in terms of Irish mythology. We shall refrain from such explanations here, but some summary of those hypotheses which seem to offer the most satisfactory interpretations of the attributes of these gods may be made.

There exist many plastic images of a being of human shape, clad in Celtic breeches and tunic or wearing the skin of an animal cast over his shoulder; he is usually bearded, and in one hand he carries a vase, in the other a hammer of varying size, while upon his head is a knot of hair or a crown like that of Pluto-Serapis.<sup>2</sup> The hammer, which may be of fanciful design—one has a circle of smaller hammers radiating from its head—has been interpreted as the thunder-hammer, the creative or shaping hammer, a degenerate stone of a lithobolic god. From these diverse interpretations have been deduced equations of the bearer of the hammer to Thor, Jupiter, Silvanus, Vulcan, Teutates, Taranis, while the pelt on the figure's shoulder has made of him a Hercules, an *exactor luporum*. That he was essentially a benevolent deity appears from an altar bas-relief<sup>3</sup> in which a hammer-bearer named *Sucellos* (the good striker?) appears with a gracious consort Nantosuelta as a personal

<sup>1</sup> Lefevre, *Origines et Croyances*, Paris, 1900, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Some 36 of these statuettes at the Musée de St. Germain. See also Esperandieu, *Recueil . . . de bas-reliefs*, *Éc.*, Paris, 1908 ff., Nos. 1583, 1621, *et passim*; Reinach, *Bronzes Figurés*, Paris, 1894, pp. 140 ff., Nos. 144 ff.

<sup>3</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 4542; *Sucellos* also occurs *id.*, 5057, 6224, &c.

tutelar. In one of the Altars of Paris <sup>1</sup> is another *Smert . . . os*, who raises a club against a snake; this bearded god (who might be a Mars, a Mercury or a Hercules) appears to have some connexion with the hammer-bearers. His serpent, like the worm Jörmungand of Scandinavian myth, may represent some aquatic catastrophe, and it is interesting to note in this connexion that the T was used at Autun during a pest as a prophylaxis <sup>2</sup> and that in bygone days the Druids had taught that the Earth would finally be destroyed by fire and water.<sup>3</sup> The only thing certain is the beneficence of the deity, and the difficulty of interpretation, a difficulty which grows with each new specimen that one examines, is a powerful argument against any definitive equation, the more so as every other of these quasi-nameless gods presents a similar problem.

The god with a wheel can most readily be associated with a cosmic idea: god of the solar disc or god of the thunder, whose mighty wheel shakes the firmament. The former identification would equate him to Apollo, the latter to Jupiter, while the fact that tiny wheels have been found in river beds has caused him to be described as a protector of travellers and hence a Mercury. A small bronze statuette preserved at St. Germain-en-Laye would appear to place the matter beyond dispute, for the wheel-bearer has also a thunderbolt; a statue of Jupiter has a wheel sculptured on its base,<sup>4</sup> but so, too, has an Apollo.<sup>5</sup> A fragmentary statue from Luxeuil <sup>6</sup> shows a horseman with a wheel-buckler crushing beneath his horse's hoofs a human body; the group appears to belong to the class of sculptures of horsemen and anguipeds common in Gaul and which is thought to represent a sky-god crushing a monster of darkness, light defeating night. At summer solstice festivals until quite recent times, in France, a fiery wheel was rolled down a hill into a river if possible, and this long-lived usage would strengthen the view that the wheel was a symbol of warmth, light,

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 3026 (3).

<sup>2</sup> Greg. Tours, *Hist. Eccl.* V. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, iv, 4, 4.

<sup>4</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 8195.

<sup>5</sup> *id.*, 5025.

<sup>6</sup> Esperandieu, in *Revue Archéologique*, 1917, pp. 287 ff.

and fertility. Thus the Celtic sky-god might have the functions and the attributes of both Jupiter and Apollo.

On another side of the Altar of Paris on which *Smert . . . os* appears can be seen in low relief a being of majestic mien, of human shape, save that from his brow sprout antlers on which are suspended torques. His proportions suggest (for the lower part of the figure is missing) that he was in a squatting position; above his head is the now almost illegible inscription: **CERNVNNOS** (the horned one). An altar from Rheims, discovered in 1837, has a similar figure, with antlered brow and torque-girt neck, squatting cross-legged and holding between his knees a sack from which escape grains which are being eaten by two horned animals (stag and bull?); below him has been seen a serpent; above him, in the centre of the fronton, is a rat; on either side of him Apollo and Mercury stand. One of the interior panels of the famous Cauldron of Gundestrup has a squatting, antlered figure wearing a torque about his neck, grasping a second torque in his right hand, a serpent in his left; he is surrounded, moreover, by a host of animals, of which three are horned. It would be tedious to enumerate all the examples of horned gods which exist; it is relevant to note, however, that Cernunnos appears on an altar of Paris, the headquarters of the Seine's river traffic and of the *Nautae Parisiaci*, a rich and powerful corporation as early as the reign of Tiberius. On an altar from Saintes, a horned god is associated with a goddess of the Matrona fertility type. The existence on another Paris altar of a bas-relief representing a bull on whose back perch three cranes and who is named **TARVOS TRIGARANVS**<sup>1</sup> has caused scholars to see in the horned gods the anthropomorphized relics of an ancient zoomorphic cult. The constant association of the horned gods with beasts usually connected with chthonian ideas would appear to give them a definite subterranean character, while their connexion with rivers and with deities of water and fertility narrows down this earth-character to the more special one of water rising from the earth and making it fertile. The sacrifice of oxen by the

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 3026 (2).

Druids for the apparent purpose of ensuring the fertility of the fields establishes a contact between the zoomorphic and fertility powers.<sup>1</sup>

Not least uncouth among the bizarre Gaulish gods were the three-headed or three-faced gods whose images, sometimes in a squatting posture, have been unearthed in many parts of France. It is difficult to refrain from connecting the triplication of head or face with the frequent grouping in threes found in the religious sculpture of Gaul, and with the literary 'triads' dear to the old Welsh bards; some doubt has, however, been cast on the Celtic nature of the tricephal by the suggestion that the figures may be nothing more than rude *Iani Quadrifrontes*, whose fourth head or face has been omitted, as it would in any case be unseen. A coin of Hadrian shows a three-headed Ianus,<sup>2</sup> and in classical sculpture the threefold was not unfamiliar. There is, however, an attractive theory advanced by M. Reinach in his *Bronzes Figurés* (p. 121), and I will venture to sum it up. Recalling the myth of Γηρυονεύς τρικάρανος (Hesiod, *Theog.* 287), he says: (i) the Geryon of fable, from whom Hercules ravished his cattle, dwelt in the westernmost part of Europe; (ii) at first his name meant not a herdsman, but a bull, from γηρών (to bellow); (iii) Ammianus Marcellinus (xv, 9) associates two tyrants slain by Hercules, Geryon of Spain and *Tauriscus* of Gaul; that is, a Gaulish Geryon, named Tauriscus; (iv) a personage with three bulls' heads appears on an Etruscan scarabaeus, while on a vase (*Cat. Brit. Mus.* ii. B. 308) three men with bulls' heads and tails appear above the struggle of Hercules and Nemeaus; (v) a bull with three horns is found in Gallo-Roman art: ταῦρος τρικέρατος; (vi) the Altar of Paris has Tarvos Trigaranus. Now τρικάρανος was confused with *trigaranus* and three cranes were substituted for the three heads or horns of the bull; (vii) *garano-* is a Celtic root almost identical with *geryon*; (viii) two cranes like those of the Paris Altar appear on the Arch of Orange; (ix) a denarius of Postumus, struck in Gaul, shows Hercules combating a triple

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *N. H.*, xv, sect. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Mowat, in *Bulletin Epigr.*, i. 30 ff., and iii. 169.

Geryon. There is at the Musée de Saint-Germain a small bronze representing Hercules pressing down a three-headed monster. What is the conclusion? That the tricephal is the relic of an old zoomorphic cult, which had also been the source of other plastic forms. 'Supposons,' says M. Reinach, 'qu'il existât, dans la mythologie des Gaulois de l'Est, un dieu dit *Taruos Trigaranos*; quand il s'agit de lui donner une figure plastique, on eut alternativement recours aux types suivants, qui répondaient par à peu près à la dénomination pré-existante: 1. le taureau à trois cornes (*taurus tricornis*); 2. le taureau avec trois grues (*taruos trigaranos*); 3. le dieu tricéphale (*τρικέφαλος*); 4. le dieu à cornes de taureau.'

The theory is attractive, as it explains not only the origin of the tricephalic deities, but of the mysterious bull with his three cranes, of the three-horned bulls and of the horned gods, since from figures with the horns of bulls to figures with the horns of deer the transition is neither long nor difficult of explanation. The question is, however, merely shifted back a step. What was the triple god of the ancient Gauls, this monster whom Hercules smote? A pre-Celtic zoomorphic deity driven under the Earth and hence assuming the character of a fertility god? It is probable, though not certain.

The squatting attitude which many of these gods, tricephals and horned, adopt, has been with some ingenuity connected with the posture of the scribe-god Imhotep of the Egyptians, who, forming a trio with Phtah and Mut-Hathor, has sometimes an infernal character, since the souls of the dead unite with his.<sup>1</sup> The god would then possess a culture quality and might represent that deity known as Ogmios, who was assimilable to Hercules, Mercury, and Hermes. The argument is not convincing, and the fact that the attitude is given to gods of apparently different functions strengthens the hypothesis that the cross-legged position was merely a usual Celtic pose, perhaps aided in plastic representation by the Buddha-like posture of certain Alexandrine deities.

<sup>1</sup> Reinach, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Within the number of these gods some place must be found for Lucan's "Triad":

*et quibus immitis placatur sanguine diro  
Teutates horrensque feris altaris Hesus  
et Taranis Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae.*

*Pharsalia*, i, 444-6.

None of the three succeeded in becoming entirely independent of classical gods during the Roman period and none was welcomed to the Roman Pantheon. Esus alone has (what may be) a portrait: it is one side of that altar which bears on its three other faces the figures of Tarvos Trigaranus, Jove, and Vulcan. A half-naked and bearded man is apparently chopping down a tree, but his axe has disappeared. A monument from Trèves<sup>1</sup> bears a similar subject, with the addition of birds in the branches of the tree, but its inscription is to Mercury. Is the woodman Esus, Mercury, or a servant of the god choosing material for a temple under the guidance of the sacred birds? A scholiast to Lucan says: *Hesus Mars sic placatur: homo in arbore suspenditur usque donec per cruorem membra digesserit*; and again, *Hesum Mercurium credunt, si quidem a mercatoribus colitur et praesidem bellorum et caelestium deorum maximum Taranin Iouem adsuetum olim humani placari capitibus, nunc uero gaudere pecorum*. Thus Esus, like Smertrios, could be identified with either Mercury or Mars; in other words, he has a peace aspect and a war aspect; he is alternately and equally both Mars and Mercury.

Taranis, whose name has been compared to Celtic words meaning 'thunder' and whom the scholiast quoted above identifies with Jupiter, is known to us from one Celtic inscription,<sup>2</sup> while *Taranucnos*<sup>3</sup> may mean 'son of Taranis'.

Teutates, whose nature we have discussed in connexion with Mercury, would probably possess the character of a national god; his form is not known and the vague nature of his powers makes all the more possible his assimilation to a number of Graeco-Roman

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 3656.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. L. XII, p. 820.

<sup>3</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 6054.

gods and to local gods, who were particularly hardy. It is at the least likely that some such vague deity was the source of the Gallo-Roman Mercury, Mars, Teutates, Esus, Taranis, Dispat, Silvanus, even Sucellos and Cernunnos, as his many aspects required expression in anthropomorphized form or in nomenclature.

Evidences of lingering animal cults may be seen in the epithets of *Moccus*, *Artaius*, and the like given to the greater gods, in the boar- and horse-standards which the Gauls carried into battle and which figure on the Arch of Orange, and in the strange story of the nine Gallizenae, virgins who dwelt on an island and possessed magical powers, including that of transforming themselves into any animal they pleased.<sup>1</sup> Clearer evidence is furnished by Epona, whose images represent a female figure riding on a horse; she holds a cornucopia or a key (that of the stable?); sometimes she is accompanied by a mare and foals or is seated in a chair surrounded by foals. She was a goddess of horses and was perhaps originally conceived as a horse-goddess, such as the Choucy bas-relief pictures her.<sup>2</sup> *Epona dea mulionum est*, says the scholiast to Juvenal, while Apuleius puts the matter beyond doubt with his: *Respiciis pilae mediae quae stabuli irabes sustinebat, in ipso fere meditullio Eponae deae simulacrum residens aediculae, quod accurate corollis roseis equidem recentibus fuerat ornatum*.<sup>3</sup> At Meaux a statuette of Epona and an earthenware figure of a mule were found in close proximity in the ruins of a circus.<sup>4</sup> Epona was extremely popular; her inscriptions and images are very numerous and she was adopted into the Roman Pantheon, her cult spreading through Italy and the northern provinces.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pomponius Mela, iii, 48.

<sup>2</sup> Jubainville, *Druides*, Paris, 1906, p. 136; Anwyl, in *Celtic Review*, 1906-7, pp. 36-41.

<sup>3</sup> *Met.*, iii, 27.

<sup>4</sup> Gassies, in *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 1901, p. 144.

<sup>5</sup> Juvenal, viii, 157; Apuleius, *loc. cit.*; cf. hippic rites in Germany, Tacitus, *Germ.*, 10. See also Reinach in *Rev. Archéol.* 1902, xl, p. 238. In this horse-rearing country the Dioscuri had had equivalents: *Timaeus*, *F.H.G.*, i, p. 194, frag. 6. Few inscriptions in Roman times, but they appear on an Altar of Paris with Cernunnos and Smert . . . os. C. I. L. XIII, 3026 (3).

Other traces of animal cults are to be found in the bronze horse unearthed at Neuvy-en-Sullias and dedicated to the god Rudiobos, in the images of boars found at the same place and in the Gaulish Diana seated on the back of a boar.<sup>1</sup> The existence of zoomorphic plastic representations in Druidic times suggests that the Druids were unable completely to suppress these images of an ancient, perhaps pre-Druidic, cult or that they considered them too unimportant to rival the great gods and hence merit suppression. Their survival into Roman times is a perpetual enigma and we can but conclude that the animal cults represent a very ancient and deep-rooted religious stratum, relegated, perhaps, to an inferior place by the culture and war gods of the Celtic conquerors, and owing their continued being to the aboriginal element in the population or to the countryfolk who, by reason of their comparative isolation from centres of culture or because of their close contact with animal life, found these zoomorphic representations in closer correspondence with their needs and aspirations than the vague Teutates and his other Gaulish or Gallo-Roman selves.

'C'est par milliers qu'il faut compter dans la mythologie gauloise les divinités tantôt mâles, tantôt femelles, des fontaines, des lacs et des rivières.'<sup>2</sup> The ancient water cults, like the animal cults, survived the Roman conquest, which but succeeded in imposing on the water-sprites names and sometimes forms: it might even be said that the deities of springs have survived the advent of Christianity. Apollo and Neptune were connected with inland waters; Nemausus, who gave his name to the city of Nîmes, was the god of the town's fountain; many French rivers and streams bear names such as 'Dive', 'Die', 'Divonne', all deriving from such original names as *Deua*, *Diuona*;<sup>3</sup> the Nymphs bore individual names: Acionna, Clutonda; the Rhine, the Seine, the Marne, the Yonne, the Sagonne and many another river were objects of worship.<sup>4</sup> In the countryside, little *fana* were everywhere to be found in

<sup>1</sup> Reinach, *Bronzes Fig.*, pp. 250 ff., 248.

<sup>2</sup> Valentin, F., *Les dieux de la cité des Allobroges*.

<sup>3</sup> *Revue Celtique*, 1873-5, pp. 1-9.

<sup>4</sup> C. I. L. XIII, *passim*.

close proximity to the springs or ponds,<sup>1</sup> whither flocked pregnant women, lovers, weak and sickly men, women and children, the maimed, the halt and the blind, sufferers from all manner of diseases; these afflicted ones drank, bathed, or did both, in supreme indifference to hygienic considerations, and left behind them some small present, often a tiny image of the part affected. Some seem to have left their ailment behind, too.

Connected with the water cults, but often indistinguishable from personal tutelars and guardians of the home, were the *Matres*, *Matrae*, or *Matronae*, who occur mainly along the Rhine frontier, where, among hundreds of inscriptions in their honour, occur many local cognomina. Their images show groups of three female figures of kindly appearance, carrying cornucopias, flowers, fruit, and sometimes infants; the earthenware figurines of single females suckling one or more babes perhaps represent a Mater detached from the conventional trio. Similar deities and similar plastic forms occur elsewhere in the Roman world, so that it is difficult to assign to them a definite Celtic or Germanic origin; we may regard them as hypostatized alimentary forces of nature, water and spring and earth fertility powers that suckle humanity.

From Aquitania come a host of local nature gods, mountain-dwellers, tree gods, among whom may be mentioned a *deus Fagus*, an *Abellio*, perhaps an Iberian Apollo, and the *Sex Arbores* to which an inscription is raised.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere, too, these tree and forest gods existed. Iberian Aquitania has provided the names of scores of gods otherwise completely unknown to us.<sup>3</sup>

Before we pass to the oriental gods, some mention must be made of the personal and social tutelars. Such were the *Genii Ciuitatum*, the *Tutelae*, the *Genii Locorum*, the *Lares Biuiarum*, *Triuiarum*, and *Quadriuiarum*, while the house had its *Lares et Penates* of Roman

<sup>1</sup> L. de Vesly, *Les Fana . . . de la région normande*, Rouen, 1909, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 33 (Fagus, also 223-5); 39, 40, 77 &c. (Abellio, supposed by some to be an apple-god); 129, 132, 175 (Sex Arboribus).

<sup>3</sup> I have compiled a list from C. I. L. XIII of some 30 Iberian gods of unknown character and some 70 Celtic.

type or its god with the hammer, the individual his *Genius* or her *Juno*, his great god reduced to the status of personal protector by the epithet *meus*, *suus*. Trades, whether organized or not into *collegia*, had their divine guardians, *Mercurius Mercator* or *Negotiator*, *Hercules Saxsanus*, or even a specially created *Genius* or *Juno*, when the plastic portrayal might be made specially significant. Of this latter type is the *Juno Saponaria* whom Prof. Jullian sees in a bas-relief from Grand.<sup>1</sup>

By the time of the Antonines, the Graeco-Roman and the Celtic Pantheons were in a state of more or less complete fusion or amicable juxtaposition on Gaulish soil, and in this period is continued and consummated that movement which began with the welcoming to Rome of Cybele and Isis. Gods from the near East flocked to Italy and to the western provinces, to be gladly received and, in their turn, to affect the religious mind of their new adherents. The novelties which these cults offered to the Gaul were chiefly the importance of mystery and ritual and the importance of women.

The Alexandrine Serapis and Jupiter-Ammon were worshipped by but a few, the former chiefly along the Rhine, the latter only among the Sequani, though Isis enjoyed a wider circle of devotees. She was *Victrix* and *Invicta*, represented with the lunar crescent, the lotus, and the sistrum; her worshippers were mainly officials and humble folk of oriental extraction. From Syria came the cults of Jupiter Heliopolitanus, Elegabalus, Dolichenus, and of these the last alone was of any importance north of the Pyrenees, and that chiefly in the military zone.

Asia Minor, however, contributed a worship which became popular in Gaul: that of the Magna Mater.<sup>2</sup> Although the companion Attis cult was rare in Gaul, the Mater flourished, especially along the trade routes. She is known as *Sancta* and her portraits show her as a mature female, gracious in aspect, crowned with a tower and escorted by lions; she carries a tympanum or a tam-

<sup>1</sup> Espérandieu, *Recueil*, no. 4892; *Revue des Études Anc.*, 1917, p. 201 f., cf. *Genius collegii locariorum* at Cologne, C. I. L. XIII, 8183.

<sup>2</sup> Over 30 inscriptions in C. I. L. XIII outside the Rhine areas.

bourine. All the accessories of her cult followed her; she had her *dendrophori*, her *Galli* and her *Archigallus*. The *taurobolium* became common in Gaul and with it spread the mystery of sanctification; it is noticeable, too, that many *taurobolia* were the gifts of women. The oldest dated inscription in Gaul referring to a *taurobolium* comes from Lyons, the year being A. D. 160, when the mystery was celebrated for the safety of Antoninus Pius.<sup>1</sup> A notice of Gregory of Tours<sup>2</sup> proves that in Gaul the Magna Mater was a fertility goddess, and this Earth-mother aspect undoubtedly had much to do with the rapid diffusion of her cult, in which the Gallo-Roman was but renewing his fidelity to those old gods whom he adored under the semblance of horned deities, and adding to his worship the spice of ceremony and ritual of a most attractive kind. The Druids had had their secrets to which few might be initiated; to the mysteries of the Eastern gods any devotee might gain admittance. Bellona, Sabazius, and Mithra appear, but they have few adorers outside the camps of the German frontier. In the Three Gauls no trace is found of Mithraic *taurobolia*. Possibly the flourishing Apollo refused to be ousted by this rival sun-god.

Already, however, syncretism is at work. The Magna Mater is a vast unification of the smaller local fertility powers; Isis is the goddess who peers through a thousand disguises and bears a thousand names.<sup>3</sup> The gods had been multiplied to such a point that the worshipper, anxious to obtain the favour of every deity who existed, could do no better than name a few gods and tail off his dedication lamely with the phrase *dis deabusque omnibus*.<sup>4</sup> The half-completed fusion of the Celtic and the Graeco-Roman Pantheons produced a confusion which could not but increase with the arrival of the oriental contingent. The situation was, however, saved to some extent by the fact that these latest comers claimed to embody within themselves all other numina. All the gods, Celtic,

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 1751.

<sup>2</sup> *In glor. confess.*, 76; cf. *Passio Sanct. Symph. Mart.*, 2.

<sup>3</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 3461 (Soissons) to Isis Myrionyma; cf. Apuleius, *Met.*, xi, 5.

<sup>4</sup> e. g. C. I. L. XIII, 8811, 1731, and often.

Greek, Roman, might now appear to the worshipper as aspects of one great deity who might be to one an Isis, to another a Magna Mater, to a third a Mercury. The *signa Panthea*<sup>1</sup> mark this advance in religious conception; they portray some particular god with the attributes (and hence the powers) of numerous other deities, or they allow to sprout from the back of a god a tree on whose branches stand busts of other divine personages, the whole no doubt signifying the ramification of one godhead into many aspects; or again, the *signa Panthea* are nothing more than a mere jumble of attributes, which possess, nevertheless, a plain significance. The particular form that the *Pantheus* took depended no doubt upon that special aspect of the god to which the worshipper or the artist was most attached.

It must not be thought, however, that the mass of the people of Gaul was affected immediately by this syncretism, whose chief adherents seem to have been officials and soldiers.<sup>2</sup> Gradually syncretic notions, relieving the worshipper as they did from the exacting appeals of a countless multitude of gods, spread from the dwellers in the towns and camps along the trade routes, but in the rural districts the Gaul still cherished his local spring-god, his tree- or his animal-gods. To the more enlightened sections of the population formal syncretism was perhaps not entirely strange. In the first century the Celtic and the Graeco-Roman gods had exhibited such agglutinative faculties that the idea of multiple equation cannot have been foreign to the Gallo-Roman mind.

From syncretism to monotheism is the shortest of steps, and it was when this spirit of synthesis was abroad, when men were more or less prepared to accept one god instead of the bewildering crowd who clamoured for worship, that Christianity became effective in Gaul. It is tolerably certain that the Christian faith first penetrated into Gaul in the first century, for Gaul was easily accessible and was traversed by good roads. The missionary zeal of the early Church would not quail at the prospect of entering this new land, and legend

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, *Revue Archéol.*, 1900, pp. 220 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Toutain, *Les cultes païens dans l'Empire romain*, Paris, 1907 ff., ii, p. 252.

has it that the first evangelists of Gaul were the family of Bethany together with a certain Maximinus, one of the Seventy-two. It is equally certain that, though Lyons and Vienne (and hence probably all the Rhône valley) were very early in possessing their churches, the effective spread of the Faith in the northern parts of Gaul is to be dated from some two centuries later, when, according to Gregory of Tours, seven bishops went forth to convert the whole land. The earliest dated Christian inscription is of the year 334<sup>1</sup> (four others follow in 347, 377, 405, 409), while their geographical distribution shows that the Christian religion was strongest in the Rhône valley and spread thence to the North slowly along the trade routes. In other words, Christianity spread precisely along those lines where were to be found the officials and soldiers who were the disciples of syncretism.

The triumph of Christianity was not yet. Gaul had to undergo further turmoils, further persecutions (that of the church in Lyons and Vienne, glorified by the names of Pothinus and Blandina, is too well known to need repeating) and when the words 'Courbe la tête, fier Sicambre!' were addressed (at any rate in the ultimate truth of legend) to Clovis, those Franks who adopted the Cross were not all willing converts.

The religious history of the Three Gauls then presents a comparatively even progress from animism to polytheism, pantheism, and syncretism, and thence to that monotheistic faith which was to become the religion of the country. Each stage in this development had its characteristic merits and each left to succeeding stages its superstitions. The Druids were forced to adopt and sanctify by their supervision the practice of human sacrifice; the Christian Church was forced to hallow the animistic practices of the pagan Gauls by planting the cross on the menhir, by expelling the god of the fountain and placing a saint in his stead.

Space will not permit a detailed analysis of the reactions which these successive religious states produced in the minds and lives of

<sup>1</sup> Le Blant, *Inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule antérieures au VIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, 1865, Nos. 62, 596, 369, 591, 248. For map of distribution, see plate 93, *op. cit.*

the people, but some rough system of progression can be pointed out. The culture-gods and even the war-gods of the Celts belong to a level higher than that of the fertility gods of their predecessors in Gaul, since they stimulate what are considered higher propensities in the human being: skill in the crafts and bravery in war. No high idea seems to have existed in the Gaulish mind with regard to the intimate relationships between god and man; the tutelary of individual or of home was the deity most closely in touch with mankind. If we may judge from the epigraphical remains of Roman times, the worshipper was content to drive a bargain with his god and, if his prayer was heard, to repay the god with a formal acknowledgement: *uotum solvit libens merito*. If the Graeco-Roman deities were responsible for this mercenary attitude, and if they made no further contribution to the essentials of religion, they seem to have been responsible in some measure for an important development in the intellectual life of the Gallo-Romans: the adoption of the Latin tongue. It is a well-known fact that Gaulish inscriptions are rare, whereas Latin inscriptions, even in the first century, are numbered by their thousands. It has been argued that Latin was used by the Gauls as a sort of parade language for special and solemn occasions, but the existence of Latin epitaphs which appeal directly to the *viator* and would hence be worse than useless if that wayfarer could read no Latin, the survival of such domestic messages as that preserved for us scratched in Latin on a fragment of earthenware instructing a wife or servant to lay five places at table,<sup>1</sup> surely indicate that, while Gaulish might still be used, Latin was understood by many. The poorest artisans had their epitaphs carved in Latin under rude images of themselves at work. Dedications to the gods were very numerous and probably preceded the epitaphs in common use, so that we may say that the Graeco-Roman gods encouraged in their passive way the diffusion of Latin and the embryonic stages of the growth of French.

With the oriental gods came new ideas: mystery, ritual of a new type, religious progression through a series of stages of initiation,

<sup>1</sup> *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 1904, pp. 149 ff.

cleansing, and sanctification. The gods were parents of their worshippers, and hence might be expected to take a keener interest in their welfare. Those virtues which had been the fruits of philosophy in the educated, of innate goodness in the ignorant, were now stimulated to a certain extent by religion. Constancy and purity (the latter unconnected in Gaul with any craze for celibacy) are praised in epitaphs: *Homo sanctissimus qui uixit annis lxx sine maculo*;<sup>1</sup> a youth aged nineteen *cuius aetas talis fuit ut uirgo defunctus sit, cuiusque sapientia omnibus amicis et parentibus admirabilis fuit*;<sup>2</sup> the man who can gaze on death with philosophic calm, *uicturus quamdiu deus dederit*.<sup>3</sup> These virtues, together with the public virtues, grow up at the same time as the family virtues. Numerous are the epitaphs praising the fidelity and chastity of wives, their forbearance and good temper. The family was assuming an importance that it never possessed in the unsettled days of independence; the appreciation of these domestic qualities reflects the more even life of the *pax Romana* and possibly the influence of women exerted through the eastern cults. It cannot be asserted with any degree of certainty that any noticeable change was wrought by his religion on the individual Gallo-Roman until the coming of Christianity, except to shift his attention from the fields to the exercise of the crafts, from the springs to trade, and thence to the cultivation of personal, if not necessarily edifying, contact with the deities. The final stage, reached only perhaps in those who really grasped the inwardness of Christianity, was the attempted identification of the worshipper with the deity by the emulation of the person of Jesus in the striving for the perfect life.

A belief in the immortality of the individual pervaded the religious development of the Gauls, but that taught by the Druids was meant, if we may believe the ancient authors, to produce a material end: braveness in battle; the immortality of the Christian was to end in the intimate approach of the soul to a perfect God. The human sacrifices of the independent Gauls could alone appease the bloodthirstiest of deities; the gods of the East cleansed their

<sup>1</sup> C. I. L. XIII, 2099.

<sup>2</sup> *id.*, 2036.

<sup>3</sup> *id.*, 2602.

worshippers with the blood of oxen; the God of the Christians fed his servants with the Body and Blood of His Son. Such was the progress made, parallel with the progress which we have seen in reviewing our gallery of gods from the many to the One, from the crudely personified power, crude in shape and nameless, but polished and romanized as time elapsed, to the all-embracing deities of the East who themselves were to vanish in the brilliance of the Eternal Light.

H. W. LAWTON.

## BYRHTEFERTH OF RAMSEY AND THE ANONYMOUS LIFE OF ST. OSWALD

IN Canon Raine's *Historians of the Church of York and its Archbishops*, I, pp. 399-475 there is printed from MS. Cotton Nero E. i—a large quarto in an eleventh-century hand—the *Vita Oswaldi Archiepiscopi Eboracensis*. This work is a most valuable source not merely for the life of St. Oswald (*ob.* A. D. 992), but also for English history in general during the second half of the tenth century, when the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* becomes extremely meagre. Bishop Stubbs (Raine, *op. cit.* lxxv) speaks of it as 'an invaluable and almost unknown evidence for the reign of Edgar and Ethelred'. Canon Raine (*ibid.*) says that 'it is not only the earliest, but by far the best and most trustworthy account (*of Oswald*) that we possess. Dr. Armitage Robinson, while inclining to the view that its importance has been somewhat over-estimated (cf. *The Times of St. Dunstan*, p. 7 and *St. Oswald and The Church of Worcester*, pp. 38 sqq.), refers to the *Vita Oswaldi* as 'our source of knowledge' for the earlier life of St. Oswald, endeavours to show that the biographer's account of Edgar's coronation at Bath is in the main 'derived *verbatim* from a copy of the coronation service akin to that which was probably used for king Ethelred' (*J. T. S.* 1917), and, together with other scholars, frequently cites its evidence for the times of St. Dunstan and St. Oswald.

This important work is, however, anonymous, and the aim of the present article is to try to throw some light upon its authorship by calling attention to the resemblances which exist between it and the writings of Byrhtferth of Ramsey.

Canon Raine makes no attempt to solve the problem of authorship. He merely says (*op. cit.*, p. lxxvi): 'On the front page of the MS. some one has written, *Vita Sancti Oswaldi Eboracensis archi-*

*episcopi a Senatu Bavonio monacho Wigorniensis, anno 1170.* Below which there is in another hand, *Sed multo antiquiorem ex caractere conjicio.* And another writer says, *Elfrici Cantuariensis archiepiscopi tempore scriptum constat esse.*<sup>1</sup> Senatus Bravonius (d. 1207) was precentor, librarian, and prior of Worcester, but there can be no question of ascribing the *Vita Oswaldi* to him. With much greater probability, the late Miss Mary Bateson (following Archbishop Ussher) ascribed this *Vita* to Oswald's nephew Oswald or Oswold (fl. 1010) a monk of Ramsey, who had studied at Fleury and enjoyed a considerable reputation as a scholar (*D. N. B.* XIII, 325). But, so far as I am aware, Miss Bateson's view, though plausible, has not been supported by detailed evidence, nor do I know that more than verisimilitude has ever been claimed for it.

It is, I think, otherwise with Byrhtferth, the monk and priest of Ramsey, who is perhaps best known to English historians from Mabillon's conjecture that he was the early biographer of St. Dunstan whom we know only as 'B. presbyter' (Stubbs's *Memorials of Saint Dunstan*, pp. x sqq.), but whose *Manual* (edited by the present writer for the E.E.T.S.) together with other writings contained in MS. St. John's Coll., Oxon. 17, give him a place second only to that of the Venerable Bede in the history of Anglo-Saxon science.<sup>1</sup>

Byrhtferth was born probably between 950 and 960 and entered the monastery of Ramsey (founded 970), where he became a pupil of the distinguished scholar Abbo of Fleury, who taught at Ramsey 985-987. The sixteenth-century antiquary Leland quotes Talbot's authority for the statement that Byrhtferth was a monk of Thorney also (cf. *Collectanea*, ed. Hearne, iv, 23). However this may have been, Byrhtferth was probably a comparatively young man when Abbo came to Ramsey in 985, for the *Manual* affords ample evidence of Abbo's influence upon his work. It is true that it has been suggested that Byrhtferth may also have studied on the continent. A passage in the *Gloss* on Bede's *De Temporum Ratione*, c. 29, reads:

<sup>1</sup> On the authenticity of the *Gloss* on the scientific works of Bede and a summary of what is known about Byrhtferth readers should consult the important article on Byrhtferth by Professor G. F. Forsey in *Speculum*, Oct. 1928.

*Ego autem in Gallia in loco qui Teotonis villa dicitur, constitutus, status mei umbram metiens, novemdecem pedes et semis inveni*; but even admitting (which I am not prepared to do) that the existing glosses on Bede's scientific works are the work of Byrhtferth of Ramsey, this passage proves nothing, for, as was first pointed out to me by the late W. H. Stevenson, it is a quotation from *Pauli Historia Langobardorum* (ed. Waitz, i, 5). Byrhtferth was actively engaged in teaching in the year 1011, the date of the composition of the *Manual*, which contains no reference to his age or physical weakness. We should, therefore, possibly put the date of his birth nearer 960 than 950.

In the *Manual* we have evidence of Byrhtferth's admiration for St. Oswald. In the enumeration of the seven-fold gifts of the Holy Spirit, it is significant that the only non-scriptural example of the grace of the Holy Spirit is St. Oswald—*Spiritus timoris Domini in Osuualdo dignissimo archiepiscopo refulsit nostris temporibus* (*Manual*, ed. Crawford, p. 212). His special devotion to St. Dunstan may perhaps be argued from the fact that MS. St. John's Coll., Oxon., which bears Byrhtferth's name, begins with his master Abbo's famous acrostic in honour of St. Dunstan:

*Summe sacer, te summa salus tueatur amicis.*

It should be noted that the author of the *Vita Oswaldi* reproduces this acrostic, and explains it at some length. (Raine, op. cit., pp. 459 sqq.). Dunstan's name also occurs in an antiphon with musical notes written on the fly-leaf of the MS. of the *Manual*:

*Alleluia. Veni alme Dunstane ad Christi solium sanctum humilibus et tuis deposce famulis regnum celeste.*

But though the antiphon is in an early hand, there is nothing to connect it directly with Byrhtferth.

A friend of Oswald's, well known to Byrhtferth, was Eadnoth, who was Bishop of Dorchester from 1006 to 1016. He uses his name in the following illustration:

*Ponne þu, arwurða broðor, gehyrst þæt se mona beo fram þære sunnan*

*twelf fæca, þonne undergyt þu swylce ic þus cweðe, 'Byrhtferð mæssepreost stent on þam twelftan stede æfter þam biscope Eadnoðe, oððe he sitt' (Manual, 164/4 sqq.).*

The same Eadnoð is mentioned in very complimentary terms in the *Vita Oswaldi*: *Inter quos resplenduit prudentia Eadnothus, venerandus sacerdos, qui temperantiam atque iustitiam necne fortitudinem concupivit nobili indagine percipere* (Raine, op. cit., p. 423).

Apart from contemporaries and purely scientific or theological writers, the most marked influence on Byrhtferth, if we may judge from the Latin of the *Manual* and the *Prologue to the 'De Temporibus'*, was Aldhelm. When he is following Bede or Heleric or some of the Fathers, Byrhtferth's Latin is comparatively simple and unostentatious; but when he is left to his own devices, as, for example, in his prologues or apostrophes in the *Manual*, his style assumes more than the usual Anglo-Saxon rhetorical efflorescence, and becomes stilted, bombastic, and replete with uncommon words and expressions, many of which are taken from the *De Virginitate* of Aldhelm. This subject will be dealt with more fully in the second volume of my edition of the *Manual*: it may be sufficient at present to call attention to the translation of a passage from the *De Virginitate* (*Manual*, p. 148), to his imitation of the famous passage of Aldhelm on the bee (Ehwald, *Aldhelmi Opera*, 231/13 sqq.) in the *Manual* (pp. 142-3) and the *Prologue to the 'De Temporibus'*, and to the fact that I have indexed more than a hundred rarer words and expressions in the *Manual*, for which close parallels are to be found in Aldhelm. This indebtedness to Aldhelm is particularly noticeable in the *Prologue to the 'De Temporibus'*.

The efflorescent rhetorical style favoured by Byrhtferth was exceedingly popular in England before the Conquest. Its ultimate source appears to be Celtic—at all events it has its closest analogue in the *Hisperica Famina* (ed. Jenkinson). No doubt Aldhelm learnt his style from Maeldubh and his Irish teachers at Malmesbury, and his influence served to popularize it among the Anglo-Saxons. But Aldhelm was not the only source. Hisperic Latin became very popular at Fleury in the tenth century, whither it had

come from Brittany; and the influence of Fleury was an important contributory cause, if not the chief reason, of its great vogue in England in the tenth century. At the same time, it should be remembered that St. Dunstan was an admirer of St. Aldhelm (cf. Stubbs, op. cit., pp. 301-2, and that others besides Byrhtferth were reading Aldhelm in tenth-century England (cf. Stubbs, op. cit., p. 388).

We find a Latinity analogous to Byrhtferth's in the eighth-century *Life of Guthlac* by Felix of Croyland, in the Anglo-Saxon Charters (particularly those of Athelstan), in Asser's *Life of Alfred*, in Frithegode's rhythmical *Vita Sancti Wilfridi* with Archbishop Oda's Preface to it, in the *Life of St. Dunstan* by B. presbyter, and in the *Vita Oswaldi*—to mention the most important English monuments of this erring and extravagant literary movement, which had a good deal in common with Elizabethan Euphuism. To all of the above-mentioned works the comment of William of Malmesbury on Frithegode's *Wilfrid* is applicable to a greater or less extent:

*Executus est id munus Fridegodus quidam versibus non ita improbandis, nisi quod latinitatem perosus græcitatem amat, græcula verba frequentat ut merito dictis eius aptetur illud Plautinum, Hæc quidem præter Sibylam leget nemo.* (H. Savile, *Rerum Scriptores post Bedam*. Francofurti M.DCI, p. 200.)

The possibility of Byrhtferth's having been the author of the *Vita Oswaldi* suggested itself to me when I noticed in the *Vita Oswaldi* a passage almost identical with one in the *Manual*, which I had run to earth in Macrobius. Here are the passages side by side:

Sicut enim Inventor rutili luminis,  
et Origo omnis boni constituit in ex-  
ordio creationis rerum, ut summus  
sol constaret, et princeps atque dux et  
moderator reliquorum luminum fie-  
ret.

Est annus solaris primus et preci-  
puus, quia sol 'dux et princeps est  
moderatorque luminum reliquorum',  
ut ait Cicero.

*Manual* (Crawford), p. 16.

*Vita Oswaldi* (Raine), p. 399.

This coincidence led me to compare the two works carefully, with the result that I discovered numerous parallel passages and other

similarities of style and expression, which, combined with the facts of Byrhtferth's life and training, afford a fair presumption that the two works are the work of the same person. Owing to limitations of space I can only give the most important resemblances and refer the reader to the originals for the remainder. The quotations on the left follow the page-order of the *Vita Oswaldi*, while the parallel passages from *Byrhtferth's Manual* are given on the right.

Cum sollerter Ylias et Odyssia atque Æneidos Virgilii sint exarata. 399/1-2

Quid summus Saturnus et socii quini? Nonne, ut præfati sumus, suo principi subjecti sunt? Orion atque Prochion et Helix, omnia cælica vasa? Nonne ejusdem gubernatione et illustratione decurrunt. 400/7 sqq.

Culmen, quod est magnificis decoratum atque suffultum actis, et septem columnis sustentatum. 400/30 sqq.

Sicut ordo demonstrat ecclesiasticus. 401/17.

Et eadem refulsit gloriosa auctoritate. 401/26.

Mente serena cacumina alti montis scandere. 402/4.

Praepotentes hujus regni eximius praesul exsuperavit. 402/12 sqq.

Sicut Prophetæ egregii ammonet eloquium, dicens, *Hæc est via* nolite declinare ab ea neque a dextris neque a sinistris. 403/3.

Ad ordinem redeamus .. propriæ relationis. 403/8.

De man nemð Ylias 7 Odissia Omeri 7 Eneidos Virgilii. 172/6.

Est unus circulus qui zodiacus . . . appellatur . . . per quem sol . . . decurrunt. 4/2.

Seo sunne geyrnð þas twelf fætu. 4/26.

Suffulti inedificabilibus columnis. 198/23. Formis donisque Dei sustentata. 92/28.

Sicut circulus ipsius demonstrat. 18/23.

Spiritus timoris Domini in Osuualdo . . . refulsit. 212/13.

In cacumine huius montis. 206/15.

Exuperantes regna huius uite. 214/11.

Ðes weg ys kynelic 7 he nys na wyrðe þæt man fram him gecyrre naðer ne on ða wynstran healfe ne on þa swyðran. 138/4.

His dictis, redeamus uenusto animo unde discesseramus mediocri alloquio. 40/13.

His dictis, redeamus ad nos ipsos. 216/8.

De ejus sanctitatis præconio loquamur. 403/12.

Ob honorem sanctissimæ Trinitatis, Individuæque Unitatis. 403/17.

Sicut legitur in Divinis apicibus. 403/33.

Nobili intelligens indagine scriptum. 404/26.

Studit tota mentis conamine practicæ vitæ desideria relinquere et supernæ gloriam felicitatis medullitus quærere, sicut celeberrimus agonista Paulus ait. 404/27.

Sic sua duplicari satagebat beata talenta Deo, ut, non solum tricesimum aut sexagesimum, sed etiam centesimum deferret gratanter opimum fructum. 406/14.

Tantis gloriosis miraculis redimitus. 407/22.

Quasi cornicinii audiens sonitum. 409/17.

Prima pars nostri exigui operis sumat fortia robora in onomate Christi. 410/1.

Omniaque Dindyma celsi poli. 410/14.

Pro Cujus passione consecuti sumus libertatis perpetuæ palmam. 411/30.

Post generale iudicium justis Arbitris. 412/11.

Quod cum reverentia pacis placet dicere. 412/24.

Cuius laudis preconio. 198/19.

Ista Trinitas et indiuidua Vnitas. 198/15. Also 236/1.

Sacros apices librorum. 244/33.

Nobili indagine. 28/26.

Abdicatis practice huius uite discriminibus. 244/22.

Ad menia superne felicitatis ingredi. 208/26.

Mansit Paulus agonista. 228/9.

Qui student amminiculatione summe Trinitatis et indiuidue Vnitatis . . . uehere Domino . . . uerum etiam tricenarii fructum et sexagenarii, gratum holocaustum afferre, nec non centenarii millenis dignitatibus sertis decoratum . . . gestare. 236/1. Cf. 208/10.

Glorifice est redimitus. 228/24. Cf. 200/24.

Cf. bymendre stefne. 172/28.

In exordio huius exigui operis fundamentum extat eximium collatum, quod est Domini Iesu Christi nomen. 198/1.

Dindima priscae legis. 244/26.

Wilnigende mid pissum þeowdome cuman to ecum freodome. 126/5.

In conspectu Iusti Arbitris. 58/15.

Ammonemus pacis reuerentia. 58/10.

Sicut norma monasticæ legis et decreta promulgant. 414/16.

Calidus extat redimitus. 415/10.

Sicut iste gessit de quo nobis est sermo. 415/13.

Binis fulcitus columnis, id est, dilectione Dei et proximi. 416/12.

Vitia carnalis petulantiae velut . . . peripsema aporians. 416/31.

(Note the quotation from Aldhelm, *De Penna Scriptoria* on p. 418.)

Coeipit cordetenus. 418/14.

Ad Angligenum regnum. 418/29.

Desideravit magna indagine fructum opimum deferre suo Creatori. 418/25.

In conspectu Iusti Arbitris. 420/14.

Ut egregius ait agonista Paulus. 421/4.

Luce clarius. 422/2.

Cf. for the construction: Illustravit et illustandro erudit. 421.

Velut novus splendor jubaris tenebras depellit. 423/29.

Nobili indagine. 423/2 f.b.

(Note the bee simile on this page.)

Pleno corde. 424/7.

Ad sanctæ urbis moenia . . . pervenire. 424/16.

Bis binis vel amplius annorum spatiis. 424/30.

Siquis autem alium verbo, ut dicitur . . . bonis operibus, sive sacra doctrina erudierit, flores Christo profert pro quibus, sertis, non tantum dico

Sicut diuinus promulgat apex. 198/14.

Constat numerus ipse redimitus. 200/18.

De quibus nobis est sermo. 222/5.

Suffultus inedicibilibus collumnis. 198/23. Et ob dilectionem Dei et proximi decoratus. 200/12. Cf. 210.

Et respuenda uelut peripsema doctrina eorum. 40/7.

Cepi cordetenus. 58/19.

Angligenis sermonibus. 44/30.

Cf. *Manual*, 28/36, 208/10, 236/1.

In conspectu Iusti Arbitris. 58/15.

Mansit Paulus agonista. 228/9.

Luce clarius. 206/14, 244/30.

Omnia penetrat, et penetrando circumdat. 198/16.

Dum serenius iubar aurei solis tenebras depulisset. 16/6.

Nobili indagine. 28/26. Cf. 244/27.

Cf. 143/26 and 244/6.

Fullum mode.

Possis ad menia superne felicitatis ingredi. 208/26.

Post sexcentis annuorum [*sic*] spatiis. 18/10.

Ðæt byð snotrum were med swyðe arwurðlic beforan Godes gesihðe, gif he wisdomes lare geleaffullum esne cyð to soðe. 170/17.

tibi denis, sed etiam millenis, sicut venerandus pater capescere promeruit veluti in fine hujus modici operis placet inserere. 432/4 f.b.

Viam aggredi cœptam. 433/11.

Vel Senecæ inventoris notarum. 433/18.

A solis ortu et occasu, ab Aquilone et mari. 436/17.

Qui ei . . . dixit in aure. 440/4.

Quod hic inserere . . . placet. 244/10.

Nec eloquium nostrum de illo. 443/5.

Rei sunt. 443/5 f.b.

Mente sagaci. 449/2.

Eodem spiritu afflati. 434/18.

Depellere de cordis antro. 449/3.

Multa dici poterant hoc in loco . . . sed quia ad alia tendimus, hæc dicta sufficere credimus. 451/31.

Demonstratum in oromate. 452/4.

Quia vero superius breviter prælibavimus . . . iam quid, etc. 453/19.

Rem breviter narrare desidero, quam præterire non libet ob inertiam desidiae torporis. 454/16.

Cumque in contemplatione spiritalis vitæ desudaret. 453/27.

Liber ejusdem vitæ descriptus luce clarius demonstrat. 457/11.

Ut ad Ejus visionis celsitudinem pervenire mereretur. 457/26.

Nec non centenarii millenis dignitatibus sertis decoratum. 236/5.

In exordio . . . huius exigui operis. 198/1. Libet hic . . . inserere. 234.

Vineam istius operis aggredi. 48/25.

For Byrhtferth's interest in the marks of scribes, see M./pp. 182 sqq.

Sicut Psalmista concinit, A solis ortu et occasu, ab aquilone et mari. 202/17.

Vt tibi in aure dico. 18/16.

Libet hic inserere. 234/25.

Placet renovari nostro eloquio. 58/24.

Simul sunt rei. 58/13.

Sagaci mente. 220/21.

Spiraculo . . . dum forent afflati. 244/1.

Tenebras depulisset cordis interioris antri. 16/7.

Plurima . . . hoc in loco potuissimus affari. 58/15.

In oromate spiritus. 246/24.

Nu we habbað medomlice þas þing gehrepod, hyt þingð us gefædlic þing þæt we rumlicor þas gerenu atraht-nion. 142/18.

Desudans in diuina lege diebus et noctibus. 244/22.

Luce clarius illustret. 206/14.

Luce clarius. 244/30. Veluti luce clara demonstrant. 20/4.

Meruit . . . gratulabundus cernere Deum. 246/24. Eius celsitudinem. 206/21.



*renovari, sufficiat hoc in loco, ut dici libet, superius retulimus, placet ad alia transire, ut prefati sumus, &c.*

The author of the *Vita Oswaldi*, like Byrhtferth, shows a considerable knowledge of science and the liberal arts. Thus he says:

‘Quid summus Saturnus et socii quini? Nonne, ut præfati sumus, suo principi subjecti sunt? Orion, atque Prochion et Helix, omnia cælica vasa? Nonne ejusdem gubernatione et illustratione decurrunt? Verum etiam illa vaga Lucina, per cujus cursum rationes omnium mensium et dierum satis liquido astrologi periti queunt investigari ablato errore.’ p. 400.

‘Revolutis perpaucis annis solaris cycli atque lunaris globi.’ p. 401.

‘Sicut solet aureus sol lucidius fulgere postquam Arietis et Tauri, necnon et Gemini ascenderit signa.’ p. 405.

‘Et supra lactei solaris ac lunaris cycli potenter fecit conscendere modum, omniaque Dindyma celsi poli concessit cernere.’ p. 410.

‘Nempe non ignoravit quoniam si nubes densissimæ polum pulcherrimum cooperiunt, ut minime possint stellæ videri, sed astris expulsis non solum, Pleiades, sed etiam vias suas homines cernere non valent.’ p. 412.

‘Scimus sane quod sol in Ariete oriens, transit in Tauro, et de Tauro in Geminis, et sic procedendo venit in Cancro, quo non altius ascendere poterit.’ pp. 442-3.

‘Sicut enim sunt tria genera musicæ artis, chromaticum, diatonicum, atque enharmonicum, quod primum sonat, i. e. chromaticum mellifluum est; secundum, diatonicum, durissimum est; tertium, id est, enharmonicum dulcissimum, sic sit et tertium miraculum quod hic inserere breviter placet.’ p. 442.

Attention, too, may be drawn to one or two of the metaphors employed in the *Vita Oswaldi*, which have their counterparts in the *Manual*. The figure of the house supported by columns is used at least thrice in both works. In ‘Superius eis pulmentarium aduexi; nunc libet eis et poculum propinare’ (*Manual*, 58/33) Byrhtferth is using a medical metaphor, with which we may perhaps compare the ‘Quo non solum debilia corpora recipiunt cataplasma et emplastra cum antidoto sanitatis’ of the *Vita Oswaldi*, p. 422. Particularly striking is the parallel use made of the figure of the sunbeam dissipating the darkness, where the language is almost identical: ‘Hesterna die, dum serenus iubar aurei solis tenebras depullisset cordis interioris antri’ (*Manual*, 16/6 sqq.) and ‘Et velut novus splendor jubaris

tenebras depellit, sic eorum Divus fulgor expulit cæcitatem a cordibus subjectorum' (*Vita Oswaldi*, p. 423).

Now while it must be recognized that books written on similar subjects and within the same circle about the same time must always gather some amount of identical style or idiom, the parallels and similarities between the *Manual* of Byrhtferth and the *Vita Oswaldi* are such that it is difficult to believe that they are purely fortuitous.

The *Vita Oswaldi* was written while Ælfric was still Archbishop of Canterbury (p. 452) and before the death of Abbo of Fleury (A. D. 1004). It was written by a monk of Ramsey intimately acquainted with St. Dunstan, St. Oswald, Eadnoth, and Abbo, and schooled in the Fleury tradition. He was in close touch with national feeling, and though naturally he sides with the monks, he is extremely patriotic, witness his outspoken admiration for Byrhtnoth:

'Transactis non plurimis mensibus, factum est et aliud fortissimum bellum in oriente hujus inclytæ regionis, in quo primatum pugnx tenuit gloriosus dux Byrihtnodus cum commilitionibus suis. Quam gloriose, quam viriliter, quam audacter incitavit principes belli suos ad aciem, quis urbanitate fretus potest edicere? Stabat ipse, statura procerus, eminens super cæteros, cujus manum non Aaron et Hur sustentabant, sed multimoda pietas Domini fulciebat, quoniam ipse dignus erat. Percutiebat quoque a dextris, non reminiscens cigneam canitiem sui capitis, quoniam elemosinæ et sacræ Missæ eum confortabant. Protegebat se a sinistris debilationem oblitus sui corporis, quem orationes et bonæ actiones elevabant. Cumque pretiosus campi ductor cerneret inimicos ruere, et suos viriliter pugnare, eosque multipliciter cædere, tota virtute cœpit pro patria pugnare. Ceciderunt enim ex illis et nostris infinitus numerus, et Byrihtnothus cecidit, et reliqui fugerunt. Dani quoque mirabiliter sunt vulnerati, qui vix suas constituere naves poterant hominibus.' (p. 456).

This passage forms a most valuable supplement to the Anglo-Saxon poem on the Battle of Maldon. The author's spelling of proper names and his etymology of 'Ramsey' argue a knowledge of Anglo-Saxon. His Latin like Byrhtferth's shows a predilection for turgidity and bombastic rhetoric, a weakness not likely to be

lessened by his fondness for Aldhelm, though he displays a wide knowledge of other Christian poets as well. Abbo of Fleury he obviously regards with admiration, an admiration which he even accords to Abbo's misguided poem in honour of Dunstan.

All the above features of the *Vita Oswaldi* fit in with the assumption that Byrhtferth of Ramsey is the author; and when to these more general resemblances we add the numerous echoes and parallels in diction, phrasing, parenthetical formulae, and formulae of transition, together with (I think) a close resemblance in the rhythm of the sentences in the two works, the probability that Byrhtferth is the author of both works becomes exceedingly strong. At all events, it will be admitted that so good a case cannot be made out for any of his rivals.

S. J. CRAWFORD.



## VI

### SPIRITUAL VALUES IN SHAKESPEARE

WHEN Jeremy Collier, at the close of the seventeenth century, produced his famous *Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage*, it was inevitable, although the Drama of the Restoration was the main object of attack, that the plays of Shakespeare should engage some of his attention. They were frequently revived in the theatre, and a fourth collected edition had not long before been issued from the press. With the approaches open in that age, the full significance of Shakespeare's work could not, under any aspect, be realized. Even Dryden's appreciation, admirable as it is, is obviously inadequate; and where genius fell short, mere talent, though backed by learning, strong common sense, and sincere purpose, could scarcely succeed.

Collier's references to Shakespeare evince, at the best, a very mild approval, and it would have puzzled him to hear that, tested even by the strictest ethical and spiritual standards, the plays of Shakespeare are worthy of study, as providing a just and noble picture of human life and its deepest concerns. In one section of his treatise, when he is contrasting, much to its disadvantage, the drama of his own time with 'the English theatre from Elizabeth to Charles II', he summons to his aid the examples of Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher, but 'as for Shakespeare, he is too guilty to make an evidence'. Collier, however, has here in mind verbal improprieties, a count which, as is to be expected, he over-emphasizes; elsewhere he has occasion to prove that the Restoration dramatists can establish no precedent in Shakespeare for the essential immorality of their treatment of social life, and the habitual contempt they show towards matters which to religiously minded people are objects of reverence.

Still it is clear that to Collier Shakespeare furnishes no model of what a blameless drama (if he thought such a thing possible) should

be. His commendation amounts to little more than a grudging admission that Shakespeare's plays are less objectionable than those of Dryden, Wycherley, and Congreve.

For its immediate purpose the *Short View* was probably sufficient. There was no adequate defence, and no adequate defence was possible. The greatest of the Non-juror's opponents pleaded guilty, and Congreve's reply, though in a respectable cause the famous wit should have been much more than a match for the earnest divine, is little better than a string of debating points (some of them telling enough), and a deft avoidance of the main issue. But had the *Short View* been wider and deeper; had it been possible for Collier to approach Shakespeare in the light shed on him by two centuries of study, he would have found material which, with his very considerable skill in controversy, would have enabled him, not only to expose the flagrant abuses of the contemporary theatre (this he accomplished), but to establish, from the practice of a supreme playwright, the spiritual obligations of the drama on the basis of final principles.

It may seem, and is, a far cry from the romantic plays of Shakespeare to the Comedy of Manners which graced (or disgraced) the last decades of the seventeenth, and the earlier years of the eighteenth centuries; but the spiritual values inherent in the former may perhaps be most clearly recognized when they are contrasted with examples of dramatic composition in which spiritual values are, as Collier maintained, deliberately outraged, or, as Charles Lamb contended, not in question. Even if Lamb's defence be accepted as something more than an ingenious paradox—the contention, I mean, that the social life reflected in the Comedy of Manners has no relation to the actual world, but belongs rather to some imaginary Paradise of Wit to which the moral law is inapplicable;—even if we adopt this view, the contrast remains, and is for the present purpose significant. Between plays which own the validity of ethical standards and plays in respect of which such standards are irrelevant, the distinction is vital, and is wholly independent of differences in dramatic kind and class.

But Lamb's defence of Restoration Comedy is untenable. It is

an excuse which the playwrights concerned, though hard put to it for arguments, never thought of pleading on their own account; on the other hand, in the defence actually offered, the plea is implicitly disclaimed. It is not true to say that the seventeenth-century Comedy of Manners recognized no ethical standards. It did; but the standards are miserably low and perverted. A few moral qualities, such as courage and generosity, are represented as praiseworthy, and the corresponding vices treated as base and contemptible. Even where sex is concerned there were certain limits beyond which debauchery was not regularly approved or condoned. Congreve himself, in his reply to Jeremy Collier, endeavours to maintain that his comedies, on a moral count, are entitled to a favourable verdict. He defends the character of Valentine in *Love for Love*, on the ground that his hero's faults 'are fewer than his good qualities; as the world goes he may pass well enough for the best character in a Comedy'—not very high praise, perhaps, though a good deal higher than the facts warrant. Indeed we can measure the gulf which separates the worlds of Congreve and Shakespeare if, while following the fortunes of one of Congreve's 'best characters' we allow our thoughts to stray for a moment to the world in which creatures so gracious and delightful as Orlando and Benedick, Antonio and Bassanio, play their parts. Qualities which in Congreve's best characters are regarded scarcely as blemishes, but almost as part of the necessary equipment of a fine gentleman, would in Shakespeare's be wholly intolerable; their presence would be felt at once as destructive of the beauty and unity of the whole design.

One is not concerned to question the right to its place of 'pure comedy', addressed exclusively to the intelligence, in which the free play of wit is undisturbed by the intrusion of serious considerations, whether of the practical or the spiritual order. One may insist, however, that whatever immunity may be claimed and allowed in a class of drama which was not Shakespeare's, in the drama of his preference moral obligations, dispensable perhaps elsewhere, are not merely acknowledged but demanded. In Shakespeare's con-

ception of the dramatic art, tragedies or comedies from which the deeper concerns of life are excluded are 'from the purpose of playing'. Hence the atmosphere of Shakespeare, and, in some measure, of the Elizabethan drama generally, is a moral atmosphere, in which the spiritual, if not pervasive, is never an incongruous element.

Mr. John Masefield, in his noteworthy Romanes Lecture, *Shakespeare and the Spiritual Life*, while holding that 'orthodox religion, whether as ritual or dogma, seems to have meant almost nothing' to the poet—a view which we shall later see reason to question—has no doubt whatsoever of his importance on the ethical side. 'His standard of conduct', he says, 'is very high: his sense of right and wrong is matchless: every age since his has felt this: one can give it no higher praise. It can be said of no other English writer.'

This is nobly and justly said; but one has still to ask, in what way does this matchless sense of right and wrong manifest itself and find expression? It would be preposterous to claim for Shakespeare that he was, as the phrase is commonly understood, consciously and of set purpose a religious writer. Neither his religion nor his morality lies on the surface; and it is idle to look for a definite moral or a definite message in any of his plays; or for a motive, other than an artistic motive, as furnishing a key to an underlying purpose. If we postulate a motive of the kind, as criticism at one time was wont to do, we are faced with this difficulty: that the greater part of the play which it is sought to explain refuses to fit in with our formula: has indeed no kind of relation to, and no bearing upon, the motive which, on the hypothesis, is the controlling principle. We have always to remember that the first business of Shakespeare the playwright was to provide an entertainment—it might be styled Comedy, Chronicle Play, or Tragedy—which, from what we should now call the 'Box-office' point of view, was likely to prove a success. That was 'the duty that lay nearest', and in the performance of this task Shakespeare was not at liberty to please himself or to take his own risks. He had to consider the interests of his fellow shareholders in the theatre, his partners in a common project; as also the interests of his

fellow players, whose livelihood depended on the degree of success attained in that mundane adventure.

'Alas,' cries Carlyle, 'Shakespeare had to write for the Globe Playhouse: his great soul had to crush itself, as it could, into that and no other mould'. We need not, and indeed Carlyle does not, deplore the fact that Shakespeare's life-work was just the writing of plays to be acted on the public stage. 'No man works save under conditions', and it is, moreover, scarcely open to question that for the manifestation of Shakespeare's peculiar genius at its highest moments, the conditions of the Globe Theatre were as favourable as any we can well conceive. But in seeking to gauge the spiritual significance of Shakespeare's work, the limitations must not be forgotten. Shakespeare was playwright by profession, coming to his task with a full knowledge of the theatre acquired in the exercise of his other profession of player. He had to compose plays which would act well and would 'take'.

It was, besides, in more ways than one, a mixed audience to which the dramatist appealed, for the option which the modern playgoer enjoys as between theatre and theatre, and one kind of play and another, was not open in anything like the same measure to the Elizabethan. And one section of the mixed audience, a section doubtless equally distributed amongst the different social classes, came to the theatre merely to be amused, and with a conception of amusement not of the highest. It is to the obligation, real or supposed, to cater for these people, that the presence of ribaldry in the Elizabethan drama is mainly referable. There are indecent jests in Shakespeare, not wholly to be excused on the score of changing standards of propriety; for Shakespeare recognized that indecency is not defensible. 'Speak not so grossly,' says Portia, in reproof of one of Gratiano's unseemly pleasantries; and there is the apology made for Benedick, who scarcely needs it (it will serve Shakespeare better): 'The man doth fear God, howsoever it seemeth not in him, by some large jeasts hee will make.' It may also be urged in extenuation that, where Shakespeare offends, it is not without a certain dramatic propriety; the language fits the character, the mood, or the

situation. Mercutio and Gratiano may be foul-mouthed; not Romeo or Bassiano; while the occasional coarseness of Hamlet is in keeping with the bitterness of a passing mood, and Ophelia's snatches of ribald song add only to the extreme pathos of the situation. Lastly, what is unseemly in Shakespeare is on the surface. It could, for the most part, be swept away without affecting in the smallest degree the conduct of the action or the consistency of the characterization.

But the comparative freedom of the text from passages that might cause offence is of small moment. The essential spirituality of Shakespeare lies in his unfailing preference for the things that are of good report, in the story he presents for our serious reflection or our mere delight; and in the characters he offers for our sympathy and admiring regard. In story and character, whatever we are led to admire is essentially admirable, and nothing that is blameworthy is ever defended or condoned. This further is to be noted: there is never in Shakespeare any conflict between the aesthetic and the moral judgement. What is presented to us as gracious and beautiful on the one side is seemly and commendable on the other. The central figures of the tragedies are invariably distinguished by great qualities which, though combined with varied imperfections, in themselves satisfy the most exacting ethical demands; and where sympathy is asked, as it often is, for 'great suffering souls' whose sufferings are traceable, mainly or in part, to their own failings, sometimes to their positive crimes, the sympathy goes out, not to the imperfections or misdeeds, but to what is great or beautiful in natures so fatally biassed and to high possibilities so tragically defeated. In the comedies, though in the delineation of character there is no crude contrast instituted between moral perfection and its opposite, amid the charm of the romantic setting, the dramatist, in his own way, places before us, for our acceptance and delight, the things that are true and honest, just and pure, lovely and of good report.

In such an atmosphere as Shakespeare's, whether the theme be sublime or familiar, the spiritual, even a definitely Christian spirituality, has entrance as of right. In the great tragedies, and in dramas

such as *Measure for Measure*, not technically tragedies, religious ideas are in keeping with the intellectual or emotional appeal. Flights of angels may be summoned to sing Hamlet to his rest; Macbeth may reflect that his act has given his 'eternal jewel' to the common enemy of mankind; and Isabella may bid Angelo remember that

all the soules that were, were forfeit once,  
And he that might the vantage best haue tooke,  
Found out the remedie.

Such language rises naturally out of the dramatic situation. But even in Comedy, and in plays in which the Comic Spirit is pervasive, religious thought has its warranted place. Even, as it were, beneath the large shadow of Falstaff, imagination takes us for a moment to

those holy Fields,  
Ouer whose Acres walk'd those blessed feete  
Which fourteene hundred yeares ago were nail'd  
For our aduantage on the bitter Crosse.

And amid the joyous appeal of perhaps the best loved of Shakespeare's comedies a speech redolent of religious sentiment is part and parcel of the romantic charm:

Speake you so gently? Pardon me I pray you,  
I thought that all things had bin sauage heere,  
And therefore put I on the countenance  
Of sterne command'ment. But what ere you are  
That in this desert inaccessible,  
Under the shade of melancholly boughes,  
Loose, and neglect the creeping houres of time;  
If euer you haue look'd on better dayes:  
If euer beene where bells haue knoll'd to Church:  
If euer sate at any good mans feast:  
If euer from your eye-lids wip'd a teare,  
And know what 'tis to pittie, and be pittied;  
Let gentlenesse my strong enforcement be,  
In the which hope, I blush, and hide my Sword.

If, then, we accept generally a spiritual content for Shakespeare's plays; if it can be claimed that religion belongs there as of right; can we ascribe to Shakespeare distinctive theological convictions, peculiar to this or that religious creed? Was he, for example, a Roman Catholic or a Puritan? Attempts have been made to prove him one and the other, and doubtless the wide comprehensiveness and gentle tolerance of Shakespeare opens the door to such attempts. Father Bowden, in his work *The Religion of Shakespeare*, will have him a Romanist, while Mr. T. Carter settles the poet, to his satisfaction, in the opposite camp. So far as these irreconcilable claims rest on external evidence they have been effectually disposed of by Dr. Beeching in his essay on Shakespeare's religion. The documents on which both disputants rely as establishing the contention that Shakespeare's father was, according to one a Romanist, according the other a Puritan, are shown by Beeching, on chronological and other grounds, to warrant no such conclusion, even if no question of identity were involved; and quite recently Mrs. Charlotte Stopes has deprived the 1592 Recusancy lists of any evidential value in this matter by her demonstration that the John Shakespeare whose name appears in the lists was not the poet's father or any of his kin.

Father Bowden, indeed, is far from relying exclusively on data furnished by the Warwickshire archives. He takes a wider view, and hence puts up a more plausible case than his rival. Still it is difficult to believe that Shakespeare's religious beliefs were of either extreme variety. That he could not have been a Puritan is, if we consider the circumstances of his life, almost self-evident. There were strong family associations with the old religion on both the Shakespeare and the Arden sides; and, in regard to the dramatist's knowledge of the Bible, of which much has been made, even if all the many quotations and allusions collected by Bishop Charles Wordsworth were traceable to the Geneva Bible—as Beeching shows they are not—it would not help Mr. Carter's case. The possession of a Geneva Bible would not prove the possessor a Puritan; and Shakespeare, Beeching shows, was 'more or less familiar with each

of the rival versions', the Geneva and the Bishops', but especially with that version which was read in the services of the Church of England.

The most that can be said of Shakespeare's relation to Puritanism is that he shows nothing of the animus against it so common with other dramatists his contemporaries. His allusions to Puritanism are few and colourless, and he brings no Puritan on the stage to be ridiculed. Malvolio (we have the authority of the text for it) is no Puritan, and Angelo can be described as one only by a use of the term which has no reference to theological dogma. Shakespeare in later life once entertained a Puritan preacher at the New Place; but this tells us no more than we could readily believe without concrete example, namely, that no worthy soul who, according to his lights, was about his Master's business, would in that house fail of a welcome. That Shakespeare could be hospitable to Puritans, and treated Puritanism gently in his plays, may throw light on the complexion of his religion, but affords no clue to his creed. Puritan he certainly was not. Between Puritanism and the Elizabethan theatre there lay an impassable gulf. A contemporary pamphleteer writes of the 'Common Player' (and such was Shakespeare) that he is '*never a Puritan*'. The Puritans to an actor or playwright of these times were, in addition to other ridiculous and unlovely features with which they were credited, simply a sect to whom the theatre was a temple of the devil, and the very existence of players an offence. Shakespeare does not seem to have resented the uncompromising hostility of the Puritans, but one cannot think of him in close association with the zealots who found satisfaction in 'an extraordinary judgment of God', manifested in certain poor people who were killed or injured by the 'flat fall' of the galleries in Paris Gardens, and who contemplated in the like spirit the speedy destruction 'bothe of bodye and soule' of those who frequented 'the *Theatre*, the *Curtin* and such like, that one day those places will likewise be cast downe by God himselfe, & being drawn with them a huge heape of such contempners and prophane persons vtterly to be killed and spoyled in their bodyes'.

To make Shakespeare a Roman Catholic is an easier task. There was nothing irreconcilable between the calling of player or playwright and the profession of Catholicism. Ben Jonson was for a time a convert, and, were ascertained facts not against it, there is no *inherent* improbability in the late uncorroborated statement that Shakespeare himself 'died a Papist'. Catholicism with its venerable traditions, its acceptance of the beautiful in Nature and Art as an aid to, rather than an enemy of, religion, has an attraction for a poet which Protestantism cannot offer in the same degree. We cannot doubt that Shakespeare felt this attraction. The histories and stories he dramatized, when they did not belong to a pre-Christian period, were set in Catholic times and Catholic countries. In the one Shakespeare play which has a Protestant interest, *Henry VIII*, the Protestant part is Fletcher's. Things and persons distinctively Catholic are treated by Shakespeare with respect and reverence; there is never any intent to slight or ridicule them:

Fieue hundred poore I haue in yeerly pay,  
Who twice a day their wither'd hands hold vp  
Toward Heauen to pardon blood: and I haue built  
Two Chauntries, where the sad and solemne Priests  
Sing still for *Richards* Soule.

And yet all this may be in part a matter of dramatic propriety and poetic preference. If we look more closely we shall find that the preference gives Father Bowden very little help. Catholicism, after all, has no monopoly of the cult of the beautiful, or of spiritual conceptions of love. Shakespeare's tenderness for distinctively Catholic characters, though real, has been exaggerated. Thus the Franciscan Friars in *Romeo and Juliet* and *Much Ado about Nothing* have sometimes been regarded as ideal religious types. It is true that they are both amiable and devout priests; but the sage counsel given by the one proves futile, that of the other fatal; and the device of Friar Laurence seems prompted by considerations which, being self-regarding, are not to his credit. There is, of course, no underlying intention to disparage the Catholic priesthood as such; but on the other hand there is no obvious design to exalt it.

In the representation of highly placed ecclesiastics Shakespeare exhibits no Catholic bias. The legate Pandulph in *King John* is shown in a light which, for Shakespeare, is strangely unsympathetic. The incitement to regicide put into his mouth, as well as what is said of him and of his master the Pope, 'who in that sale [of pardons] sels pardon from himselfe,' and the oft-quoted defiance,

Tell him this tale, and from the mouth of *England*,  
 Adde thus much more, that no *Italian Priest*  
 Shall tythe or toll in our dominions,

simply could not have been written in the time of Elizabeth by a poet who in his heart confessed or favoured allegiance to the Papacy.

Of other high ecclesiastics, the Bishop of Carlisle in *Richard II* is a brave and honest man; the bishops in *Henry V* are politic opportunists who seem ready to subordinate truth to the temporal interests of the Church, and to trade upon the simplicity of an upright and sincerely pious king. Cardinal Beaufort in *Henry VI* is thoroughly wicked; and of the other great Cardinal it is enough to say that his character in the part of *Henry VIII* which is Shakespeare's, is without attraction. The scenes in which Wolsey is invested with a pathetic dignity are Fletcher's.

In his delineation of ecclesiastical personages Shakespeare's aim is simply to be true to human nature, and to history as he found it in his sources. He is guiltless of propaganda, and where questions of ritual and dogma are not bound up with questions affecting national unity and independence, his approach was that of the impartial dramatist, not of the partisan. In the religious differences which vexed his country Shakespeare—it is a reasonable guess—held some middle position between uncompromising extremes; neither approving nor too severely condemning either. Such an attitude seems in harmony with the general outlook on life revealed in his writings; and it is, in no small measure, because of this kindly detachment, that Shakespeare has a universal appeal and that in what he has left there is little or nothing, except what lies on the surface, that is obsolete or outworn.

The *via media* in the time of Elizabeth was no clearly marked path, though there must have been many who would fain follow it. Numbers doubtless preferred the old ways and clung to the old traditions, but had no mind to further the designs of their country's enemies. Others, loyal to their queen and paying willing obedience to her laws in religion as in other matters, had nothing of the zealot's spirit, and took little pleasure in the persecution of their fellow countrymen whose conscience forbade them to conform. There was also the natural man who declined to sacrifice his ale and cakes on any Protestant altar. Shakespeare was not without sympathy for the natural man, but where exactly he stood in the wide middle territory admits of no decisive proof: each must settle the question in accordance with the impression he receives of the spirit of the plays and poems as a whole. That Shakespeare was no persecuting zealot we may be certain. Methods to which both sides resorted when it suited them, repelled him:

I, but I feare you speake vpon the racke,  
Where men enforced doe speake anything.

One welcomes this sentiment, and it required perhaps no little courage in those days to give it public utterance. My own impression—it is only an impression—is that Shakespeare was Catholic rather than Protestant in spirit, though the preference did not preclude conformity to the national Church. Still, when all is said, any leanings to the older religion, if they were present at all, could have amounted to little more than a sentimental attachment. When issues of immediate and practical import become involved, Shakespeare's place on one side of the dividing line can be defined with certainty. Where the choice lay between submission to the Pope and allegiance to the Sovereign, the Englishman's duty, as Shakespeare conceived it, could not be doubtful. The faith of the uncompromising Catholic in those days involved a serious weakening of patriotism. Loyalty, as he understood it, to his church carried with it, unavoidably, treason to his country. Shakespeare's patriotism, proclaimed, not once only, in splendid verse, admitted of no qualification;

his loyalty to his 'gracious Empress', 'the imperial votaress,' was genuine and sincere. No Englishman, 'sitting at the play', any time in the last decade of the sixteenth century, could have mistaken the application of the final speech in *King John*, with its echo of a crisis so recent, when all but a few Englishmen sank their differences and closed their ranks in the face of a common danger from without:

This England neuer did, nor neuer shall  
Lye at the proud foote of a Conqueror,  
But when it first did helpe to wound it selfe.  
Now, these her Princes are come home againe,  
Come the three corners of the world in Armes,  
And we shall shooke them: Naught shall make vs rue,  
If England to it selfe, do rest but true.

And when the great Queen was gone, but while the memory of her was still fresh, the thought of the plots against her throne and person, the dangers from abroad she had faced, must have been vividly present in the imagination of every one at the Globe Theatre as he listened to these lines,

Duncane is in his Grave:  
After Lifes fitfull Feuer, he sleepes well,  
Treason ha's done his worst: nor Steele, nor Poyson,  
Mallice domestique, forraine Leuie, nothing,  
Can touch him further.

It is inconceivable that a poet whose heart inclined to the cause for which Allen and Parsons had plotted and Campian and Walpole had died, should deliberately have sought to awaken these memories. Still less would a Catholic playwright in the year 1606 quite gratuitously have introduced in his dialogue an unmistakable allusion to Gunpowder Plot and the Jesuit Henry Garnett:

'Faith here's an Equiuocator, that could sweare in both Scales against eyther Scale, who committed Treason enough for Gods sake, yet could not equiuocate to Heauen.'

There is no explaining away these passages; their bearing is manifest; and if it be answered that the dramatist threw them in for prudential reasons—in short, in order to curry favour with authority or save his own skin, the plea surely defeats its own end. The gain is small, from any point of view, if Shakespeare be deprived of the claim to rank as an honest man in order that he may be proved a bad Catholic.

Happily no such dilemma need be faced. Early in the poet's career his 'vprightness of dealing, which argues his honesty' was reported by 'diuers of worship', and after he was dead, Ben Jonson, who loved him and honoured his memory (on this side idolatry) as much as any, testified to his honest, open, and free nature. The sincerity which distinguished Shakespeare in the common relations of life was present also, we need not doubt, in matters of deeper concern. There is indeed not a shred of documentary evidence, and no legitimate inference to be drawn from his written work, that would compel us to believe that Shakespeare was other than a conscientiously conforming member of the Church of England as by law established, the Church into which he and his children were baptized, by which he was married, and according to the rites of which he was buried. Further, if the terms of a more than dubious will be made the basis of a claim that John Shakespeare, the poet's father, was a Roman Catholic, the authentic will of William Shakespeare the son may be accepted as testimony to the poet's religious faith. The solemn words of the preamble may be formal, but no one is compelled to believe that Shakespeare in so serious a matter set his hand even to a conventional falsehood. His conformity may not have been of the self-assertive order, but there is nothing to prove that to Shakespeare 'orthodox religion, whether as ritual or dogma, meant almost nothing'. It meant much to those creatures of his imagination to whom the poet seems to have imparted something of his own mind and personality; and nowhere in the plays can be found a passage in which any tenet of the Christian faith is mentioned or alluded to otherwise than with reverence, while there are many in which an acceptance of Christian doctrine is at least im-

plied. Finally there is perhaps more significance than generally belongs to negative evidence in the total absence, so far as is recorded, of any suspicion of infidelity or 'atheism' attaching itself to Shakespeare while he lived.

In plays with a pagan setting dramatic propriety is in essentials scrupulously observed; but even here the poet is sometimes off his guard. Thus in *Cymbeline*, as a critic remarks, Posthumus in pre-Christian Britain is 'made to apply the language of the early divines in distinguishing the three parts . . . of Repentance, as the condition of the Remission of Sins'; and, in the greatest of the tragedies, Kent and Edgar find in the spectacle of Lear with Cordelia dead in his arms an image of the Day of Doom.

Critics who themselves, in greater or less degree, are out of sympathy with dogmatic religion, have found in Shakespeare, particularly in the period of the great tragedies, a philosophic attitude which cannot be reconciled with Christian conceptions. Such views reflect perhaps rather the critic's than the poet's spiritual outlook; and are sometimes arrived at by attributing to the dramatist opinions and sentiments at the moment appropriate to the character and the situation, but furnishing no guide to the ethical or spiritual meaning of the play as a whole. A crucial instance may be found in *King Lear*, a tragedy which is not only set in pagan surroundings, but, we are asked to believe, has a pagan message:

As Flies to wanton Boyes, are we to th' Gods,  
They kill vs for their sport.

But the words are Gloster's, spoken at a moment when their bitterness may well be forgiven; and the desperate doctrine is in the same play refuted in the words of a much more sanely balanced character, 'The Gods are just.' A note more in harmony with the tenor of Shakespearian tragedy is heard in the quiet resignation of Hamlet: 'There's a speciall Prouidence in the fall of a sparrow . . . the readinesse is all'; and

There's a Diuinity that shapes our ends,  
Rough-hew them how we will.

We may remember, too, Bradley's theory of tragic Reconciliation; the feeling that remains, as final impression of a Shakespearian tragedy, that ultimate values are not to be appraised by striking a balance between the happiness and suffering experienced in the world within the term of the individual life. And this sense of reconciliation is not alien to Christianity.

Something may be said in conclusion of the dramatist's attitude to beliefs which are only loosely, if at all, related to orthodox creeds, but which, if not precisely spiritual, pertain to matters outside the experience of ordinary sense; belief in ghosts, good and evil spirits, witchcraft, and other manifestations of 'metaphysical' power. The supernatural has a prominent place in four of Shakespeare's plays, two comedies and two tragedies. The Fairies in *A Midsummer-Night's Dream*, creatures partly of folk-lore, partly of romantic literary tradition, are treated in a spirit of playful fancy; but there is no mockery in the picture. Some of the sager characters take the miraculous occurrences seriously, and the scepticism of Theseus, who classes poets with madmen, need not be accepted as representing Shakespeare's attitude to such things. The spirits of *The Tempest* are born of the poet's imagination. They are in part perhaps symbolical, with the significance of symbols; but if they are as unsubstantial as dreams, the lesson is solemnly enforced that things the most common to sense are not more solid and durable.

*Macbeth* is steeped in the supernatural, and even to-day, in seeing or reading the play, we must assume the reality of supernatural phenomena, if only as a poetic device serving an artistic purpose. We accept such conventions readily to-day; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was not so easy. The Middle Ages were too near, and there were many, and these not the least wise, who shared the opinion of Sir Thomas Browne: 'For my part I have ever believed, and doe now know, that there are Witches: they that doubt of these, doe not only deny them, but Spirits; and are obliquely and upon consequence a sort not of Infidels, but Atheists.' Shakespeare would not have dealt so roundly with those who questioned the

reality of witchcraft, but we do his intelligence no dishonour if we conclude that he was not of their number. The Witches in *Macbeth* have some features in common with the grotesque and repulsive hags of popular superstition. Chapter and verse may be cited for the resemblance; but, as Charles Lamb long ago observed, the Weird Sisters in *Macbeth* are distinguished by essential differences from the witches of vulgar conception, such as appear in plays by Dekker and Middleton. They are not wretched old women who traffic with the devil; they are mysterious beings who come we know not whence, and who vanish 'as breath into the wind'. They 'have more in them than mortal knowledge', and have power over men's souls. They are 'instruments of darkness' who tell men truths to betray them 'in deepest consequence'. The supernatural in *Macbeth* is treated with the utmost seriousness; and if we remember the mental and spiritual horizon of the age, it is difficult to suppose that with Shakespeare it was all poetic make-believe.

In *Hamlet* the ghost of buried Denmark has an objective reality; there is no hint of hallucination. Hamlet doubts, not that he has seen a spirit, but that the spirit which resembled his father as he lived was his father himself:

The Spirit that I haue seene  
May be the Diuell, and the Diuel hath power  
T'assume a pleasing shape, yea and perhaps  
Out of my Weaknesse, and my Melancholly,  
As he is very potent with such Spirits,  
Abuses me to damne me.

This is exactly the attitude which is adopted towards spiritualistic phenomena by the Roman Catholic Church to-day. Hamlet's belief—and Hamlet is often Shakespeare—in a spirit-world which at moments reveals itself on earth, is confessed in those most familiar of all familiar verses,

There are more things in Heauen and Earth, *Horatio*,  
Than are dream't of in your Philosophy—

not Horatio's philosophy; Horatio was no rationalist, but rather, as we should now say, Science, to which we appeal as interpreter of the world of Nature, but whose authority stops there. Shakespeare was, at least, no materialist; and if one should go beyond this certain fact, and add that the religion he openly confessed he held in simple faith, there is no evidence to invalidate the plea.

MARK HUNTER.

## VII

### PASCAL AND SCEPTICISM

PROBABLY it was reflection on his own experience that urged Pascal to say in one of his *Pensées*: 'The last thing one finds when writing a book is what to put first.' One of the many apparent contradictions of his rich genius was that, in spite of his eagerness never to concede priority of invention to others when he considered it due to himself, he published next to nothing unless impelled to do so by other than personal considerations. Desire for celebrity was alien to him; desire for truth he always cherished. The enigma of his mind would have been less baffling had he discovered, not only how to begin, but also how to continue and end his projected work on the truth of religion. As it is, we do not even know what he would have named this work; the name alone would have told us something. '*Apologie de la religion chrétienne*' conveys a meaning: so does '*Pensées sur la vérité de la religion chrétienne*'; perhaps a title differing from both of these would have been chosen.

The arrangement he would have adopted to expound his ideas is equally obscure. He liked aphoristic expression; it corresponds with that clear relief in which ideas stood out in his mind unqualified for the nonce by their necessary correlates. Would he have retained the aphorisms which constitute the bulk of the actual *Pensées*, contenting himself with extended development here and there? The *Lettres Provinciales* had proved themselves a very effective polemic against the abuses of casuistry; would he have chosen the form of dialogue so successfully employed there? It seems certain that anything resembling mathematical exposition, where the argument advances along a strictly logical path would have been avoided; Pascal tells us that such a method is inappropriate when the appeal in the first instance is to the heart; the objective must be kept steadily before the mind and must be approached along a number of convergent lines so that in the end it will have been seen from many points of view and the whole truth will have

been discovered. Nevertheless this is but a scanty indication of the form his work would finally have assumed.

The *Pensées* remain as the most unsystematic exposition of doctrine that has been handed down to posterity. They consist of ideas jotted down for memory as they occurred to the writer, on any slip of paper that happened to come first to his hand; they were found at his death, in 1662, packed together almost anyhow in bundles about his room. This very disorder has its merits; the reader can surprise Pascal conversing with himself, probing the depths of his conscience, seeking after light: he can see the birth and gradual development of many an idea which a completed work would only have revealed fully grown. It is not to be wondered at that more than one literary man, intent on observing a mind in travail, on analysing a complex personality, and disillusioned on the score of doctrine, has rejoiced that we should have these first promptings of the spirit rather than a studied elaboration of ideas. Yet it is hard to agree with such views; what we know of Pascal gives us ground for thinking that the charm of the detached fragments would not have vanished in the completed work, whilst French literature has lost a Pilgrim's Progress that might have formed a worthy counterpart to our English classic. Pascal would have taken his typical sceptic and would have gained his confidence by appreciating to the full his position, since he himself knew well the phases of the scepticism of his day; he would have argued with his interlocutor on the latter's own ground, induced in him not only an understanding of, but also an affection for, things spiritual; and finally to the heart thus prepared he would have imparted the truths of religion as he himself conceived them.

The comparison which has been made of the *Pensées* with the fragments of a storied window halts in various ways. It is not sure that Pascal knew exactly the design; it is certain that many of the parts exist in duplicate, and it is certain that many would have been discarded and others greatly modified before being put into their places. With the fragments as they actually exist an infinite variety of patterns is possible: the different arrangements adopted in the

editions of Havet, Brunschwig, and Chevalier, to mention only three and all relatively recent, produce the impression of quite different works, as indeed they are. A guiding principle has to be found somehow, if the *Pensées* are to form an intelligible whole, and the data for this are meagre. With the most scrupulous sifting of the materials furnished by Pascal's whole career, the final interpretation is apt to be tinged with the critic's own preferences.

With the question of doctrine we are in this article only in so far concerned as faith and doctrine are inseparable. Our object is, by a discussion of the vicissitudes of Pascal's faith or scepticism, to prepare the way for an intelligent reading of the *Pensées*. Many other things are required for that end; but the question of faith or scepticism is fundamental, and it is not surprising that controversy should have turned chiefly about it. The *Pensées* present the unusual spectacle of a sceptical exposition of human nature and conduct, expressed in terms of deep conviction such that doubt of the author's adherence to these views seems precluded, whereas the avowed purpose of the work is to inculcate a love for the truths of religion. Are we to suppose that Pascal had deluded himself into thinking he believed whilst at heart he remained an unbeliever? Did his intellect tell him that relativity was the last word, whilst his affections were turned to the absolute?

Almost every conceivable position between the two extremes of faith and scepticism has been assigned to Pascal. It may help to elucidate the nature of the problem if I quote a few writers on this topic. Cousin, to whose provocative assertions we owe in part the revival of interest in Pascal about the middle of last century, states that an all-embracing scepticism formed the inmost core of Pascal's mind, that a sombre pessimism tinges his whole thought, a pessimism which, in spite of heroic resistance, enthralls his whole heart. Sainte-Beuve, more cautious and more subtle, affirms that he never doubted more than when he most firmly believed. Others, Havet for instance, have accepted this juxtaposition of apparent irreconcilables and have expressed more clearly the relation between them: Pascal for them is a sceptic in philosophy and a believer in religion, not keep-

ing, however, the two spheres merely side by side without contact with each other, but using the *impasse* in which exclusively secular reasoning finds itself as evidence of religious truth. Havet expresses the *nuance* in a few trenchant antitheses: 'Others simply say: Everything is obscure if religion is not true; Pascal says: Everything is obscure because religion is true, and it bears witness to the truth of religion that everything should be obscure. Others say: Nothing but revelation can prevent you from becoming sceptics; he says: Nothing but revelation can justify you for being sceptics. Others say: You cannot remain in doubt, have recourse, therefore, to grace; he says: You cannot get out of doubt, infer then, from that, original sin.' The majority of writers, however, and especially of more recent writers, would seem to hold that Pascal, at all events, the author of the *Pensées*, was a sceptic neither in philosophy nor in religion. But, even granting this, we are far from the end of our difficulties. Belief is by no means an easily defined state, and its sources are elusive. Those who deny the scepticism of Pascal in both religion and philosophy cannot agree as to whether his belief was of the voluntarist or the intellectual type, whether protestantism or catholicism has the greatest claim to his allegiance. There can be little doubt that he considered himself a faithful son of the true—that is, the catholic—church. But the question is: Is not the ultimate basis of his belief that on which protestantism is built up? Does he not for his ultimate sanction of belief, appeal to a *je ne sais quoi* present within the heart of man? Would he allow the dictates of authority to take precedence over the dictates of conscience? Weingarten says: 'Pascal is an imperishable witness of a certainty of religion given in immediate consciousness, exalted high above all reflection. And by his attempt to justify Christianity solely by its ethical, inward, and eternal relations to the human mind, he has turned a new page in Christian religious thought and in Christian apologetics. Proof proceeding from the spirit and from power here replaces an inadequate method based upon philosophic demonstration or upon a merely external and historical view of things.' Vinet, in his *Études sur Blaise Pascal*, is more outspoken still: 'The Holy

Spirit, not the Church, is the authority for Pascal. Let any one read carefully the *Pensées* and then answer this question: Is not the Church, as authority, a *hors-d'œuvre* in the system of Pascal? This protestant interpretation would appear to be the most congenial to the majority of present-day readers of Pascal in our own country; on the Continent the case is, perhaps, rather different; no small number in France, and some at least in Germany, give preference to a more intellectualist and catholic interpretation, even if they find it necessary to qualify this intellectualism. They recognize that the *Pensées* contain much that clearly points to immanentism as the final word; but they go on to observe that though religion thus founded may satisfy many emotional needs, it is not demonstrably true for all that: proof demands external arguments, prophecies, miracles, and the whole wonderful outward manifestation of the Christian religion in the Church. Outward and inward are assigned their proper places in the summing up: the arguments of immanentism make us desire that religion should be true, objective arguments prove that it is true.

Needless to say, the exponents of all these points of view, and of others too in the gamut between faith and scepticism, find corroboration enough in the *Pensées* for their opinions. The statement that any reader inclines to discover in a book whatever his previous experience and his temperament have predisposed him to detect explains how these detached aphorisms (with a few developed passages) can be combined and commuted in all sorts of ways. There is one predisposition, however, which we must regard as more warranted than the rest, namely, the predisposition acquired by a study of whatever is known of Pascal. With this compass, we can embark upon the uncharted sea of the *Pensées* with a reasonable hope of reaching some port.

In one of the not infrequent autobiographical passages occurring in the *Pensées* we find the writer giving in broad outline the development of his mind. The chronological delimitation it suggests is misleading if understood literally; in actual experience no clean-cut dividing line separates one phase from the other; and it is important to

remember that Pascal never lost his interest in mathematical study. The passage does, however, tell us what at different periods of his life was uppermost in his mind, and the words suggest an ascending order of interests, from the outward universe of space and time through the inner universe of the human mind and heart to a sphere of reality in which inward and outward are transcended and combined.

'I had spent much time in the study of the abstract sciences; and the narrow circle within which they kept me gave me a distaste for them. When I began to observe human nature, I saw that abstract science is ill adapted to man and that I was erring further from my state in penetrating that than others in ignoring it. I pardoned those others their lack of knowledge. But I thought my circle of acquaintances would be wider in my study of man, which I thought the proper study of mankind. I was mistaken; fewer study human nature than mathematics. It is only because they do not know how to study it that they turn their minds to other things: but perchance even that is not yet man's proper study, perchance we are happier if we do not know ourselves.'

The man who thus speaks of the '*peu de communication qu'on peut avoir des sciences abstraites*', of the relative isolation in which abstract science left him, is the man who, as a child of 12 years, had somehow or other, practically unaided, reached the proof of the 32nd proposition of Euclid; who, as a boy in his middle teens, had made important contributions to mathematics, in particular to the theory of conic sections; who had, manifestly, anticipated notions of the calculus which were only developed later; who had inspired Descartes with mixed feelings of admiration, incredulity, and jealousy; who, before he was 20, regularly brought original contributions before the most distinguished scientists of his day; who, in his early twenties, had successfully carried out experiments in physics which place him in the front rank of physicists, experiments which brought into clearer light the implications of the discoveries of Torricelli; who, in order to relieve the routine monotony of arithmetic calculations, of which the experience was brought home to him through his father being at that time a kind of superintendent for the collection of taxes in Normandy, had invented a calculating machine and had himself supervised all the detailed technical work

connected with this invention; who had, by his efforts to commercialize his machine and turn it into a source of wealth, made himself a sort of business man as well as a man of science; who, as mathematician, physicist, and inventor, had gained the esteem, not only of the most illustrious scientific circles of his time, but also of persons occupying the highest political and social rank, such as the Queen of Sweden and Cardinal Richelieu. Thus it was no lack of success that made Pascal speak slightly of the value of abstract science to satisfy him.

It is not our object to enter upon a close study of Pascal's biography. We can, however, mention one or two facts which go to explain in some measure his moral development. He mixed but little as a child with children of his own age and never went to school. His father undertook his education, following a plan devised by himself, of which the guiding principle was to prepare the boy's mind for receiving the facts of knowledge by a simple explanation of the theory underlying those facts, thus making possible from the outset some rational co-ordination of the particular details communicated to him. His education was thus rather exclusively intellectual, and this bias was only intensified by his extremely early association with the eminent circle of scientists into which his father introduced him. His mother died when he was only three years of age, thus depriving his nature of an emotional element so necessary to counterbalance the intellectualist training his father was giving it. He had two sisters, the younger being as precocious as himself, only in another line: whilst still a child she had gained repute for her poetic gifts and was early presented to Richelieu and to royal personages as both a poetess and an amateur actress. We may admit that the scientific friends of Pascal's father included some jolly fellows; we may also admit that the younger sister must have been possessed of outstanding charms; it remains true, none the less, that jovial adults (*à leurs heures*) and infant prodigies, even when cradled by the muses, can give artistic distinction and a playfulness not less intellectual for being playful. The affective side of Pascal's nature contained a void; and we are less surprised at his emotional instability and the emotional crisis which later supervened.

The attitude of Pascal towards the question of belief and scepticism in religious and secular matters during these first twenty years of his life can be estimated with a reasonable chance of accuracy. The society he frequented included probably some *libertins*, or free-thinkers; the unsettled conditions of the preceding century caused by religious warfare had left a widespread heritage of free-thinking, which was only kept below the surface, but not suppressed, by the strong hand of authority during the 17th century, and which reappeared with only increased effrontery during the 18th. The Pascal family does not, however, appear to have shared *libertin* views. It was not eminently religious; the customary rites of the Church were observed and its teachings were accepted because it was possible to accept them without deeply inquiring into their meaning and without sacrificing any belief in the powers of human reason to attain mathematical and scientific truth. Pascal at this period resembled the majority of human beings in that he displayed neither great aversion nor deep yearning for a domain of reality inaccessible to discursive reasoning.

In the autobiographical passage quoted above, Pascal speaks of his beginning the study of man after he had spent much time in the study of the abstract sciences. He omits all mention of an event which is of some importance for us and which falls between the period we have just dealt with and the period during which observation of human nature was uppermost in his mind. This event is commonly referred to as his first conversion. It came about in this way. For some time the doctrine of Jansenism had been cultivated in various groups scattered up and down the country; it seems to have found a favourable soil in certain parts of Normandy. Now it chanced that, on a January day of 1646, Pascal's father, then living at Rouen, fell on the ice and injured his thigh. Medical attention was received from two gentlemen who had been converted to Jansenism themselves, i.e. to the teachings of Saint Augustine as interpreted by Jansen, bishop of Ypres, and who sought to make proselytes whenever occasion offered. These two gentlemen spent some time in Pascal's home, in order to make sure of the soundness

of the cure, and, as their custom was, they spoke much of religion. They employed their zeal so well that, one after another, all the members of the family were converted to their views, the father probably first, although in fervour he was outstripped by his more impetuous son, who was then 23 years of age. Now what did this conversion mean for Blaise Pascal? It certainly did not signify an utter change of heart. In the years following 1646 he continued to devote himself to his scientific pursuits; his zeal for them even increased. It was precisely during these years that he made the discoveries in physics above referred to. His whole life in fact resembled closely what it had been hitherto; the main acquisition seems to have been a tendency to indulge in theological controversy and a skill in composing consolatory epistles.

This first conversion provided Pascal's intellect with new matter, more than it brought about a re-birth of the whole man. The doctrine he now espoused was so logically constructed, it explained so lucidly some of life's most thorny problems, that it could not fail to appeal with special emphasis to a mind so eminently intellectual. How neatly, for instance, the problem of evil is solved by the doctrine of the Fall; how clearly does the relation of freedom to determinism show in its light; how nicely we can explain those yearnings for infinite perfection as the nostalgia for a former state of bliss from which primeval guilt has removed us.

Several circumstances throw light on Pascal's frame of mind at this juncture. His zeal for his newly acquired theological doctrine caused him to abandon all charity and make himself into a vulgar denouncer against an old priest, known in the Church as Saint-Ange. This priest had ventured to assert that reason alone, unaided by faith, tradition, and authority, can lead man to a knowledge of the mysteries of religion, the Trinity, the Creation, the Incarnation, &c. Such statements were anathema to a man intent on justifying the Redemption by the impotence of human reason to contribute towards salvation. The reports we possess of the conversations of Pascal and a group of friends with Saint-Ange show that on this occasion two intellectual conceptions were pitted against each other.

It is hard to exculpate Pascal of a certain vindictiveness, such as often marks controversies of this kind, whether their subject be religious or secular.

Even such a document as the letter Pascal wrote to his elder sister and his brother-in-law to console them on the death of their father (1651) is rather an application of Jansenist principles to the special case than a frank outpouring of a heart filled with grief, although filial affection pierces through at many points. The letter reproduces the arguments commonly used in times of bereavement by Jansenist confessors to those submitted to their direction. Death is not really an evil. Our fear of death is a perverted fear. What really should be feared is annihilation, and the things of this world are already *nihil*; the only real annihilation is spiritual, death of the body is not that. But since by man's first guilt the desire of temporal things replaced in our heart the desire for God, we fear the loss of such things. Nevertheless occasions such as the death of a near relative may bring us back to a sense of realities, teach us where true solace can be found, divert our desires from the temporal to the eternal. Hence it is our duty to grieve at the loss of those dear to us: to remain in brutish indifference would deprive us of all the value affliction may possess for us as a means of grace.

Up to the present we have seen no trace of scepticism in Pascal's mind. His attitude has been that of firm belief in the power of reason in things of this world and of trust in authority in religious matters, provided that what authority teaches does not offend reason. In a document written two or three years before his father's death we find a very neat definition of the boundaries between the two. Bossuet has entitled this document: 'On Authority in Matters of Philosophy'. It was intended to serve as a preface to a treatise on the meaning of a vacuum, a treatise which would have disposed of the scholastic arguments against the possibility of a vacuum. The treatise was never written, we have only the preface, but it is the important thing for our purpose. It tells us that in theology, authority is alone competent, because there it is inseparable from truth; 'its principles go beyond nature and reason and since the mind of

man is too weak to reach certainty in these matters by its own efforts, it can only reach it when aided by a power omnipotent and supernatural'. Pascal then utters a protest against authority and the cult of antiquity in scientific pursuits—in fact, in whatever is accessible to human reason. He was driven to these reflections by the objections, remnants of scholasticism, which had been advanced against his views on the vacuum. 'With those things,' he says, 'which fall under the senses or the intellect, the case is different; authority is useless; reason alone is competent. Their rights are distinct; just now (in theology) one had all the advantage; here the other rules in its turn. But, as things of this sort are commensurate with the mind, the mind has fullest liberty to penetrate there; its boundless fertility brings forth incessantly; its discoveries are endless and unceasing.' 'Whatever force antiquity may have, truth should always take precedence, although only newly discovered. For truth is older than any opinion we may have had of it, and it would be to ignore its nature to imagine that it sprang into existence at the time it began to be known.' These passages compare reason with authority, progress with blind clinging to antiquity; others point the further contrast between reason and instinct. 'Is not that to treat human reason unworthily and to lower it to the instinct of animals, since it suppresses the main difference between the two, which is that the effects of reason increase without intermission, whilst instinct remains always the same.' 'It is not the same thing with man, who was only made for the infinite.' It would be difficult to find a more enthusiastic eulogy on human reason; not even the infinite is beyond its scope. There is no question of mathematics and physics weaving a web of error to enmesh the mind and prevent it from assimilating itself with reality; mathematical truth is truth.

Thus, before Pascal set himself to the study of man by direct observation of living material as well as by the reading of moral philosophy, he had not only attained great intellectual powers: he had been initiated into the knowledge of human nature in the abstract by Jansenism. It was a sombre initiation. Seldom have

the ineradicable wickedness and the utter impotence of human nature been so ruthlessly exposed as in Jansenism. The cardinal feature of the doctrine is the insistence on man's guiltiness; in Adam all Adam's posterity virtually pre-existed, and since the capacity of free choice possessed by our first parent was used to choose evil, man has been the slave of evil ever since. His freedom has been lost; merit cannot therefore be his, and he cannot earn salvation. A select few are predestinated *for* goodness, not because of their goodness, the rest are condemned. The Law, as expounded in the Old Testament, has only served to reveal the malady, not to heal it; and by its insistence on the fear of God it has simply replaced one form of desire by another. The Redemption, in its turn, has not restored man to his first state; it has caused grace to be accorded to a few chosen by God himself, not as a reward of merit, but as a gift of mercy.

Those who have the spiritual energy necessary to accept so austere a doctrine as this have probably also strength enough not to despair. When, however, that spiritual energy relaxes somewhat, the second state of the man who has accepted such views is apt to be worse than the first—they will be found to have undermined rather than to have confirmed his faith. Pascal, himself, seems to have feared this. Writing to his sister in 1648, only two years after his conversion and more than two years before penning the letter on his father's death, he would appear to bring a certain hesitancy into close connexion with his Jansenism. 'I have felt my inability [to support his sister in her resolve to enter Port Royal, the monastery which had become the stronghold of Jansenism] incomparably more since the visits in question. Far from having derived therefrom light to guide others, I have derived but trouble and confusion for myself, which God alone can assuage. To this end, I, too, shall diligently work but without over-eagerness or uneasiness, knowing that either would carry me further from the end I seek.' At the close of the letter he writes, 'In fine, after having pondered much on this matter, I can only see there darkness in which it would be dangerous and difficult to decide, and for my part I entirely suspend

judgement both by reason of my weakness and my lack of knowledge'.

This was only a very transient phase of doubt. We have seen how secure was Pascal's faith in the power of reason in mundane things and how trusting his acceptance of authority in religion up to and after this date. But the rift was there, and it was widened by circumstances from which one would have expected a very different result. We have just alluded to his sister's resolve to leave the world and devote herself to God. Blaise Pascal had at first been a consenting party. The father, on the other hand, flew into a passion on hearing of the design, and to urgent entreaties he only conceded that his daughter should enter Port Royal after his death. Clandestine escapes from home into a convent were not infrequent, and possibly the father feared his daughter might adopt this course. The natural result was that religion could no longer be discussed with the same freedom in the family: the brother and sister must not speak alone too often in order to avoid the appearance of complicity; the sustaining power of companionship was lost.

Pascal's father died in 1651; and then he, in his turn, opposed his sister's resolution. True, he only asked for a postponement for two years: but why even this reluctance? The letter above discussed proves the persistence of conformity with Jansenist teaching. It is with some surprise that we learn that the opposition was based merely on a question of money: he did not wish any part of his sister's dowry to go to Port Royal. He had made with her a legal arrangement that he should retain the capital sum, and should pay her annuities, and that these should cease if she took the veil. She did not wish to enter Port Royal totally impecunious and demanded her share just at a moment when Pascal needed more than he possessed to keep up his position in the fashionable society he had begun to frequent, and to commercialize his calculating machine. Although he finally yielded, the incident was unlikely to confirm his zeal for religion.

Before entering upon what is usually called his *vie mondaine*, which followed shortly after the events just mentioned, Pascal may, then, reasonably be supposed to have weakened somewhat in his

Jansenist faith, without ceasing to admire and use its serried logic. This *vie mondaine* is, in the narrower sense, the period he refers to as being devoted to the observation of human nature. It is also the period during which, if at all, he fell a prey to scepticism. We must not suppose that Pascal now made acquaintance for the first time with distinguished, or even convivial, gatherings. His scientific prestige, as well as the social standing of his family, had frequently brought him into contact with men of high rank. But there is a difference between those former and his present associations: his earlier acquaintances, usually much older than himself, had been in the first place distinguished and in the second place sprightly and gay. Now he looks primarily for charm in outward bearing, accompanied by real superiority of character and mind.

It was then fairly common for men of rank and wealth to attach to themselves men of humbler station: profligates would naturally prefer profligates, they did not require monitors; on the other hand, men of greater refinement, men with a bent to science or art, would choose as their companions those known to excel in the qualities required. Thus Pascal found in the Duc de Roannez, governor of Poitou, less a patron than a friend; he was not only an original genius in mathematics and physics, he possessed a charm of manners, an ease in conversation, a warmth of persuasion, that few could resist. He soon became associated with the everyday interests and pleasures of the Duke just as much as with his scientific pursuits. The urbanity of Poitou is well known; it is the region that produced men of the type of Fenelon, the model of exquisite grace and delicacy, so different from the typical product of Pascal's native province of Auvergne.

We cannot pretend to enumerate all Pascal's companions at this date. In the *Pensées* he mentions Des Barreaux, who by this time had become dissolute to the point of brutishness, and with whom he certainly had little to do. He also names, more respectfully, Miton, a strange nonchalant personage, notorious gambler, author of one or two essays and quite content to see them ascribed to others. But there is one who played such an important part in Pascal's develop-

ment that it is worth our while to make closer acquaintance with the man and his ideas, since these ideas, once they had received the depth of meaning Pascal's mind was able to give them, constitute one of the main ingredients in his ultimate position with regard to belief. We have seen how severely intellectual had been his early education; and how intellectualist had been his acceptance of Jansenism at his first conversion: how unstable therefore. The period of his first conversion had found a mind thoroughly prepared in one direction; and this preparation had been made in the purely secular pursuit of scientific study of the world of space and time. The second conversion found the whole man prepared, not merely one aspect of him; and this further preparation, like the first, was made on the purely secular plane; but it was no longer confined to the material universe, it included the inner universe of the heart.

The Chevalier de Méré, the companion in question, was some twelve years Pascal's senior. He was of noble parentage, connected with the family of Condé. He passed through a sound course of study, especially on the classical side; he not only read Latin and Greek, he also appreciated the artistic value of works written in those languages. He was also conversant with Italian and Spanish. He had travelled much, and visited England, Germany, Spain, and even America. He had also had a military career and had been honourably mentioned in *La Gazette*. When he had definitely settled down in France, his authority in matters of polite conversation was universally recognized, though he talked but little, his mind being rather of the reflective and meditative order. In a century and in a society so artificial that it had all but banned expression of pleasure in the beauties of nature, he expresses unfeigned delight in natural forms, colours, and sounds. He loved the artistic as much as he despised the artificial at a time when *préciosité* was rapidly degenerating into a cult of far-fetched affectation. One cannot say whether he was protestant or catholic in outward observance—until the eleventh hour; at heart he was indifferent in religious matters, he was a free thinker and a purely secular code of ethics replaced religion for him.

This particular code of ethics went under the name of *honnêteté*—the *honnête homme* being near the equivalent of our 'perfect gentleman'. It raised no mean standards, otherwise it would not even temporarily have satisfied Pascal. It essentially consisted in the avoidance of any extreme that might give offence to those belonging to the same social sphere as oneself, and in the cultivation of qualities calculated to gain the esteem of men of taste and refinement. Elegant sociability is its ideal, and the exquisitely social man is the work of art it seeks to produce. It therefore sets an interdict upon slander, self-interest, wounding irony, coarse flattery, ostentation, avarice, and in fact on whatever renders a man objectionable in polished society. It requires a certain detachment from conventionality, mutual forbearance, a capacity to listen as well as to talk, suppression of the *ego*, simplicity, and honesty of heart. It thus happily blends stoicism with epicureanism.

More important for our purpose than the ideal proposed are Méré's observations on the mental training necessary to attain it, since it is these observations that awakened Pascal to a sense that mathematical proofs are not the only kind of proofs. Once this feeling has been awakened, it is no longer necessary to look to authority as the sole warrant for knowledge inaccessible to discursive argument; once the whole implications of this other source of knowledge are recognized, we may find that the supernatural is within us as much as the natural. The very *raison d'être* of a rigid distinction between the domains of authority and of reason vanishes. But we are here anticipating the final result of our study.

Méré has no one word for defining the faculty in question; if we examine how he speaks of it, we should nowadays probably term it intuition, a word used neither by him nor by Pascal. He describes it as a certain tact, a *je ne sais quoi*, a certain feeling, a certain penetration, a certain ability to judge, from slight involuntary outward manifestations, of the elusive movements of the soul (not giving the word any religious meaning). Obviously there is a great difference between the self-surrender to another human personality which Méré considered essential in order that the subtle movements of

that other personality may enter our own, and the self-surrender demanded by religion so that a transcendent order of reality may become operative within us moulding our finite nature into an organ for its expression. Méré little suspected into what tree, under the influence of another environment, the seed he scattered would grow when, with some self-complacency, he wrote to Pascal:

‘You still retain a habit you contracted in this science: the habit of judging all things by the criterion of their demonstrability; and this is usually false. Your long arguments, advancing point by point, prevent you from plunging at first go into knowledge of a far higher order, knowledge which never errs. I warn you that thereby you lose a great advantage in social intercourse; for with mind alert and eyes quickened you can from the mien and bearing of people observe many things of great use to you. If now you were to ask the man who knows how to profit by this kind of knowledge on what principle his knowledge is based, he might well answer that he cannot tell and that his proofs are only proofs for him. You think, moreover, that to have a right mind and not to reason falsely it is enough to follow your figures and never leave them. I swear to you that that is as good as nothing, as worthless as the art of reasoning by rule, of which petty minds and pseudo-scholars are so proud. What is most difficult, as it is most necessary, is to penetrate into the real nature of things, whether you desire to oppose one to another, compare one with another, join them together or separate them: when this is done you can, in discursive reasoning, make strictly correct inferences. Neither your numbers nor that specious method of argument of yours can teach you what things really are; they must be studied in another way.’

This letter doubtless reproduces the subject-matter of many a conversation. It enables us to catch more than a glimpse of the master initiating his pupil into his own way of thinking. Pascal’s mind was, however, too resistant to allow his faith in mathematical reasoning to be entirely shattered; he came to see that intuition (if we may use the term) and mathematical argument are complementary, not mutually exclusive. The *Pensées* distinguishing the *esprit de géométrie* from the *esprit de finesse* are too long to be quoted here in full. A short extract will show how seriously Pascal had reflected on the subject:

‘Ce qui fait que les géomètres [understand mathematicians] ne sont pas fins,

c'est qu'ils ne voient pas ce qui est devant eux, et qu'étant accoutumés aux principes nets et grossiers de géométrie, et à ne raisonner qu'après avoir bien vu et manié leurs principes, ils se perdent dans les choses de finesse, où les principes ne se laissent pas ainsi manier. On les voit à peine, on les sent plutôt qu'on ne les voit; on a des peines infinies à les faire sentir à ceux qui ne les sentent pas d'eux-mêmes: ce sont choses tellement délicates et si nombreuses, qu'il faut un sens bien net et bien délicat pour les sentir, et juger droit et juste selon ce sentiment, sans pouvoir le plus souvent les démontrer par ordre comme en géométrie, parce qu'on n'en possède pas ainsi les principes, et que ce serait une chose infinie de l'entreprendre. Il faut tout d'un coup voir la chose d'un seul regard, et non pas par progrès de raisonnement, au moins jusqu'à un certain degré.'

No one, comparing these two quotations, can fail to see how far the pupil had surpassed the teacher. The nature of that other power of the mind to apprehend truth is more distinctly seen. At this stage, however, it is still not very far removed from reason, and it has nothing essentially religious about it. Other *Pensées* lead us to think that Pascal did not remain content with the position here reached. Opinions may differ as to whether the further step was in the right or the wrong direction. The frequent mention made of the heart in these other passages points to a more irrational method of apprehending reality than the faculty hitherto discussed. This latter, after all, is but a faculty required for any creative synthesis, however humble it may be. It stands at the beginning and the end of every rational process. Conscience may indeed be implied in its operation, if we fully realize all that it means; but conscience has not yet been emphasized, and it was an act of conscience that definitely terminated Pascal's *vie mondaine*.

The society in which he moved during this brief period of his life was not one of which he need be ashamed. The elegance, the refined taste, the high degree of culture and even of scholarship which characterized the better part of it would have permanently satisfied most men. He had no cause to consider himself a social failure; Méré explicitly testifies to his success; his company was everywhere sought and his mathematical studies, which he never

abandoned, added constantly to his fame. Nor need the life he led have occasioned scruples even to a highly punctilious mind, even if we admit that he drove through the streets of the capital in a carriage with a team of four horses, indulged in a little gambling, and paid rather more than platonic attention to the fair sex. We may be sure that there was nothing riotous in his mode of living. What was it, then, that brought about, when he had, all told, led this brilliant life for less than eighteen months, the dejection his younger sister, now at Port Royal, describes?:

‘. . . amid his important occupations, amid all the things that might help to make him love the world, things to which one could with reason think him firmly attached, he was strongly moved to quit it all both by his extreme aversion for the follies and amusements of the world and by his incessant remorse. He said that he was detached from all things as he had never been before; but that he was so estranged from God (*dans un si grand abandonnement du côté de Dieu*) that he was not impelled in that direction either, whither none the less he was striving with all his power. It was, however, he said, rather his reason and his own mind that were urging him to what he knew to be the better, than any motive coming from God himself.’

What was going on in Pascal’s mind during that critical year of 1654 can only be conjectured; he has not left us confessions *à la Rousseau*. We must draw what reasonable inferences we can from the facts known to us. His sister Jacqueline, to whom he was deeply attached, had devoted herself to a life of poverty and austere piety, a condition in violent contrast to the elegance and splendour in which he lived. He visited her frequently and must have felt this contrast. Then, again, he had the same pride as Jacqueline in money matters—we remember her aversion to becoming a charge on the resources of Port-Royal—he could not stand an onslaught of creditors with the equanimity of a Méré. More than once he must have felt the life he was leading alongside the Duc de Roannez an empty sham; his slender means did not allow him to give it even that degree of reality which belongs to refined worldiness supported by an ample purse. It is significant that one *Pensée* speaks of lack of means as a thing men strive most to conceal. A third fact of no

small importance was the increasing weakness of his health, which often made it impossible for him to do what he considered the life he had chosen imposed upon him as an obligation, unless that life were to be a mere sham. Lastly, we have to remember that Pascal had for some considerable time, before his *vie mondaine*, been in touch with *messieurs de Port-Royal*; he had read a number of their books and must have felt how much more deeply these books fathomed life than that manual of serene scepticism, the essays of Montaigne, which he avows had been his favourite reading during his association with Méré; he had long meditated on the doctrine of the *Augustinus*, and what before had only touched little more than the surface of his being now became of vital import to what was deepest in him; impressions once received may often vanish from our conscious life for a time, whilst working unseen within us, only to reappear with increased potency in their due season.

For nearly a year the struggle went on in Pascal's mind. At length the strain on his conscience became intolerable. Torn between conflicting impulses, he passes through an emotional crisis, culminating in an ecstatic vision, a record of which he penned immediately after he had regained normal consciousness. A copy, written on parchment, he ever afterwards carried with him, sewed within the lining of his coat, where a servant by chance found it shortly after his death. This memorial, as it is usually called, is so extraordinary a document for a man of Pascal's genius that it is worth while to reproduce it in full even in this short study. It runs as follows:



L'an de grâce 1654,

Lundi, 23 novembre, jour de saint Clément, pape et martyr, et autres au martyrologe.

Veille de saint Chrysogone, martyr, et autres.

Depuis environ dix heures et demie du soir jusques environ minuit et demi.

Feu.

'Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob, non des philosophes et des savants.

Certitude, Certitude, Sentiment, Joie, Paix.

Dieu de Jésus-Christ

*Deum meum et deum vestrum.*

'Ton Dieu sera mon Dieu.'

Oubli du monde et de tout, hormis Dieu.

Il ne se trouve que par les voies enseignées dans l'Évangile.

Grandeur de l'âme humaine.

'Père juste, le monde ne t'a pas connu, mais je t'ai connu.'

Joie, joie, joie, pleurs de joie.

Je m'en suis séparé:

*Deliquerunt me fontem aquae vitae.*

'Mon Dieu, me quitterez-vous?'

Que je n'en sois pas séparé éternellement.

'Cette est la vie éternelle, qu'ils te connaissent seul vrai Dieu, et celui que tu as envoyé: Jésus-Christ.'

Jésus-Christ.

Jésus-Christ.

Je m'en suis séparé; je l'ai fui, renoncé, crucifié.

Que je n'en sois jamais séparé.

Il ne se conserve que par les voies enseignées dans l'Évangile:

Renonciation totale et douce.

Soumission totale à Jésus-Christ et à mon directeur.

Éternellement en joie pour un jour d'exercice sur la terre.

*Non obliviscar sermones tuos. Amen.*

The dullest imagination cannot fail to be moved by the picture of Pascal conning at that midnight hour the 17th chapter of Saint John's Gospel in one of the 16th-century translations, as the antiquated syntax *Cette est la vie* testifies. Smitten with remorse, he reviews his worldly past and finds that he has rejected and despised the source of life and sought satisfaction in things that perish, and not in that which is infinite and imperishable. Suddenly there comes over him a feeling that, through the mediatorial influence of the words before him, he has found contact with the spirit that has created this world. A blinding light dazzles even his eyes of flesh, and in an instant the chaos of life resolves itself into harmony; its contradictions vanish and, in the Infinite, in God, he has found

that certitude and peace and joy which the finite can never give. Henceforward he will live only in God, his pattern the eternal Word incarnate and his reward eternal bliss.

The emotional intensity of this memorial, and the fact that Pascal always carried the parchment copy of it about his person, must not lead us to suppose that his future formed an entire breach with his past. He soon afterwards gave himself up to an asceticism which most would consider morbid, but his concern with mundane things suffered no diminution. He continued his mathematical studies; he gave advice on the education best fitted to train men destined by birth for high position; in the *Lettres Provinciales* he waged war on the abuses of casuistry, despising none of the subtle cunning of an all-too-human reason; to the end, even the purely secular virtue of *honnêteté* found favour with him, as one of his latest letters shows. To imagine Pascal as for a time an infidel persecutor of Christ who passed through a moment of ecstasy and was ever after prepared to accept the greatest absurdities in religious matters, is as false as most simplifications of this kind are. Far from regarding this trance as the sole determinant of Pascal's future belief and conduct, one would almost be justified in stating that he would have acted as he did had the crisis never occurred. The work of conscience had been done: light from another source than from the world of finite things had shone upon him; another order of reality, to use more modern phraseology, a world of new values had asserted itself and had given new significance to the whole mental life.

We have now to face the question: Did Pascal, out of the material furnished by his previous experience, including of course his reading, construct any definite system for wrestling with scepticism? That struggle was certainly his aim; he did not set himself the facile task of preaching to the converted. He did not need to bask in the sunshine of admiring approval; he was a man of battle, and strove to achieve victories over himself no less than he tried to make the good triumph over the evil and belief over unbelief in others. It must not be supposed that virtue lies solely in systematic presentation, but we have the right to expect a measure of consistency in

the opinions of those who would convert us to their way of thinking. Did Pascal possess any such consistency? That he had faith, nay, more, that his whole being was penetrated by faith at the time he jotted down his *Pensées* seems to us certain: but could he give reasons for his faith that did not conflict with one another, and of which one group did not stand in contradiction to another?

It seems highly probable that he never reached a final reconciliation of the conflicting elements in his thought. The sceptical arguments taken over from Montaigne, so numerous that a running commentary on the *Pensées* reads almost like a re-edition of the *Essais* in many parts, need not trouble us much. Do we not generally tax a facile optimism which closes its eyes to obvious evils as a sign of superficiality? Has not every poet and philosopher who has looked seriously on the world been terrified by its shortcomings? It is impossible to doubt that reason is more often than not the dupe of the senses, of the imagination, of the will, of *amour-propre*; no Montaigne is needed to tell us this. Further, any one can see that man is placed in a position intermediate between the infinitely great and the infinitely small. What characterizes Pascal in all this is the poetic fervour of the expression, not the novelty of the idea. How small is man compared with the universe, say we; Pascal says:

‘Que l’homme contemple donc la nature entière dans sa haute et pleine majesté; qu’il éloigne sa vue des objets bas qui l’entourent. Qu’il regarde cette éclatante lumière, mise comme une lampe éternelle pour éclairer l’univers; que la terre lui paraisse comme un point au prix du vaste tour que cet astre décrit, et qu’il s’étonne de ce que ce vaste tour lui-même n’est qu’une pointe très délicate à l’égard de celui que les astres qui roulent dans le firmament embrassent. Mais si notre vue s’arrête là, que l’imagination passe outre; elle se lassera plutôt de concevoir, que la nature de fournir. Tout ce monde visible n’est qu’un trait imperceptible dans l’ample sein de la nature. Nulle idée n’en approche. Nous avons beau enfler nos conceptions au-delà des espaces imaginables, nous n’enfantons que des atomes, au prix de la réalité des choses.’

Such outbursts belong usually to lyric poetry; they tell us how the

poet reacts to impressions which we all receive. A more striking illustration still is the following passage:

'When I see the blindness and wretchedness of man, when I see the universe dumb, man without light, abandoned to himself, lost in this remote corner of space, knowing not who placed him there, nor what he shall do, nor what shall become of him hereafter, incapable of all knowledge, then I am struck with fear, like one carried into an awful desert island, who should awaken not knowing where he is and without means of escape. And then I wonder how we do not despair in such a miserable state. I see others about me of a nature like my own; I ask them if they are better informed than I; they tell me they are not. And thereupon these unhappy erring men, looking around them, see some baubles to which they become attached. For my own part I could not attach myself to such trifles; and considering how much more likely it was that there was more than what I saw, I tried to discover whether God had not left some mark of himself.'

All this portion of the *Pensées* is Montaigne read by a Jansenist possessed of an artistic (lyric) temperament. It is, in fact, the Jansenist in Pascal that enables him so deftly to turn the sceptic's position. The more desolating the picture drawn of man's present condition, the greater proof it affords of the truth of religion, 'car la foi chrétienne ne va presque qu'à établir ces deux choses: la corruption de la nature et la rédemption de Jésus-Christ.' We may think Christian faith does more; we may think it establishes the possibility of realizing in some measure the divine within the human; we may think that its true meaning is to show that, although value and reality in fact rarely do coincide in human existence, they are not hostile to one another. At his best Pascal himself is witness that, even within the finite, goodness is possible; one of the most beautiful of his *Pensées* runs:

'I love all men as my brethren because they are redeemed. I love poverty because He loved it. I love money because it gives the means of helping the miserable. I keep troth with all. I do not render evil to those who wrong me, but I wish them a lot like mine which brings neither good nor harm from men. I try to be just, true, sincere and faithful to all men; and I have a tender heart for those whom God has more closely bound to me; and whether I am alone or seen of men, I lay all my actions before God, who shall judge them, and to

whom I have consecrated them. These are my thoughts, and every day of my life I bless God my Redeemer who has implanted them in me and who has transformed a man full of weakness, misery, concupiscence, pride and ambition into one exempt from all these evils through the power of His grace, to which all the glory is due, since of myself I have but misery and error.'

The truly religious point of view expressed in this passage, in the terms most used in Christian thought, but full of a meaning which is absolutely religious, was rather the final stage reached by Pascal than the first step in the overcoming of scepticism. That first step seems to have been prompted rather by the Jansenist teaching of the origin of man's corruption having so deeply penetrated Pascal's mind: man is not only corrupt, but he knows that he is so. Now the knowledge of good can never arise solely from evil; had there been nothing but imperfection in man's nature, that very imperfection would never have been known to him. The doctrine of the Fall makes the matter clear. There was an original unity of human and divine, there is a present division; and for some few at least there will be an ultimate reconciliation of the two and restoration of what has been lost. The line of argument occurs again and again in the *Pensées*:

'If man had never been corrupted, in his innocence he would enjoy truth and felicity. If he had never been anything but corrupt, he would have no idea of truth or happiness. But, wretched that we are, we have an idea of happiness and cannot attain it; we perceive an image of truth and possess a lie. Alike incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge, the one thing that we know is that we were once in a state of perfection from which we have miserably fallen.' 'Why does man weary of everything and seek to delude himself by a multitude of occupations? Is it not because he has the idea of a happiness which he has lost and which, not finding it in himself, he seeks vainly in external things, without ever being able to content himself; for it is to be found neither within us nor without us, but in God alone.'

Thus the implications of self-consciousness become our warrant for considering man's real nature, in spite of present corruption, to be akin to the divine. We find Pascal glorifying the dignity of thought as eloquently as any rationalist.

'To know oneself miserable is to be miserable; but to know that one is

miserable is to be great.' 'Thought constitutes the greatness of man.' 'Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature; but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for the whole universe to arm itself in order to overwhelm him; a vapour, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But even were the universe to overwhelm him, man would still be nobler than that by which he perishes, for he knows that he dies, he knows what advantage the universe possesses over him; the universe knows nothing of it.' 'So then our whole dignity consists in thought. This must be our starting point on our upward journey; not space and time, which we can never fill.'

This line of argument must, however, not be too closely pressed; to make of Pascal a forerunner of German idealism would be to do violence to the *Pensées*. The *prius* is man's dignity, not self-consciousness; we are not great because we know our misery, but we know our misery, because we are great. An idealist would be inclined to invert the order; for, as Pascal leaves the matter, we have still to seek for a source of our knowledge of man's greatness, or rather of the remnant of greatness in man's nature, and along these lines we can only find that source in authority and revelation.

We have then to search for a criterion of the veracity of revelation. Pascal tells us:

'For my part I must admit that when the Christian religion had explained to me the doctrine of the Fall, my eyes were opened and I saw everywhere the marks of this truth: for the whole world preaches a God whom we have lost and a nature which has fallen, both within man and without.'

What, however, guarantees the primary assumption? The *Pensées* contain elaborate arguments drawn from both the Old and the New Testament, arguments many of which have been invalidated by more recent biblical research. Even had they not been, their objective value would still need to be tested. The narrative of the Old and of the New Testament might form, regarded as a more or less self-contained system, a thoroughly self-consistent whole: but this, in itself faultless, system, to be regarded as true, must fit in with the whole cosmos of experience. The advice given by Pascal first to arouse the desire that religion may be true and then prove that it

really is true, would lead us along a most dangerous path if too literally followed. It would use in a good cause that distortion of the truth by the will which he so deeply deplores in another context. Understood as Pascal probably wished it to be understood, it supplies what we can with some reason regard as the key to his final thought—remembering that his life ceased before he reached explicit finality.

To make this study of Pascal's attitude towards belief and doubt anything like complete it would be necessary to examine what proof-value he ascribes to the common arguments by which religion is supported. And here the matter becomes very obscure; Pascal makes use of metaphysical arguments, whilst in other *Pensées* he tells us that metaphysical arguments are of no avail; he makes great use of historical arguments, and arguments based on prophecy and miracles, whilst yet appearing to assert that these arguments, too, cannot establish religion. Does he mean that although no one argument, taken singly, is sufficient, their cumulative value is overwhelming? Are they inserted in order that any one having a bent that way may use them for his own conviction? We cannot overlook the fact that his sister had been healed of a painful eye disease *on* touching a sacred relic brought to Port-Royal, and he believed it was *by* touching it. It is not unlikely that this supposed miracle, wrought at a time when nothing short of divine intervention seemed able to save the monastery, had no small part in supplying the first impulse to the resolve to write the work on the truth of Christian religion. He saw, however, that this miracle was disbelieved by the adversaries of the monastery and of the Jansenism it stood for. His experience among the cavalier associates of his *vie mondaine* had brought home to him, what of course he knew before, that all the historical and other arguments do not in themselves carry conviction. About these he might nearly have said what he says of the attempts to prove God from the works of nature:

'I should not be astonished at their enterprise if they were addressing the faithful; for it is certain that those who have a living faith within their hearts see at once that everything that exists is nothing but the work of the God whom

they adore. But those in whom this light is extinguished, those persons destitute of faith and Grace . . . see in such arguments nothing but obscurity.'

These words seem to us to point to the conclusion to which the whole of Pascal's thought was tending. The Jansenist doctrine of the imparting of grace has received a subtler shade from his reflexions on intuition. We have seen above how little a purely intellectualist attitude satisfies him, even in purely mundane things. He goes so far as to assert that the self-evidence of the principles on which mathematical reasoning is based is an affair of the heart, i.e. contains an irrational element.

'We know truth, not only by reason, but also by the heart: it is in this latter way that we have knowledge of first principles, and it is in vain that reason, which has no part therein, tries to combat them. We know that we do not dream, although we are powerless to prove it by reason; this powerlessness only proves the weakness of our reason, not the uncertainty of all our knowledge. For the knowledge of first principles, e.g. that space, time, movement, numbers exist, is as well established as any knowledge that reasoning can afford. And it is on this knowledge of the heart and instinct that reason has to support itself.'

Let us remember that Pascal does not use the word intuition; when speaking of this extra-intellectual means of knowledge he uses commonly the word heart, although he often describes the process instead of using any one word to denote it. It is on the *inwardness* of conviction that he insists. If this is true of mathematic and ordinary worldly belief, it can be only doubly true in the sphere of religion.

It reads almost like a French translation of Luther when we put side by side 'Es muss einer allein darum glauben, dass es Gottes Wort ist, dass er inwendig befinde, dass es wahr sei.' 'Darum muss dies Gott ins Herz sagen, das ist Gottes Wort', and such passages in the *Pensées* as 'Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point'. 'La foi est un don de Dieu. Ne croyez pas que nous disions que c'est un don de raisonnement.' 'C'est le cœur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison. Voilà ce que c'est que la foi: Dieu sensible au cœur, non à la raison.'

There would thus appear to be no reason to doubt Pascal's faith at this period: he has traversed scepticism and found it self-destructive. The source of this faith is to be found in the experience of conscience, its content is furnished by events accepted as historical. This does not justify us in claiming the author of the *Pensées* for Protestantism. We would rather think that they show that he, like Luther, like every truly religious mind in fact, believes that the Infinite of religion is a more comprehensive reality than the infinite of intellectualist philosophy. It is a reality directly experienced in the heart and in conscience: a reality which appeals to and transforms the whole man. Taught in the school of Jansenism and belonging to a particular age, Pascal accepts in the main the statement of doctrine then current in that school; but his religious genius probes down to the fundamentals of all doctrine. Catholics and Protestants, believers and unbelievers in the Christian faith, have found spiritual food in the *Pensées*, and no change in the outward trappings of religion will impair their worth.

E. W. PATCHETT.



## VIII

### PETER STERRY

#### PURITAN, PLATONIST, AND MYSTIC

##### i

FOR the last half-century English scholars and critics have devoted considerable attention to the literature of the central and latter part of the seventeenth century. Recently criticism of this literature appears to be passing into a new phase. In the period when the work of Professor Saintsbury and the late Sir Edmund Gosse was produced it was almost entirely aesthetic, and popular appreciation of the beauty of much seventeenth-century prose and verse is certainly due to such writers. But contemporary scholarship seems to be combining an equally keen and discriminating appreciation of the art of writers of the age of Milton with a growing interest in their ideas. It is coming to be realized that English literature of the seventeenth century is a marvellous treasury of permanently valuable thought and mental experience as well as of beautiful verse and prose. The new attitude is well illustrated by Professor Grierson's subtle analysis of the thought of the metaphysical poets, and even more by recent studies of Milton in America and elsewhere, which have come to a head in the *Milton* of Professor Saurat, a work which shatters the old conception of Milton as a supreme artist in verse playing with outworn legends and obsolete theology, and replaces it by the far more interesting and attractive picture of a Milton who, like Dante, is one of the supreme thinkers of Europe, a poet whose ideas have a permanent and intrinsic value apart from their magnificent expression, and apart from their merely historical significance.

In an earlier work (*Milton and Blake*, F. Alcan, Paris, 1920) Professor Saurat has drawn an exceedingly interesting and detailed parallel between the ideas of Milton and those of William Blake. He has shown that Blake was not only to some extent an inheritor

of Miltonic ideas, but that, in spite of the apparent divergence of many of their opinions, he possessed a mind that was in many ways remarkably akin to Milton's; that he was, as Saurat puts it, 'a wild brother of Milton; it might be said a Milton gone mad, had not the word "mad" too ominous a ring in connection with Blake'. Then he adds, in a sentence of remarkable insight, 'the study of Blake is like a magnifying-glass held over many important peculiarities of Milton'.

It may be of some interest, at a time when the writings of Blake are being more carefully studied and highly valued than ever before, and when scholarship is examining with a new interest the ideas of Milton, as well as of other thinkers of the age, such as the metaphysical poets and the Cambridge Platonists, to draw attention to an almost forgotten contemporary of Milton, who was associated both with him and with the Cambridge philosophers, and whose writings show such startling affinities to those of Blake that one is inclined to believe that Blake must either have had some knowledge of them or else have drawn inspiration from closely related sources.

## ii

Peter Sterry was born about 1614 in Southwark or the immediate neighbourhood, and was probably the son of an Anthony Sterry who was baptized at Ruardean in Gloucestershire in 1584, where local records reveal the existence of a large clan of Sterrys in the neighbourhood.

Nothing is known of his life until he entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1629. Emmanuel had been famous as a Puritan College, and it was to become famous again as the home of the Platonist and Latitudinarian movements. Sterry came to Emmanuel at exactly the time when he was likely to fall under the influence of Benjamin Whichcote, with whom he appears to have been intimate up to the time of his death. Whichcote had entered Emmanuel three years before Sterry, and his teaching was inaugurating that new and fruitful development in English religion and philosophy which is associated with the names given to him and to his friends

and disciples, John Smith, Henry More, Nathaniel Culverwel, and Ralph Cudworth, the names of Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians. The ideas of the new school cut right across the old (and by now barren) controversies of Calvinist and Arminian, and Presbyterian and Anglican. It was essentially a modernist movement, an attempt like those of St. Clement of Alexandria in the third century, and of the Italian Platonists in the fifteenth, to reconcile Christianity with humanism, and produce a philosophy of religion that would satisfy both spirit and intellect. Like most similar movements, it derived its main impulse from the study of Plato and of the neo-platonists. Whichcote and his friends read and encouraged the reading especially of Plato and Plotinus. 'He set young students', writes Burnet, 'much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin.' The ideas of the new school, which seemed revolutionary to old-fashioned Anglicans and to Puritans alike, may be summed up briefly as follows. Firstly they taught a new and lofty rationalism based upon a conception of the human reason as an essentially divine faculty, the free exercise of which is a religious duty. The 'reason' of the Cambridge Platonists is not so prosaic as the 'reason' of the eighteenth century,<sup>1</sup> which tended to become identical with common sense. Like the *voûs* of Plato and Aristotle, it included an element of superrational perception. Whichcote was fond of quoting a text from Proverbs that became a sort of motto for the school: 'The Spirit of Man is the Candle of the Lord.' Religion, according to Whichcote, must have a rational basis: 'Where *Reason* speaks,' he wrote, 'it is the voice of our Guide; it is a natural voice, we cannot but hear; it is according to the very make of our nature. It is also true in Religion . . . to follow God and to follow right Reason is all one: a man never gives God an offense; if he doth [that] which Reason requires.'<sup>2</sup>

'They are . . . greatly mistaken who in Religion *oppose* points of Reason and Faith: as if Nature went one way, and the Author of

<sup>1</sup> Reid, in his *Intellectual Powers* (1785), says that there can be no opposition between 'reason' and 'common sense'.

<sup>2</sup> *Moral and Religious Aphorisms*, London, 1753, Cent. IX, No. 877.

Nature another. . . . Nothing *without* Reason is to be *proposed*; nothing *against* Reason is to be *believed*: Scripture is to be taken in a rational sense.' <sup>1</sup>

Secondly, they adopted a new attitude of tolerance in what they regarded as unessentials. 'They loved the constitution of the Church and the liturgy,' writes Burnet, 'but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form . . . they continued to keep a good correspondence with those who differed from them in opinion, and allowed a great latitude both in philosophy and divinity; from whence they were called men of latitude.' Whichcote's own career illustrates his indifference to the questions which caused such bitterness between Puritan and Anglican. He was elected to a fellowship of his College, and was presented to a living under the primacy of Laud; he became Provost of King's and Vice-Chancellor of the University under Cromwell; but he conformed at the Restoration, and, though he had to relinquish the posts that he held at Cambridge, he became rector of a London parish.

Of Henry More his biographer writes that 'He was not for either Rancour or Persecution. He thought, that all Persons making Conscience of their ways, and that were themselves Peaceable and for granting of a Liberty unto Others, ought not to be severely us'd or Prosecuted; but born with as befits Weak Members, till God shall give a greater Light'. <sup>2</sup>

Thirdly, and perhaps this is the most attractive element in their work for the modern student, the Cambridge Platonists introduced a modernist type of religion based upon a conception of God, not as the grim Calvinist Judge, but as the absolute goodness and beauty immanent in the universe to which the spirit of man is essentially akin, and with which it can have communion by means of love. This 'love' for the Cambridge Platonists is the normal stage of the human will.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Moral and Religious Aphorisms*, London, 1753, Cent. IX, No. 880.

<sup>2</sup> *The Life of the Learned and Pious Dr. Henry More*, by Richard Ward, ed. M. F. Howard, 1911, p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. N. Culverwel, *Discourse on the Light of Nature*, Chap. XI.

Many passages could be quoted in illustration. None is perhaps more characteristic than the following from the *Select Discourses* of John Smith, Whichcote's greatest disciple:

'God', he writes, 'is not onely the *Eternal Reason*, that *Almighty Mind and Wisdom* which our *Understandings* converse with; but he is also that *unstained Beauty* and *Supreme Good* which our *Wills* are perpetually catching after: and wheresoever we find *true Beauty, Love and Goodness*, we may say, Here or there is *God*.'

I have devoted some space to the Cambridge Platonists because it was certainly out of their teaching that the work of Sterry sprang. His writings carry the mystical side of their teaching to its highest point of development, just as those of Cudworth were to represent the highest development of the intellectual element. Their Hellenic conception of a God who is the Supreme Beauty as well as the Supreme Wisdom and Justice, and their mysticism, must have had a great attraction for an imaginative young man who was repelled by what must have appeared to him to be the empty ritualism of the high Churchmen and Romanists, and the gloomy determinism of the Calvinists. Sterry, in a sermon delivered many years after he left Cambridge, characterized the former as 'the Ghost of *Judaisme* cloathed with the mantle that it wore in its life time, appearing with the same *outward pompe*, with the same *delicious pleasures* of *Pictures, Musick, Perfumes* &c. as of old . . .' the latter 'as *Judaism* undrest, like an *apparition in chaines*, or *Lazarus* when he came forth from the grave with the *grave-cloathes* bound about him'.<sup>1</sup> These words probably represent fairly accurately his attitude towards the two chief parties in the English Church when he was at Cambridge, and it is therefore not surprising that he adopted the new ideas with enthusiasm. The one definite statement that we have concerning his university career is that he 'and one Sadler' were the first to make a public profession of Platonism.<sup>2</sup> In view of later events it would be interesting to know whether he met Milton at Cambridge. It is possible, as Milton was in residence at Christ's till 1632, while

<sup>1</sup> *England's Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery*, 4to, 1652, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Baker MSS., vi. 84.

Sterry's residence at Emmanuel lasted from 1629 probably until about 1640.

Sterry was elected to a fellowship of his College in 1636. His subsequent career was strangely different from those of the other Cambridge Platonists, who generally remained quietly at Cambridge throughout the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Restoration, without taking a strong line in the great religious and political controversies that divided the nation.

He seems to have come to London at about the time of the outbreak of the Civil War. In February 1640 he married Frances Ashworth (*née* Bushell) the widow of a London citizen, and it may be supposed that about that date he became a preacher in London. He threw in his lot with the Parliamentary and Puritan party, and in 1643 was one of the fourteen divines appointed by the House of Lords to the famous Westminster Assembly which abolished Episcopacy and the liturgy. Sterry belonged to the minority in this body who were called 'Independents' and who resisted the attempt of the majority to establish the Church on a Presbyterian basis. Milton, it may be remembered, made a bitter attack on the Presbyterians in the Westminster Assembly in his sonnet 'On the new forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament'. Sterry was one of the Independent members who earned Milton's emphatic praise in that poem as

Men whose Life, Learning, Faith and pure intent  
Would have been held in high esteem with *Paul*.

He held the office of chaplain to Lord Brooke, the Puritan and republican peer, cousin to Fulke Greville, the friend of Sidney, and from November 1645 onwards was an occasional preacher to the Parliament. He became intimate with Cromwell, who was probably attracted by the mystical strain in his character, and with Sir Henry Vane the younger, that strange compound of mysticism and worldly wisdom. Richard Baxter is said to have satirized Sterry and Vane in a neat epigram which shows that wit was not the exclusive prerogative of the cavaliers: 'Vanity and sterility,' he said, 'were never

more happily conjoined.' But Baxter lived to change his opinion of Sterry, and in his *Catholic Theology* (1675) he pays a fine tribute to the man and his writings.

In 1649 Sterry was appointed Chaplain to the Lord General Cromwell, and continued in that office until the Protector's death. He seems to have been employed by Cromwell for many purposes connected with scholarship. He made an inventory of the State Records, was employed to report on various books and manuscripts which the State proposed to buy, and finally, the most interesting detail of all for posterity, it is almost certain that he assisted Milton in his work as Secretary for Foreign Tongues to the Council of State. On 8 June 1657 a Mr. Sterry was appointed to assist Milton. It is possible that this may have been Peter Sterry's brother Nathaniel, or another relative, Thomas Sterry, both of whom were Puritans and Parliamentarians, but Peter's scholarship, the closeness of his opinions to those of Milton, and his intimacy with Cromwell all point to the probability that he was the man. A fine holograph letter of Sterry's to Cromwell congratulating him on the victory of Dunbar is extant, and furnishes conclusive proof of his intimate friendship with the Protector. Eight of the sermons preached by Sterry before the Parliament were printed. The sermon in which he celebrated Cromwell's victory over the Scottish Presbyterians entitled *England's Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery compared with its Deliverance from the Roman Papacy* has a special historical interest, and affords striking parallels to passages in the writings of Milton. Sterry was one of the preachers who prayed by the Protector's bedside in his last illness. After Cromwell's death he was Chaplain to John Lisle, one of the peers made by the Protector, at his house at Sheen. His last official sermon was preached apparently on the eve of the Restoration, as the printed version bears the date January 1659.<sup>1</sup>

After the Restoration, like Milton, he may have been in some danger. His patron Lisle was a regicide, and had to flee from the country. Sterry was apparently considered important enough to be

<sup>1</sup> This probably stands for '1659/60' as the date of publication is given as 1660.

granted a special pardon, which is still in existence.<sup>1</sup> It is dated 9 November 1660, and is couched in very ample terms. It is probable that Sterry's conformist friends such as Whichcote, and possibly Henry More, were instrumental in obtaining this document for him. He could not have been in want, although he must, of course, have lost the post of salaried chaplain that he had held under the former government. His wife, to judge from her will, which is extant, was a woman of considerable property, and two of his sons were being educated at Eton.

Sterry, unlike the other Cambridge Platonists, did not conform at the Restoration, but he continued to teach and preach, apparently unmolested, at various places in the neighbourhood of London. He was one of the first preachers to apply for a licence under the Declaration of Indulgence of 1672, and his popularity as a preacher is proved by the fact that he was granted a licence to preach in no less than three different places,<sup>2</sup> Berkhamstead, Hackney, and Bishopsgate. He did not, however, benefit for long by the new policy of the government, nor did he live to see the recrudescence of persecution that followed its abandonment. He died in November 1672, apparently after a long illness. His last words are said to have been '*That it then pleased God also to give him full assurance of those Truths he had taught others*'.<sup>3</sup> He was buried in the Church of Little St. Helen's, Bishopsgate. Whichcote is said to have exclaimed on hearing of his death: '*Well . . . as much as the World thinks me to love Money, I tell thee, I should be well contented to part with half of what I have to obtain only some Hours free Conversation with that greatly Enlightned Friend of ours. . . .*'<sup>4</sup> Whichcote's affection and admiration for him is proved by an anecdote preserved by the writer who has recorded the foregoing details. On one occasion

<sup>1</sup> The original is in the possession of Mrs. E. Poolman of Melbourne, Australia, who has kindly lent me a copy.

<sup>2</sup> G. Lynn Turner, *Original Records of Early Nonconformity*, London, 1911, ii, 878, 957, 967.

<sup>3</sup> *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel*, London, 1710, The Publisher to the Reader, sig. A 2, v.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

he is said to have been arguing with Sterry on 'some abstruse Points in Divinity' when 'he [Sterry] Explain'd himself with such Ease and Clearness, that the Doctor [Whichcote] rising from his Seat, and Embracing him, express'd himself in this manner; *Peter, thou hast overcome me, thou art all pure Intellect*'.<sup>1</sup> The testimonies of the persons who edited his posthumous works agree concerning his personal charm, his lofty integrity, and his remarkable intellectual gifts, and these testimonies are fully corroborated by his extant correspondence. On the other hand, his strongly expressed and rather unusual views made him many enemies. The mystic is always liable to be misunderstood, and Sterry's isolated position as an opponent both of Anglicanism and of Presbyterianism made him the subject of much ill-natured gossip.

He was reported to have used very extravagant language at the time of the death of his friend Cromwell. The Scottish Commissioner, Robert Baillie, wrote that Sterry prayed 'in the Chapel' after his death in the following words: 'O Lord, thy late servant here is now at thy right hand, making intercession for the sins of England.'<sup>2</sup> He adds that Sterry after this was 'out of favour' as a 'court parasite'.

According to Burnet—no very reliable authority when it is a matter of hearsay—he prayed that Richard Cromwell might be made 'the brightness of the father's glory and the express image of his person'. His alleged assertion that the great Protector had gone to heaven is cleverly satirized by Butler in the third part of *Hudibras*, where he implies that Sterry mistook the true heaven for a tavern called 'Heaven' which stood at the end of Westminster Hall:

Tossed in a furious hurricane,  
Did Oliver give up his reign ;  
And was believ'd, as well by saints,  
As moral men and miscreants,

<sup>1</sup> *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel*, London, 1710, The Publisher to the Reader, sig. A 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Baillie Letters*, Edinburgh, 1775, ii, 429.

To founder in the Stygian Ferry :  
 Until he was retriev'd by Sterry,  
 Who in a false erroneous dream,  
 Mistook the New Jerusalem,  
 Profanely for th' apocryphal  
 False heav'n at the end o' th' hall.

However, in justice to Sterry, his own categorical denial of the whole story must be quoted. As it has been overlooked by all his biographers, including the author of the biography in the *D. N. B.*, it seems only fair to give it in full. It occurs in the Preface to the last of his sermons published during his lifetime: *The True Way of Uniting the People of God in These Nations* (1660):

'The little pleasure which I take in, as also the little profit, which for the most part redounds from Verbal Apologies have made me long silent, whilst thou mayest perhaps have read, or heard reported words, as having proceeded from me in a Publick Sermon, which were absolutely untrue both for the form of Expression, and the Sense. It seems not unfit upon this occasion of appearing in Print, nor improper for my present Subject, to give thee this Account of my self.

First It appears to me a very vain thing for any person in this world to determine with an infallible Assurance the state of any person in the next world without a particular, infallible and extraordinary Revelation from Heaven in the case, which I never pretend to.

Secondly, According to my poor measure of Understanding in the Gospel, nothing can more fundamentally subvert the whole Mystery of Christ together with all Evangelical Spiritual Principles, and Truths; nothing can more directly oppose the Supream Design of the Father, the Peace and comfort of all his Children; than to joyn any Creature with our Lord Jesus in the Great Work of his Mediation, a principal part whereof his Intercession is, the value, and Vertue of which Part, as of the whol mediation, consists in this, That our Lord Jesus, our only and ever blessed Mediator, and Intercessor is the only, true, Eternal God, of one undivided Essence with the Father, and in all things equal to Him.

I humbly intreat thee, Christian Reader, to judg of me according to these Maxims, and to beleieve that I never did, and through Grace hope, that I never shall express any thing unsuitable to them.'

Sterry concludes with a few words to his calumniators, which breathe the charity and humility of the true mystic:

*'But it is good for us to say to all in all Cases, as St. Paul saith to the Galatians: You have not injured me: I am as you are: be you as I am. I am as you are; I set my soul in your soul's stead. Be you as I am, in the fellowship of the same Grace and Love of the Father;'*—

Another expression used by Sterry in the sermon *England's Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery* gave rise to much scandal. In an extraordinary passage in this sermon the following words occur:

*'The Lord Jesus hath his concubines, his Queens, his Virgines, Saints in remoter forms, Saints in Higher forms, Saints unmarrie'd to any forme who keep themselves single for the immediate embraces of their love.'*

The use of erotic imagery is a common feature among Christian mystics, and is often abused. Sterry's words are certainly in rather bad taste. But the works of the Catholic mystics abound in erotic imagery often of the most luscious type, and it may be pleaded in defence of Sterry that the point which he tries to illustrate by means of the unfortunate metaphor of a celestial harem is really an admirable one. He is pleading for toleration for all forms of religion, and urging that the love of God can exist in connexion with various forms of worship, and also (a bold doctrine in the seventeenth century) among those who have no fixed form of worship at all.

The neglect of Sterry's writings is probably in a large measure due to the bad reputation which he acquired on account of such unfortunate passages both among Anglicans and among Presbyterians, who between them constituted the immense majority of the nation. Dryden may well have had such a man as Sterry in mind when he described in a famous couplet the Puritan preachers who survived from the Protectorate:

A numerous host of dreaming Saints succeed  
Of the old true enthusiastic breed.

Sterry was exactly what the men of the Restoration and the eighteenth century called an 'enthusiast', that is, one who wrote as the

spirit moved him with little regard to what the men who had learned from Locke called 'reason' or 'good sense'. In fact he is probably the most perfect example of an 'enthusiast' in English literature until the appearance of Blake.

## iii

Sterry's extant printed works are eight sermons preached and published between 1645 and 1660, and three volumes published from his papers after his death. These are the elaborate and unfinished *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, a philosophical treatise published in 1675 (Folio) and two volumes of sermon notes and other miscellaneous works called *The Rise, Race And Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man* (8vo 1683), and *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel* (8vo 1710). The Editor of the last-named volume gives a list of works which he proposes to publish if sufficient support is forthcoming, but apparently this condition was never fulfilled, and they never appeared.

Manuscript copies of these works were preserved by the Sterry family, and have recently been lent to the present writer by their owner, Mrs. E. Poolman of Melbourne, a living descendant of Peter Sterry. They are documents of the highest interest, and it is difficult to understand why they have never been printed. The most interesting part of the unpublished manuscripts consists of a large collection of transcripts of letters by Peter Sterry, chiefly to members of his family. A remarkable series is addressed to his eldest son, Peter Sterry,<sup>1</sup> and gives a most beautiful and poignant picture of the relationship of the gentle and tender-hearted mystic with a son who appears, while at Eton, to have fallen into the dissolute ways which few young men of property avoided during those years of moral and political chaos. The letters which appeal to the better nature of the younger Peter and promise the forgiveness of his

<sup>1</sup> An abbreviated version of one of these letters has been printed by Sir Wasey Sterry, C.B.E., a distinguished living member of the family, in his *Annals of Eton College*. I take this opportunity of acknowledging the kindness and courtesy of Sir Wasey Sterry who has communicated to me much valuable information concerning Peter Sterry, and has allowed me to examine some interesting family documents.

father are probably among the finest of their kind in the language. Other letters of wonderful beauty and eloquence are addressed to Frances, the wife of Peter Sterry, his daughter, another son named John, a brother, a grandson, and various disciples, one of whom apparently was in America.

The manuscripts also include some mystical and philosophic treatises, a paraphrase of the Canticles in heroic couplets and some other short pieces in verse and prose.

These manuscripts were lent by their former owner, the late Mrs. Wynter of Taunton, Somerset, to the late Dr. Grosart, who was so struck by their quality that he proposed to print them and to write a monograph on Sterry. The published works, though never popular, were never wholly forgotten. Some prayers selected from them were printed in the eighteenth century, and one sermon in the nineteenth. One of Sterry's books was owned by John Byrom, and his works were known and admired by Julius Hare, Archbishop Trench, John Sterling, and Frederick Denison Maurice. More recently Mr. Major Scott included an essay on Sterry in his *Aspects of Christian Mysticism*, and Mr. F. J. Powicke published a short study of his works in his book on *The Cambridge Platonists*. Both these writers, however, approach his work purely from the religious and philosophic point of view, and pay little attention to its literary quality, and none to its affinities with the work of great English poets. Tulloch in his *Rational Theology in the Seventeenth Century*, the standard work on the Cambridge Platonists, does not mention Sterry, and his writings were ignored by the compilers of *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and Chambers's *Cyclopaedia of English Literature*.

To the present writer the significance of Sterry's work seems to be threefold. Firstly, there is its brilliant quality as literature; secondly, its very great interest as an expression of religious and mystical experience; thirdly, a point which has hitherto entirely escaped notice, its remarkable affinity to the works of Sterry's contemporary Milton and to those of William Blake, the chief mystic and 'enthusiast' of the following century.

Sterry's prose has been compared to Milton's, and it is no hyperbole to say that the splendour and harmony of its cadences can only be matched in the works of the greatest artists in English prose style: Donne, Milton, Sir Thomas Browne, and Jeremy Taylor. He cast his works into the rigid conventional forms of the seventeenth-century sermon or philosophical treatise, but actually they resolve themselves into a series of prose poems, which for sheer imaginative power can only be compared to the *Meditations* of his contemporary Traherne. Sometimes the effect is a limpid tranquillity, as in the following sentences from *The Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*:

'He that in a clear Evening fixeth his eye on the Firmament above him, beholdeth by degrees innumerable Stars, with springing lights sparkling forth upon him. If God lift up a little of his Vail, and by the least glimpses of his naked Face enlighten and attract the eye of our Soul to a fixed view of Himself, with what Divine Raptures do we see the eternal Truths of things, in their sweetest Lights, springing and sparkling upon us, besetting us round in that Firmament of the Divine Essence as a Crown of incorruptible Glory?'<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes Sterry's prose rises to a majestic and thunderous eloquence that reminds the reader of the greatest passages in the sermons of Donne:

'Jesus Christ sends forth His Angels to gather his Saints from the four Winds, at the Resurrection. When the Body of a Saint crumbles and scatters into Dust; Every Dust lies gathered up into the Bosome of some holy Angel. There all the single Dusts are comprehended in one Form of a Glorious Body. In this form the Angel brings them forth at the call of Christ: This is the Resurrection of the Body. This is as true of each Piece of Life and Death in our Persones and Affaires while yet we are on Earth. When our Happinesse, Hopes, and Hearts are ground into the smallest Dust: they then lie Compact and compleat in their Angelicall Chamber; on a sudden, as at a Blast of an Angels Trumpet, or Glance of an Angels Eye, can Jesus Christ give our Dead Hopes a Glorious Resurrection out of the Dust.'<sup>2</sup>

Such paragraphs, which are to be found on almost every page of Sterry's works, are lyrical poems comparable to those of his con-

<sup>1</sup> *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *The Clouds in which Christ Comes*, 1648, pp. 55, 56.

temporaries, Crashaw and Vaughan, and, if they had happened to have been cast in metrical form, would no doubt have attracted the attention of literary critics long ago. The genius of Sterry was essentially that of a poet, and it was probably only the accident of his vocation and training that led him to express himself in the rigid forms of the sermon or philosophical treatise. He had little enough aptitude for reasoning. At his best he does not reason; he sings and prophesies. In a rather pathetic sentence in *The Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* he cries:

'But how have I wandred, and delightfully lost my self, by drinking in eagerly this Wine of Angels and Glorified Saints,' . . .<sup>1</sup>

He was always wandering and delightfully losing the main thread of his argument in mazes of poetical eloquence.

The most striking feature of his style is the extraordinary wealth and beauty of his imagery. Sometimes it is drawn from nature, for which he had a deep and genuine feeling.<sup>2</sup> 'Divine Truth' is compared to a '*Rose-Tree*, which as it hath its beautiful perfumed Roses, so it hath *prickels* to guard those Roses from rash and rude hands'.<sup>3</sup> The same image is used to shadow forth the relationship between the outer life of the world and the inner life of the spirit.

'As all the thornes in a Rose-bush are sent forth from y<sup>e</sup> Seede of y<sup>e</sup> Rose, & are ordained to serve the Beauty, & Sweetnes of y<sup>e</sup> Rose: so is this worldly Image, & Life in which wee walke heere, with all its thornes of temptations, & troubles, y<sup>e</sup> Rose bush' . . .

<sup>1</sup> *A Discourse* &c., p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> In a remarkable passage in the unpublished MSS. he anticipates Wordsworth's religious attitude towards nature: 'that Sympathy, w<sup>ch</sup> seemes to be in nature between a Divine state of things, & the ffeldes, or groves; . . . we generally find the nativeness, the Springing Life, the ffreshnes, & flourishing Lustre, the Solemnity, the Quiet, the Purity, the Sweetnes, the Liberty, the Pleasures, the Mixtures of Light & Shade, the Opennes of the Light, the Depths of the Shade, the Murmurings of windes, the Clearnes, & Course of Rivers, all conspire together to awaken in the Soule a certain sense, & Image of an Immortall & Divine State, & to raise the Soule to desiring of it, & aspiring to it.' Cf. Wordsworth's *Lines Composed Above Tintern Abbey*, ll. 93-102.

<sup>3</sup> *A Discourse* &c., p. 157.

'Let y<sup>e</sup> Rose, & not y<sup>e</sup> Bush be yo<sup>r</sup> Joy & Glory, so shall your Bush to[o] at length, being sowne in y<sup>e</sup> Grave of Christ come up a Rose in his Resurrection from y<sup>e</sup> Dead.'<sup>1</sup>

'The Kingdom of Christ' is said to resemble 'a lovely Morning, the golden Hour of the Day, when there is no more shades or pure light, but both are mixt, and sweetly married into the pleasant Flowers of Saffron or Roses, breathing their sweetnesses thorow the whole Air and Universe.'<sup>2</sup>

One of his finest natural images, typical of his delight in wide spaces and great lights is his description of the man under the law:

'A man under the *Law* is like him, that standing Upon the Brink of a River, looks not up, to see the glorious Image it self of the Skie, but looking downwards, sees the *Shadow* of it at the Bottom of the Waters.'<sup>3</sup>

Another type of imagery which he uses freely, and which may appear astonishing in the works of a Puritan preacher, is drawn from the classical mythology and from the poets. Sterry's mind was clearly soaked in the great poetry of the ancient and the modern world. He is especially fond of taking some classical myth or some incident from classical poetry, and using it as an illustration of Christian teaching. The *Aeneid* was clearly one of his favourite poems; in his sermon entitled *The Clouds in which Christ Comes* he uses an incident from Virgil's poem with extraordinary felicity as an illustration of the presence of Christ in the world:

'The Prince in the Poet wrapt about in a Thicke and Darke Ayre, entred into Carthage, passed thorow the Court into the presence of the Queene, there stood in the midst of them unperceived, while they speak of Him, as absent, Lament him as lost; till the Fire purified it selfe into a Clearnesse. So the Great Prince of Peace and Spirits, as He comes forth, casts a Cloud about Him; so he comes on upon us; so he encompasseth us, is still in Motion. Yet still we speak of him, as far above and beyond the Starry Sky, and of His Comming, as at a Great Distance. But, Behold! He is already in the midst of us; He breaks forth on our Right hand, and on our Left, like a Flame, round about us, and we perceive Him not.'<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MS. Letter Book, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> *A Discourse &c.*, p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> *The Comings forth of Christ In the Power of his Death*, 1650, sig. A. 4 v.

<sup>4</sup> *The Clouds in which Christ Comes*, 1648, p. 18. Cf. *Aeneid*, i. 410-588.

In the Preface to the *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, perhaps the most eloquent of his writings, the doves which led *Aeneas* to the golden tree come to his mind as an image of his hope that his works may lead his readers to the Divine Love:

'as a pair of silver-feathered Doves flying before *Aeneas*, guided him to the Tree laden with golden boughs in the midst of a thick and obscure Wood; So this Discourse, aiming at a resemblance of those beautiful and lovely Birds, sacred to love, in a whiteness of unspotted Candor, may be a birth of Love, though weak, and flying low, sent forth to allure and guide thee into those everlasting Heavens of Divine Truth and Goodness,' . . .<sup>1</sup>

Sterry was perfectly consistent in using imagery of this kind, for, like Blake, as we shall see, he considered the great poets and artists of all ages to be true prophets, and even the pagan mythologies were in his opinion 'confus'd Dreams of Christ'.<sup>2</sup>

A third type of imagery is even more surprising in the work of a Puritan. It is clearly drawn from romance and probably from romantic drama. In the *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, as an image of the coming of God to the soul we are given 'A Royal Bridegroom, which, in the habit of a Shepheard, presents and marrieth himself to the beloved Maid in the midst of the Woods'.<sup>3</sup>

The sorrows and pains of this world are compared in a sentence of wonderful beauty to the bad dreams of a prince:

'Such are y<sup>e</sup> Dreames w<sup>ch</sup> a Prince hath of a Prison, while he sleepes in his Pallace within Curtaines of Gold, and Silke. Hee awakes, & dispiseth his Dreame ffor behold Hee is a Prince surrounded with Power, pleasures, & Glory in y<sup>e</sup> midst of his Kingdome.'<sup>4</sup>

iv

Sterry was undoubtedly a mystic in the strictly technical sense of the word, and his books reveal most of the characteristics described by Evelyn Underhill, Dean Inge and other writers on

<sup>1</sup> *A Discourse &c.*, Preface, sig. C 2.

<sup>2</sup> *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel*, 1710, p. 316.

<sup>3</sup> *A Discourse &c.*, p. 108. This may well be a reminiscence of *A Winter's Tale*.

<sup>4</sup> MS. Letter Book, p. 20.

Christian mysticism. He has the usual conviction of the mystic that there is a divine element at the apex of the soul, 'a spire-top' as Sterry calls it in one place, which is akin to God and through which communion with God is possible.<sup>1</sup> 'God hath look'd sweetly forth from the top of thy Spirit,'<sup>2</sup> he writes in one place, and in another he speaks of '*Spirit . . . that Spire-top of Things, whither all ascend harmoniously, where they meet, and sit together recollected and concentred in an Unfathom'd Depth of Glorious Life. From hence thou lookest down, and seest all Flesh, as a heap of Single Dusts . . .*',<sup>3</sup> and again, 'It is the Opinion of some very learned men, that the Supream part of the Soul, which is above sensible Things, ever living in the midst of Invisible Things, the Head, and Spirit of the Soul; that this is each Mans Angel.'<sup>4</sup>

Closely connected with this conviction is the state which writers on mysticism call 'illumination', in which all things are seen irradiated with spiritual beauty. It is clear that Sterry like his contemporaries Traherne and Vaughan often experienced this state:

'The chief Object and Pleasure of the Natural Eye is the Glorious Body of the Sun in its Purity, at its Height. The second is the Skie, the Air, the Earth, the Seas, as they are enlightned and gui[l]ded<sup>5</sup> with the Sun-Beams. This is the first Supream Object and Delight of the Spiritual Eye, of Divine Love, Christ in Glory, the Face of God shining forth in the full strength of its most Ravishing Beauties, without any Veil or Cloud upon them. The pleasure next to this, is to see all Things, every where in the Sunshine of Godhead, as the Beams from the most high and sacred Beauties in the face of God full upon them. How will every Bush of Thorns shine in this Light? How will every heap of Dust sparkle, as a heap of Diamonds, as a knot of Angels, yea a Constellation, a Combination of, a shining and singing Harmony of Divine Attributes, Divine Excellencies? What a Heavenly Heat or Flame, rather of Divine Love and Joy will each thing thus seen, raise in thee?

The Great Men in Rome had of old Galleries, in which the Walls on each

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, ed. 1925, Appendix C.

<sup>2</sup> *The Rise, Race and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man*, p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>5</sup> The printed text reads 'guided', obviously a misprint.

Side were cover'd under and between the Light with Polish'd Stones, Clear and Transparent as our Looking-Glasses: In these they saw, as they walk'd the entire Images of themselves and their company.

O what a Heaven doth he continually walk in, to whom all Things round about him are hung with these Curtains of *Solomon*, the Living Brightnesses of a Divine Light; the Flower of Light Springing from the Face of God?'<sup>1</sup>

This passage may well be compared with Traherne's famous Meditation:

'The corn was orient and immortal wheat, which never should be reaped, nor was ever sown.

I thought it had stood from everlasting to everlasting. The dust and stones of the street were as precious as gold: the gates were at first the end of the world. The green trees when I saw them first through one of the gates transported and ravished me, their sweetness and unusual beauty made my heart to leap, and almost mad with ecstasy, they were such strange and wonderful things . . . Eternity was manifest in the Light of Day.'<sup>2</sup>

Then there is the sense of alienation from God, the Dark Night of the Soul as the mystics have called it:

'When God *withdraws*, he *draws* in all his Blessings, as the sun often goes in, and gives up the Sky, and Day to dark Clouds. What wilt thou do when like wretched *Saul*, *The Philistines are upon thee, and God hath forsaken thee?* . . . What then can all thy Pleasures or Honours do? Will they not be as Miserable Comforters, as the *Witch of Endor* to *Saul*; presenting thee with Devils under God-like forms; ill-boding, foretelling thy death and Ruine?'<sup>3</sup>

While we were Innocent, our Nakedness was our Purity, as a beautiful face unveil'd, as a Jewel drawn from the Case. By the Fall we are naked, as a Sheep, when its White Fleece is torn from [it] by the Briars; we are shamefully naked.'<sup>4</sup>

In a remarkable passage in the *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* he gives expression to the well-known mystical paradox of the

<sup>1</sup> *The Appearance of God to Man* Ec., p. 341.

<sup>2</sup> Traherne, *Centuries of Meditations*, ed. Dobell, iii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *The Rise, Race and Royalty* Ec., pp. 48, 49.

<sup>4</sup> *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel*, p. 233.

Divine Love-play, the bitter-sweet of the struggle of the soul with the Divine Lover:

'O sweet and Divine Mystery! O musical Discord, and harmonious Contrariety! O *peaceful and pleasant War!* where the supream Love stands on both sides, where as in mysterious Love-Sport, or a Divine *Love-Play*, it *fight*s with it self, suffering for it self, dying by it self, and to it self, and so it self Sinking by death into its own sweetest bosom and dearest embraces, the fountain of Life, the center and circle of all Delights: O *bitter Peace!* disordering Melody! broken and unpleasant Harmony! where *Love suffers* all evil, and is slain on both sides to make perfect the Harmony!' <sup>1</sup>

This passage will recall to the reader Crashaw's famous lines based on the words of St. Teresa:

O how oft shalt thou complain  
Of a sweet & subtle PAIN.  
Of intolerable IOYES;  
Of a DEATH in which who dyes  
Loues his death, and dyes again.  
And would for euer so be slain.<sup>2</sup>

Finally Sterry had certainly experienced the ecstatic sense of unity with God which is generally regarded as the final reward of the mystic:

'As the zeal of the House of God, which is *Love* flaming, did *eat up David* and *Christ*; so let this *heavenly Love* of the *Divine Beauty*, which is the Beauty it self, descending in a pure and sweet flame upon thee, by consuming thee, convert thee into one spiritual flame with it self. Now live no where, but where thou lovest, in thy Beloved. Let thy beloved alone live in thee' . . . <sup>3</sup>

This passage will recall to the reader the climax of Crashaw's *The Flaming Heart*, and it is strange to find the Puritan and friend

<sup>1</sup> *A Discourse &c.*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Crashaw, *A Hymne to the Name and Honor of the Admirable Saint Teresa* (ed. Martin, 1927), ll. 97-102.

<sup>3</sup> *A Discourse &c.*, Preface, sig. A 2.

of Cromwell using language which is so close to that of the ardent royalist and Roman Catholic:

By all thy brim-fill'd Bowles of feirce desire  
By thy last Morning's draught of liquid fire;  
By the full kingdome of that finall kisse  
That seiz'd thy parting Soul, & Seal'd thee his;  
By all the heau'ns thou hast in him  
(Fair Sister of the SERAPHIM!  
By all of HIM we haue in THEE;  
Leaue nothing of my SELF in me.  
Let me so read thy life that I  
Vnto all life of mine may dy.<sup>1</sup>

v

I have mentioned the remarkable affinities between the thought of Sterry and his contemporary Milton on the one hand and that of Blake on the other. When I showed Professor Saurat recently some passages from Sterry's works, he said: 'This man is a type intermediate between Blake and Milton,' and in my opinion this sentence summarizes Sterry's position very well.

Sterry resembles Milton in some of the particular doctrines that he holds, and also in the general fact that he was a seventeenth-century Puritan who, like Milton, combined intense religious feeling with humanism, with a love of art, of literature, and of culture. He differs from Milton by the fact that he was a mystic—that is one who claims to have had communion with God by means of a superrational faculty. In this respect he is closer to Crashaw, Vaughan, and Traherne, and also to Blake, than to Milton. Some of the specific doctrines that he held in common with Blake and with Milton, may be summarized as follows. Firstly like Milton, and like Blake, he believed that all things and all creatures, including the humblest and most repulsive, are essentially divine, or rather that they have in them some part of the Divine Life. Milton in the

<sup>1</sup> Crashaw, *The Flaming Heart*, &c. (ed. Martin), ll. 99-108.

*De Doctrina Christiana* declared emphatically that 'all things are of God',<sup>1</sup> and his God the Father in *Paradise Lost* says:

Boundless the Deep, because I am who fill  
Infinitude, . . .<sup>2</sup>

while *Raphael* tells Adam that

one Almighty is, from whom  
All things proceed, and up to him return.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly Blake in his *Song of Liberty* writes

Every thing that lives is Holy,<sup>4</sup>

and he is said to have told Crabb Robinson that

'We are all co-existent with God, members of the Divine Body, we are all Partakers of the Divine Nature.'<sup>5</sup>

Sterry in his *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* is very close to Blake:

'Nothing is *mean and vile* seen in a right and universal Light.'<sup>6</sup>

'No object however low embaseth the Divine Understanding.'<sup>7</sup>

In a letter to his son he speaks of 'ye Heavenly Hierusalem, whose Gates stand open in every Creature, Place & Heart by Night and by Day'.<sup>8</sup>

Sterry's God, like that of Milton and that of Blake, is present in every living creature and indeed in all things:

'Every thing that *IS* beareth written upon it this *Name* of God, I AM.'<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Treatise of Christian Doctrine*, ed. Bohn, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Paradise Lost*, VII. 168, 169.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, V. 468, 469.

<sup>4</sup> *A Song of Liberty* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 204.

<sup>5</sup> Crabb Robinson, *Diary*, ed. Symons, p. 255.

<sup>6</sup> *A Discourse*, *Œc.*, p. 30. Cf. Blake's great saying in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*: 'If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite' (Nonesuch ed., p. 197).

<sup>7</sup> *A Discourse*, *Œc.*, p. 28.

<sup>8</sup> MS. Letter Book (4to), p. 52.

<sup>9</sup> *A Discourse*, *Œc.*, p. 9.

'God in the presence of his Glory, *resides* in every Creature, *beneath* the form of that Creature, as a Vail wrought with a Figure of himself. Thus he constantly resides in each Creature, as the *Root*, and Being of its Being; In the pure nature of man, he shines through the Vail of the Angelical or Intellectual Image, as a *transparent* Vail of finest Lawn, or sweetest Light, sprung from his own Face.' <sup>1</sup>

In fact Sterry's God the Father, like Milton's, is the Absolute—Absolute Being and also Absolute Life. 'God,' he writes in the *Discourse*, 'is eminently, transcendently a vital Act. . . . He is life it self, life pure, absolute, unmixt, unconfined, eternal, infinite, a Fountain ever equally unexhaust, a Sea unbounded.' <sup>2</sup>

In one of the grandest passages in his works, Sterry speaks of all humanity as priests in the divine temple of the world:

'Thou, O Man, art set in this world, as a Priest in this Temple. Behold! Both the Intellectual, and the bestial part in it; Love, and hatred; War, and Peace; Joy, and Grief; Light, and Darkness; Weepings, with Howlings, Laughter with Shouts; Life, and Death with all that is delightful, or dismal belonging to them; all these Heavenly, and Divine Mysteries. Every one answereth to a purpose in the Heart of God, to a Pattern in the Eternal, and Essential Form of God. Every one answereth to the Musick of the Holy Angels, which stand in Quires in the uppermost parts of the Creation, as the Levites upon the walls of the Temple. The basest, the bloodiest Persons, and Offices; those that kill, and those that are killed, bear the Figure of *Jesus Christ*, like the Beasts for Sacrifice, or the Sacrificing Priests in their linnen Garments stained with Blood.' <sup>3</sup>

Like all Monists Sterry found it necessary to look for an explanation for the existence of evil in the world. His usual way of dealing with this problem is not, I think, one that is ever used, either by Blake or Milton. It is based on a conception which is common enough among the Platonists, and which is derived ultimately from Plato himself.<sup>4</sup> This is the idea of God as the divine artist used with such magnificent effect by Spenser in his *Hymne of Heavenly Love*. Sterry explains good and evil as necessary parts of the Divine artist's work just as, in his own words, 'the Flats and Sharpes, the

<sup>1</sup> *A Discourse*, 3<sup>d</sup> ed., p. 117.

<sup>3</sup> *The Rise, Race, Royalty*, 3<sup>d</sup> ed., p. 285.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Timaueus*, 37.

Bases and Trebles, the Concords—and Discords of Musick' are necessary to the harmony of the musician, and 'the lines, lights, shades, and colours' are necessary to the complete picture.<sup>1</sup> But in one very interesting passage he combines this notion with another doctrine which, as Saurat has shown, plays a very important part in Milton's philosophy. This is the doctrine of 'retraction' or the deliberate withdrawal of the Divine Nature from part of its own work. This 'retraction' is described in the famous lines in *Paradise Lost*, where God the Father explains the existence of evil in the following words:

I uncircumscribed myself, retire  
And put not forth my goodness;<sup>2</sup>

Sterry uses exactly the same idea in a passage of his sermon *The Commings Forth of Christ in the Power of his Death*:

'God bringeth forth his works in *Subordinations*. Heaven is a *work*, on which he lays out much *cost* and *skill*, to make a *Throne* for Himself. The Earth is a *cheaper* and *courser* peece of *Work*, for a *footstool*. Hell is his *strange Work* in which he *estrangeth* himself from himself; in which he goeth to the vastest Distance, to bring forth a *Work* most unlike himself, in which he hides the *Workman* in the *Horror* of the *Work*, and *shews* him, by *hiding* him so deep.'<sup>3</sup>

Sterry, like Milton and Blake, had a conception of the Second Person of the Trinity that was very different from that of the ordinary Christian. The Christ of *Paradise Lost*, it will be remembered, is primarily the Incarnate Word, the Creative Spirit who constructs the universe out of chaos. He is also the Greater Man who will 'redeem us and regain the blissful Seat', the composite personality which includes the spirits of all the regenerate, or the communion of saints. God the Father says to the Son that he will save

them who renounce  
Their own both righteous and unrighteous deeds,  
And live in thee transplanted, and from thee  
Receive new life.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *A Discourse*, §c., p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Paradise Lost*, VII. 170, 171.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, sig. a 3 v.

<sup>4</sup> *Paradise Lost*, III. 291-5.

In the *De Doctrina Christiana* Milton writes that the regeneration is

'to create afresh, as it were, the inward man, and infuse from above new and supernatural faculties into the minds of the renovated. This is called Regeneration, and the regenerate are said to be engrafted in Christ.' <sup>1</sup>

Blake's Christ is the 'Greater Man' of Milton:

We live as One Man; for contracting our infinite senses  
We behold multitude, or expanding, we behold as one,  
As One Man all the Universal Family, and that One Man  
We call Jesus the Christ; and he in us, and we in him  
Live in perfect harmony in Eden, the land of life, . . . <sup>2</sup>

Sterry's conception of Christ is very close to Milton's and to Blake's. His Christ is the Creative Spirit that has fashioned, and which informs the universe:

'This Spirit brought forth from it selfe the Creation, and still sits upon it, hatching it, till it breake the Shell of This Darke Flesh and spring forth into its own Life and Image.

'The Lord Jesus is this Spirit; who is, before *Abraham* was, by whom the Worlds were Made; who is a Spirit, Comprehending, Cherishing, Enclosing, Comming forth into all the Fleshly Births of Time.' <sup>3</sup>

But the Christ of Sterry, like the Christ of Milton, is not only the demiurge, who has created the visible world; he is also the Greater Man, the composite personality formed by the union of the spirits of the regenerate:

'Our Blessed Lord in his Second Appearance comes into the World, as a Soule Comes downe into the Body. The Soule Comes downe into the Body Clothing it with a new Shape, Life and Lustre. So Jesus Christ descends into the World, to Comprehend, to Acte it, to Appeare in it, to Gather it up into one Spirit of Beauty and Immortality, in Himself.

'So shall the Heavenly Man'sprout forth thorough the Earth, as an Vniversall Paradise; sending forth all Earthly formes as Revived Plants, By a New

<sup>1</sup> *T. C. D.*, ed. Bohn, pp. 327-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Jerusalem*, (Nonesuch ed.), 38.

<sup>3</sup> *The Clouds in which Christ Comes*, 1648, sig. A 3 v.

Growth, out of Himselfe. Then shall All with out the Circle of this Spirituall Person, this Quickning Spirit be Death and Hell; . . .<sup>1</sup>

'If you will Touch the Heart of God with your Prayers and sorrowes, it must be by a Union between Him and you, in one Universall, Common Person, the Lord Jesus, God-Man.'<sup>2</sup>

The language that Sterry uses concerning this Divine Person or Image as he calls it, is sometimes astonishingly near to that of Blake. Like Blake, he speaks of human sins as wounds done to the Divine Image:

'The *Image* of God is that in which all things are *United*. He that takes any piece out of this Image, he breaks the *Unity*, he makes a *Wound*, to let in Death and Ruine.'<sup>3</sup>

This passage will at once recall Blake's verses in *Jerusalem*:

O Human Imagination, O Divine Body, I have Crucified.<sup>4</sup>

The Divine Vision still was seen,  
Still was the Human Form Divine;  
Weeping, in weak & mortal clay,  
O Jesus! still the Form was thine.

And Thine the Human Face, & thine  
The Human Hands & Feet, & Breath

And O thou Lamb of God, whom I  
Slew in my dark self-righteous pride, . . .<sup>5</sup>

Sterry, like Blake, considered that egoism, or excessive self-love was the supreme sin that prevented man from becoming a member of the Divine Image.

Blake insisted that

. . . Selfhood which must be put off & annihilated away. . . .  
To cleanse the Face of my Spirit by self-examination,  
To bathe in the Waters of Life, to wash off the Not Human  
I come in Self-annihilation & the grandeur of Inspiration.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Clouds in Which Christ Comes*, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *The Rise, Race, Royalty, &c.*, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Jerusalem*, 24.

<sup>6</sup> *Milton*, 47, 48.

Sterry expresses exactly the same idea in the following words:

'The Devil is *Self-Love*; a particular being cutting off it self from the rest of things; from Him who is the great, *I am*; in whom all things have their Being.'<sup>1</sup>

Blake's doctrine of forgiveness is the centre of his ethical teaching and inspires some of his finest verse:

Mutual Forgiveness of each Vice,  
Such are the Gates of Paradise.<sup>2</sup>

Why should Punishment Weave the Veil with Iron Wheels of War  
When Forgiveness might Weave it with Wings of Cherubim?<sup>3</sup>

Sterry's prose is never so impassioned as when he is teaching the same lesson:

*'To forgive much.* This is the Divine way of making our Brethren Captives in a noble War of Love, and binding them to us in Golden Chains of Affection; *To forgive much.* It is said, that we should make a Golden Bridg for a Flying Enemy. By retaining our Anger, we force our Brethren to retain their Enmity. So we bring upon our selves the Danger of a Desperate Enemy. But by Pardoning freely, speedily, sweetly, we make a Golden Bridg for our Brethren to pass over from their enmity to Love. When we have an offending Brother at our Mercy, let us think we hear *Jesus Christ* from Heaven pleading for him.'<sup>4</sup>

Both Sterry and Blake would seem to regard forgiveness as a re-uniting of the different parts of the Divine Image (the term is common to both) just as selfishness is a dissolution of its unity.

Concerning the faculty which enables man to partake of the divine life, there is apparently some difference of opinion. For Milton, that faculty is Reason. It is Reason in the epics of Milton that regenerates Man and gives him a share in the Christ or Greater Man. The Fall is the betrayal of man through Passion. The Regeneration in *Paradise Regained* is the triumph of Reason over

<sup>1</sup> *The Rise, Race, Royalty, &c.*, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *The Gates of Paradise* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 753.

<sup>3</sup> *Jerusalem*, 22.

<sup>4</sup> *The True Way of Uniting the People of God In These Nations*, 1660, p. 26.

Passion. True freedom is obedience to the voice of Reason. *Michael* explains the Fall to *Adam* in the following words:

Since thy original lapse, true Libertie  
Is lost, which alwayes with right Reason dwells  
Twinn'd, and from her hath no diuidual being:  
Reason in man obscur'd, or not obey'd,  
Immediately inordinate desires  
And upstart Passions catch the Government  
From Reason, and to servitude reduce  
Man till then free.<sup>1</sup>

Blake's opinion of 'Reason' on the other hand, is well known. It is symbolized as *Urizen*, the *Satan* of Blake's epics, the prime corrupter of this world, from whom man can only be rescued by the passions; and especially by the divine Imagination or Poetic Genius symbolized as *Jesus*. Yet, as Saurat has excellently demonstrated, the difference between the ideas of Milton and Blake on this subject is more apparent than real. It is largely a question of terminology. The 'Reason' of Milton is not the cold analytical faculty that passed under that name in the eighteenth century,

that false secondary power  
By which we multiply distinctions . . .<sup>2</sup>

as Wordsworth called it, but, like the Reason of the Cambridge Platonists it included much that was superrational; while, as Saurat acutely remarks, the Imagination of Blake had much in common with the Reason of Milton.

Sterry's position is closer to that of Blake than that of Milton. He recognizes the excellence of 'Reason' but gives it a secondary place below a superrational faculty that he calls 'Spirit', which seems to be practically identical with Blake's 'Imagination' or 'Inspiration'. In one important passage he divides man into three parts:

' . . . three different *Principles of Truth*, constitute the three different *Parts* or *states of life*.

'First the *brute part* of the world; it is that which is acted by *sence*.

<sup>1</sup> *Paradise Lost*, XII. 82-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Prelude*, ii. 216, 217 (text of 1850).

'Secondly *Reason* makes *man*; or the *rational state*.

'Thirdly the *Spirit* is the principle of a *Saint*. . .'<sup>1</sup>

In a criticism of the Socinians he writes sentences which might well be from Blake's own pen:

'Reason is a *pillar* of a *Cloud*; the Spirit only is the *Pillar* of *Fire*, which hath light in it. Reason is that *Gladius versatilis*, that sword in the hand of the Cherubim, that kept Paradise; a sword that turns every way. It may keep men from the tree of Life, but can never bring them to it.'<sup>2</sup>

Similarly in Blake the Reason is the power that denies, the power that says 'no':

The Negation is the Spectre, the Reasoning Power in Man.<sup>3</sup>

It should be noticed, however, in this connexion that Sterry refused to be led into the violent antinomianism that disfigures Blake's writings. Blake's belief in the freedom of 'Imagination' often leads him to something dangerously like a rejection of all ethical restraint and a contempt for all outward ceremonies:

Abstinence sows sand all over  
The ruddy limbs & flaming hair,  
But Desire Gratified  
Plants fruits of life & beauty there.<sup>4</sup>

. . . overthrow their cup,  
Their bread, their altar-table, their incense & their oath,  
Their marriage & their baptism, their burial & consecration.<sup>5</sup>

Sterry's far saner attitude is finely shown in an impressive passage where he warns his readers not to imagine that his pleadings for 'Spirit' are to be interpreted as excuses for breaches of moral law or even for the despising of outward ceremonies:

'First I intend not any thing that I shall plead for the *Spirit* as a pretence to the Flesh. I humbly conceive a fleshly licentiousness justified by the name of the *Spirit* to be, if not that sin it self, yet the next step to the Sin against the *Holy Ghost*.

<sup>1</sup> *The Spirits Conviction of Sinne*, 1645, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Milton*, 47.

<sup>4</sup> Nonesuch edition, p. 99.

<sup>5</sup> *Jerusalem*, 91.

'Secondly I would not *have* the Glory, which I give to the *Spirit*, interpreted, as a laying aside of the Ordinances, or a reflection upon the *Forms* of Godliness. While we have the Life of *Christ* in these earthly Bodies, and the manifestations of the *Spirit* in this flesh; *Ordinances* and outward *Forms* will be of necessary use. Only these Rules are carefully to be observed: *First*, that our Ordinances and outward Forms flow naturally, kindly, and freely from the *Spirit*. *Secondly*, That we behold them in the Light, and enjoy them in the Light of the *Spirit*. *Thirdly*, That we rest not in them, but make use of them to grow up through them into the invisible and Heavenly things themselves.' <sup>1</sup>

Sterry's 'Spirit', like Blake's 'Imagination', and also like Milton's 'Reason', is the quality through the possession of which the Saints become part of the body of Christ. It has within it a higher principle which Sterry calls the Spirit of Christ: 'Now of These Three,' he writes concerning 'Body', 'Soul', and 'Spirit', 'the Higher lives In the Lower, and Above It. The Lower lives By the Higher. And the Highest of all Three, the Spirit of Man hath a higher by which it self lives, even the Spirit of the Lord Jesus, who is the King and Father of Spirits.' <sup>2</sup>

This doctrine is practically identical with that which Blake expounds concerning the Poetic Imagination. 'The Eternal Body of Man is the Imagination, that is, God himself The Divine Body . . . we are his Members.' <sup>3</sup> 'Imagination is the Divine Body in Every Man.' <sup>4</sup> Closely connected with this idea of a superrational faculty both in Blake and Sterry we find as a natural accompaniment, the idea of a supersensual vision. Blake's theories of double, treble, and quadruple vision are well known to students of his works:

For double the vision my Eyes do see  
And a double vision is always with me.

Now I a fourfold vision see,  
And a fourfold vision is given to me;

<sup>1</sup> *The True Way of Uniting the People of God In these Nations*, 1660, pp. 20, 21.

<sup>2</sup> *The Teachings of Christ in the Soule*, 1648, sig. A 3, v.

<sup>3</sup> *The Laocoon Group* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 765.

<sup>4</sup> *Annotations to Berkeley's Siris* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 1021.

'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight,  
And threefold in soft Beulah's night  
And twofold Always. May God us keep  
From single vision & Newton's sleep.<sup>1</sup>

Sterry knows the double vision, and even seems to anticipate Blake in his idea of multiple perception:

'There is a Two-fold Eye,' he writes, '1st The *Inward*. 2. The *Outward Eye*. 1st The *Inward Eye* shall see Christ. Saint Paul speaks of this, Ephes. 1. 18. *The Eye of your understanding being enlightened*. This also is Two-fold. 1st A *Naturall*. 2. A *Divine Eye*. The *Naturall Eye* is that of Reason, which is always open in all Men, so farre as they are Men. The *Divine Eye* is for many yeares, many ages, quite shut up in the soul ever since the Creation, untill the Regeneration.'<sup>2</sup>

Sterry's attitude towards pagan mythology may well be considered in connexion with the theory of multiple vision. For him, as for Blake, there was an important element of truth in the religions of the ancient world. His great saying that they were 'Confus'd Dreams of Christ' has already been quoted. He appears also to have conceived the ancient Gods as eternal principles or, as he calls them, 'unities':

'The Heathen Philosophers stiled the *Unities* of things, *Gods*. This *Unity*, to which all things were present, was with them; the *Character* of a God. The Scriptures upon the same ground, stile all Intellectual Spirits, both Angels and Men, *Gods*. He calleth (saith Christ) *them Gods, to whom the word of God came*.'<sup>3</sup>

Blake explains the pagan mythologies in a very similar way:

'Visions of these eternal principles or characters of human life appear to poets, in all ages; the Grecian gods were the ancient Cherubim of Phoenicia. . . . These gods are visions of the eternal attributes, or divine names, . . .'<sup>4</sup>

Finally, Sterry, like Milton, and like Blake, had a very high

<sup>1</sup> *Letter to T. Butts*. (Nonesuch ed.), p. 1067.

<sup>2</sup> *The Clouds in which Christ Comes*, p. 25. Cf. Blake's *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*: 'the five senses, the chief inlets of soul in this Age.'

<sup>3</sup> *A Discourse*, &c., p. 74.

<sup>4</sup> *Descriptive Catalogue* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 788.

opinion of Art. Puritanism has often been called the enemy of Art, but Milton and Sterry, two arch-puritans, regarded Art in a way that many Anglicans and Roman Catholics would consider idolatrous, if not blasphemous. For Sterry as for Milton and Blake, the great poets and artists are divinely inspired in the fullest sense of the words. Every one knows Milton's daring praise of 'our Sage and serious *Spenser*' as a better teacher than '*Scotus* or *Aquinas*', and his insistence upon his own direct inspiration in *Paradise Lost*. Blake's worship of the Imagination or Poetic Genius as the true basis of all religion is the very centre of his system. 'I know of no other Christianity and of no other Gospel than the liberty both of body & mind to exercise the Divine Arts of Imagination.'<sup>1</sup> 'Prayer is the Study of Art, Praise is the Practise of Art.'<sup>2</sup> Sterry writes of the 'Divine Pieces of those Divine Spirits, . . . *Homer, Virgil, Tasso*, our English *Spencer*, with some few others like to these'.<sup>3</sup> Incidentally it is interesting to notice that he mentions the poets that were chiefly admired by Milton, and there can be little doubt that 'some few others' includes Milton himself. In another place he declares that '*Divine Poets* . . . with most inspired and acquired skill, raise, refine, and delight the best minds, by awakening in them the richest, the liveliest Images of the Divine Work and the Divine Mind'.<sup>4</sup> Painters are also mentioned in similar terms, and the work of a '*Vandike* or *Titian*, or some great Master'<sup>5</sup> (Blake would hardly have approved Sterry's choice of painters) is used as an image for the work of God.

Many of the ideas that I noticed as common to Milton, Sterry, and Blake, are, as readers of Professor Saurat's book will at once notice, those which he claims that Milton derived from that remarkable body of Jewish mystical tradition called the *Kabbala*. The absolute and ineffable deity, the secondary creative deity, and especially the 'Greater Man' (Adam Kadmon) are all to be found in the *Kabbala*. Whether Sterry, like Milton, went direct to such

<sup>1</sup> *Jerusalem*, 77. 'To the Christians.'

<sup>2</sup> *The Laocoon Group* (Nonesuch ed.), p. 764.

<sup>3</sup> *A Discourse, &c.*, p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

books as the *Zohar*, or whether he derived his ideas from English Kabbalists such as Robert Fludd or Henry More, is not, perhaps, a very important point. What is really interesting and significant is that he is another example of an English writer of genius whose imagination like those of Milton and Blake was kindled by this particular set of ideas which, together with those of Plato and the neoplatonists, seem to have an especially fertilizing effect on the English mind. For the scholar the significance of Sterry lies in his remarkable intellectual kinship to two great English poets, and the valuable light which his ideas throw upon theirs. For the general reader, when the general reader discovers Sterry, he will be valued as a mystic and as a poet, a seer of visions of a new heaven, and a new earth, whose lips are touched with the authentic fire, and whose cry

*O England! London! Remember Hierusalem.*<sup>1</sup>

is echoed over a century later by William Blake's

England! Awake! Awake! Awake!  
Jerusalem thy Sister calls!

VIVIAN DE SOLA PINTO.

<sup>1</sup> *The Spirits Conviction of Sinne*, p. 31.



## IX

### FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL AND HIS WORK

IT would ill become the writer of this essay in a volume dedicated to one of the founders of the London Society for the Study of Religion, were he not to acknowledge that in treating of the work of another of the founders of that Society, of one who was moreover bound by ties of closest friendship to Dr. Montefiore, he does so as a disciple of both, proud of the privilege of their friendship, grateful for the blessings therein received. Of von Hügel, whose voice as the sound of many waters is still about my ears, who saved me from the snares of subjectivity, and who best taught me how God fulfils Himself in many ways of creed, and rite, and prayer, never may I commence to speak

Except with bent head and beseeching hand,  
That still, despite the distance and the dark,  
What was, again may be: some interchange  
Of grace, some splendour once his very thought,  
Some benediction anciently his smile.

#### i

The main features of Baron von Hügel's life are well known. He derived from many sources, Scotch mother, Austrian father, Lutheran pastor, Catholic tutor, Dutch Dominican and French secular priest, that immensely varied yet richly massive texture that characterizes all his thought and utterance. A real experience of inner stress and conversion in early manhood and apparently again in later life, together with the life-time practice of daily meditation, systematic prayer, vocal or quiet, frequent communion and confession, all this enabled him experientially to interpret with a never-failing wisdom and charity other varieties of religious experience and to be as discriminating towards the backsliding of the sinner as towards the ascensions of the saints. A restricted but increasing

range of influential, intensely intellectual, and international friendships fostered in him a truly catholic temper and poise of judgement. Tried by suffering and acquainted with grief he became the healer of souls that we knew. A life-long interest in geology yielded him many of his apt images, while there is something geologic in the slow but mighty workings and upheavals of his mind. Those slow workings, that daily searching meditation, enabled him to ride with safety the turbulent waters of modernism in the first decade of this century. His part indeed was personal rather than public and if, as Mr. Bevan justly says, he played the part of a 'good angel towards George Tyrrell', it was rather the Abbé Huvelin and Saint Catherine herself who saved the Baron for his own proper work of demonstrating the Catholic synthesis of institution, creed, and mystical experience. That work he completed in his fifty-sixth year with the publication of *The Mystical Element* (1908). Thereafter, *Eternal Life* (1912) and *Essays and Addresses* (1921) (and 1926) appeared rather as more detailed and invaluable discussions of special points, running commentaries, enriched with many a personal illustration, upon the main doctrine of *The Mystical Element* than as essentially new and further works. They are richly suggestive variations upon the themes elaborated and orchestrated in the grave symphony of the *Mystical Element*. Whether the as yet unpublished draft for the Gifford lectures represents anything substantially new and additional, I cannot say.

What makes the *Mystical Element* so impressive is its scale. Epic in length and breadth, it marshals in full array the chief forces of our civilization, the life-giving constituents of any world religion, the ultimate problems of mysticism and knowledge, of evil and the after life, of immanental divinity and transcendental deity, of personality human and divine. Scientific in conception and partly so in method it provides a volume of closely criticized and evidential data as the basis of its fundamental theme. Yet it is almost dramatic in its method, for on its vast stage move to and fro the august figures of philosophy, theology, and sanctity, advancing and receding according as they illuminate or darken the counsels of her whom the

Baron sets as central figure in the spiritual combat he is exhibiting, Saint Catherine of Genoa. Plato and Aristotle are here, St. Paul, Dante, and Thomas Aquinas, a great cloud of modern witnesses also from Kant to Alexander, from Leibniz to Newman, from Lessing to Clement Webb, all summoned to testify to the great argument of Christ's colloquy with the saints. The comparatively slight outward incidents of the life of St. Catherine are made to serve as a foil to the boldness and range of her thought. He takes us in, out, and over (favourite prepositions of hers and his), in, out, and over the profoundest experiences of the inner life of the soul, until we take through accumulating waves of fact and reflection that voluntary plunge to which she calls us, for which the Baron has been training us as we read and ponder, a plunge into waters that hurt yet heal, pain yet purify the soul in proportion to our sincerity, 'of hard self-centredness, petty self-mirrorings, and jealous claimfulness above all'. As after reading Plato's *Republic* we are sealed unto Justice, as after reading the Fourth Gospel we are sealed unto Love, as after reading the Kantian *Critiques* we are sealed irrevocably unto Law, so after reading Saint Catherine in von Hügel and him in her we know that we are sealed unto suffering for the sake of the joy set before us; sealed unto suffering in the fire of Justice, sealed unto suffering in the fire of Law, sealed at last unto suffering in the light and fire of Love, the Love that will not let us go. So, although the *Mystical Element* is the work of one who rightly claimed that he was a 'writer's writer and a thinker's thinker' it is yet a work in which the lowliest and most untutored soul may discern something of its high destinies, something of the clouds of glory which encompass it round about, something of the unspeakable riches gathered in God our Joy, our Home. Three constitutive elements in modern civilization he reveals: (i) the Greek passion for richness and harmony of life, the Greek faith in the absolute values of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, partially revealed in their emergence in the phenomenal order, the Greek groping for the Figure glooming purpureal, cypress-crowned on the hid battlements of Eternity; (ii) the Christian revelation of that Figure, His name it knows, and

what His trumpet saith, the Christian apprehension of personality as uniquely portrayed in Christ; and (iii) the Scientific temper of our day athirst always for more and more facts to bring within the reign of law; a temper ill-content with the data of spiritual experience unless these too reveal order, not disorder; truth, not delusions; beauty and not an ugly subjectivity. These three forces, in von Hügel's mind, are necessary to man's full life, man thrives only as they are present in healthy friction like three high-spirited horses drawing but one car. In like manner three constitutive elements in any world religion are discerned; in like manner friction is declared to be the necessary condition of life therein. These constituents are the vitamins A, B, and C of our corporate life, the vitamins A, B, and C of our interior life. Omit any one of these constituents and that life shrivels, distorts, decays. And as the vitamins A, B, and C are to be found as much in lowly and little prized foods as in most highly esteemed and costly foods, as much in swedes as in grapefruit, in lettuce as in spinach, so these vitamins of our religious and corporate life are to be found as much in the resolute handling of *things* by a devoted charwoman as in the scientific resolution of things under law by a devoted scientist. Eliminate from a rice dietary the roughage of rice-polishings and beri-beri results: feed patients suffering from beri-beri with discarded rice-roughage or rice-polishings and health is restored. In like manner eliminate from the corporate or interior life the roughage of the institutional, and spiritual anaemia will result. Conversely, blend with the emasculated emotionalism of a too subjective mystic the rough discipline of intellectual pursuits and creeds, and the anti-scorbutic properties of the latter will restore a forthright personality. And in this friction lies the necessary ground, in the Baron's doctrine, for that suffering, that cross which is, he says, 'the sole means to the soul's true Incorporation'. In this thought, afterwards elaborated in many a letter, many a later address, and particularly in the notable essay on Suffering and God, he finds as rigorously as did Francis Thompson (that poet whose work he so strangely never mentions which is yet in so striking accord with his own) one of the two primary truths

of spiritual experience, one of the 'two eyes of religion, one of the twin pulse beats of its very heart'.

What is the other primary conviction, the other eye of religion, its other twin pulse beat? It is that of the givenness of God: 'the vivid continuous sense that God the Spirit upholding our poor little spirits, is the true originator and the true end of the whole movement: in all it may have of spiritual beauty, truth, goodness and vitality: that all the various levels and kinds of reality and action are, in whatever they have of worth, already immanently fitted to stimulate, supplement and purify each other by Him Who, an Infinite Spiritual Interiority Himself, gives thus to each one of us indefinite opportunities for actualizing our own degree and kind of spiritual possibility and ideal; and that He it is Who, however dimly *yet directly* touches our souls and awakens them in and through all those minor stimulations and apprehensions, to that noblest, incurable discontent with our own petty self and to that sense of and thirst for the Infinite and Abiding, which articulates man's deepest requirement and characteristic.' Here in this closing paragraph of the *Mystical Element* the Baron was already preparing the way for the long historical survey of Man's experience and record of his experience of *Eternal Life*. The book bearing that name was published five years after the *Mystical Element*, and consists substantially of an impressively illustrated reaffirmation of institutionalism as the home and ground of man's experience of *Eternal Life*, of God as Given, not conceived or made. How the concepts and forms created by our 'finite durational spirits' have been interpenetrated and sustained by 'the infinite eternal spirit, God', is traced successively in Oriental, Jewish, and Hellenistic times: the interpenetration of spirits and the culminating conviction of eternal life in the primitive Christian writings, particularly in the Johannine texts; the inextricable presence of a real personal God in even the most abstractive moments of the experiences of Plotinus; the same increasing and inextricable sense of individuality in St. Thomas Aquinas and in Eckhart; its abiding presence at the very heart of and in spite of the Kantian criticism of the ontological argument;

its insurgence in all the inconsistencies of subsequent philosophies, especially in Bergson and Bosanquet, all this leads up to the central thesis in the twelfth chapter that despite its persistent weaknesses, perhaps incurable in a world of clock-time, institutional religion has its essential strength in conserving in the individual and in society the strong sense, the inextricable experience of Eternal Life. In the presence of this inextricable given the only fitting attitude of soul is adoration and this fundamental note which he had learnt from the Abbé Huvelin in 1886 he illustrates in a series of fine and generous appreciations of Mr. Montefiore's 'moving pages upon Prayer', of Frederick Robertson, of Dean Church, of Newman, of the Curé d'Ars, of Mère Marie de la Providence, of the Abbé Huvelin himself. 'In such souls,' he writes, 'living in and not abandoning the ordinances of institutional religion we catch the clearest glimpses of what for man, even here below can be, and is, Eternal Life.'

The two series of *Essays* but reiterate the theme, adorn and illustrate it with increasing force and richness. They reveal more explicitly the author of the *Mystical Element* as indeed a man of prayer, as indeed able to guide the soul aright in those facts and truths which are of most importance in the life of prayer. They re-establish his decisive contrast between necessary suffering in humanity and ultimate joy in God; his decisive pronouncement for a real and costing discipline or ascesis in life, but only that we may reach our own abiding joy in Him who, 'encompassing all and penetrating all is God, not a Sufferer, but indeed the Sympathiser, God Joy, the ocean of Joy, our Home'.

And the *Letters* express once, again, his tenacious hold on his fundamental conceptions, together with the tender catholicity of all his sympathies. He could be true to the truth of his own religion because he was also true to the trueness expressed in the religion of others. His favourite feast (*Letters*, p. 314) was All Saints. He found them in all religions.

ii

Fundamental to the Hügelian philosophy of religion is the givenness of God. While this conviction always enabled and com-

pelled him to appreciate at their full value the religious experiences of good men in communions other than his own, it also compelled him steadily to increase his stress and valuation upon the institutional and especially upon Catholic institutionalism. The fervent sympathy with Modernism tones down with the passing of the years, with the death of George Tyrrell and that of his daughter Gertrud. His increasing respect for authority and institutions grew *pari passu* with his increasing conviction of the givenness of God.

What does this mean in him? Clearly, for him, God is not given in the Kantian sense of the term. God is not numbered among the data subsumed under the forms of Space and Time and organized under the categories of the Understanding. Von Hügel as sharply contrasts the spiritual noumenal with the phenomenal, the realm of supernature with the realm of nature as ever Kant did, but whereas Kant leaves us powerless in regard to things in themselves, von Hügel continuously affirms the interpenetration of the phenomenal by the spiritual. That is, God is given, not by the forms of perception, nor by the categories of the Understanding, nor by the regulative Ideas of Reason, but given in the very texture of things-in-themselves, given in the very fact of that realm of supernature whose existence Kant was compelled to affirm but whose character he was afraid to describe; given in the imposition upon the sensible of a significance which is always spiritual; given in our perception that the immanent can satisfy us only if it be transcendent, guaranteed by an absolute character immune from the transitory and the contingent. Within the formal suppositions of the Kantian criticism the givenness of God cannot be other than not-proven, indemonstrable, and this von Hügel recognizes and admits, but the religious mind is not constrained to stay within the Kantian argument and the appeal may lie elsewhere.

Is then God to be realized as given in History? Is it indeed vain for us to flee Him down the nights and down the days, vain to flee Him down the arches of the years? Is it indeed true that while we dimly guess what Time in mists confounds:

Yet ever and anon a trumpet sounds  
From the hid battlements of Eternity;

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Those shaken mists a space unsettle, then  
 Round the half glimpsèd turrets slowly wash again.  
 But not ere him who summoneth  
 I first have seen, enwound  
 With glooming robes purpureal, cypress-crowned:  
 His name I know, and what His trumpet saith?

The Baron answers, Yes. The trumpet saith God's name, His many names in pre-Christian history, in post-Christian history, in the very fact of Christ's life on earth, in the history of His Church and of his Saints. Void History of God, deny His presence, His givenness therein and it becomes what it became to one who had found the wages of sin to be death, 'a tale full of sound and fury, signifying *nothing*'. If criticism may perhaps say that Christ is too little particularized in von Hügel's theology, it is only because an all pervasive Presence cannot be particularized, and for the Baron, Christ's is a presence not to be put by. If it be urged that pre-Christian thought could scarcely be expected to realize that givenness before the Angelic Song rang in the shepherds' ears, the answer is that pre-Christian thought yet had its own intimations of Time's immortality, its Isaiah and its Plato. The hesitating first chapter of *Eternal Life*, however, bespeaks some uncertainty on its author's part as to whether oriental religions contain an equal witness. Somewhat doubtfully he avers that 'Eternal Light' in the 'oldest parts of the Avesta . . . may apparently be taken as non-successive Life, apprehended as such in God or even lived by the soul itself'. The critic may perchance hear the poet murmur, 'If Light can thus deceive, wherefore not Life?'

Is God given in the realm of Nature? The Baron's insistence upon the two movements of World-flight and World-seeking, upon the necessity of some intellectual discipline other than the specifically religious would at first seem to answer this question in the affirmative. But when it is realized that while for him 'God is the God of the body as of the soul, of Science as of Faith, of Criticism and Theory as of Fact and Reality' (*E. L.*, p. 332), yet also for him the sciences are rather 'fruitful instruments of purification' (*E. L.*, p. 133)

than modes of revelation, it would seem that for him there is given in Nature God's signatures but not God's certainty. This would indeed seem to follow from his strict insistence upon Divine transcendence. Science and Art may indeed glean those signatures of God in Nature, but they can only at their best and through their own particular discipline yield not a God who is given, but one who is glimpsed.

There remains then the very fact of religious experience, 'in the labyrinthine ways of man's own mind'. Is God given therein? Is He the object necessarily presented to, and apprehended by the religious mind? (*Essays* I, p. 44). In his essay on *Religion and Reality* (which is an amplification in 1918 of a paper first published in Italian in 1909) von Hügel answers emphatically in the affirmative. Unless, he says, we are to become simple sceptics in Ethics, Politics, and indeed in Natural Science, there is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in interpreting our inter-subjective intercourse as expressing our gradual apprehension of a trans-subjective superhuman Reality. That Reality is itself the determining occasion, object and course of man's long search for, and continuous re-finding of God. If the reality of the spiritual world and of God be called in question, so also can be questioned the reality of the external world in general, but 'neither of these worlds can with strict consistency ever be thus dissolved by any single man'. The anti-religious facts of 'deception, lust, injustice, cruelty' are less evidences against God, the given ultimate Object of all our experience than examples of the law of friction between our religious activities and other activities lawful in themselves and necessary to man's health and balance even in religion. The question for von Hügel therefore becomes 'not whether I can know God, but whether I do', or, as Professor Clement Webb has written, it is not so much a question whether God exists as what He is like. The Baron answers that both within and outside the specifically religious experience 'there is found to exist the sense of a "More-than-merely-subjective"'. There is the more-than-merely-subjective world and Order of Nature, the more-than-merely-subjective Moral Order, the more-than-merely-subjective Aesthetic Order. But these orders presuppose an Order-

ing, and we find not in the form of deductive reasoning, but in that of intuitive experience that the more-than-subjective Ordering of the three orders is indeed none other than Perfect Personality, perfect Spirit, very God of very God. All knowledge has something revelational within it: and at every level of knowledge a given is revealed, most of all at the supreme level of religious experience we have 'an absorption of the Subject in the Object, and a response . . . of the Object to the Subject'. 'The prevenience of God becomes thus the crown and final guarantee of all the other, minor preveniences which variously bring us the materials and occasions for our other kinds of knowledge and conviction—from the crystal and the plant on to the animal and man'.<sup>1</sup> Von Hügel concludes his demonstration of the givenness of a transcendental object of all experience by affirming, in a striking passage, an abiding difference between our present experience and the ultimate Reality revealed therein. 'All actually lived Religion,' he writes,<sup>2</sup> 'is, in proportion to the depth and delicacy of its spirituality, always simultaneously conscious of two closely interconnected things: the more than human reality of the Object of its experience, which Object indeed Itself reveals Itself in, and makes real, this experience, AND the abiding difference between even this its present experience and the great Reality thus experienced and revealed. . . No true scientist, artist, philosopher, no moral striver, but finds himself, at his best and deepest moments, with the double sense that some abiding, trans-subjective, other-than-human or even more-than-human reality, or force, or law, is manifesting itself in all his experiences; and yet that these very experiences, and still more his reasoned abstracts of them, give but a very incomplete, even imperfect conception of those trans-subjective realities.' Once again he strangely ignores his contemporary Catholic poet, who had already written *In No Strange Land*:—

O world invisible, we view thee,  
 O world intangible, we touch thee,  
 O world unknowable, we know thee,  
 Inapprehensible, we clutch thee!

<sup>1</sup> *Essays* I, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.* p. 63 f.

Does the fish soar to find the ocean,  
The eagle plunge to find the air,  
That we ask of the stars in motion  
If they have rumour of thee there?

Not where the wheeling systems darken,  
And our benumbed conceiving soars!—  
The drift of pinions, would we hearken,  
Beats at our own clay-shuttered doors.

The angels keep their ancient places,  
Turn but a stone and start a wing!  
'Tis ye, 'tis your estrangèd faces  
That miss the many splendoured thing.

But if our estrangèd faces *do* miss the many-splendoured thing, what then? Does the Baron's reiterated affirmation of the Givenness of the object do anything in itself to persuade estrangèd faces not to miss the many splendoured thing? The cumulative demonstration from successive levels of experience is impressive in its cumulativeness, but does it carry with it a persuasive, a coercive power to capture and convince the tardy or unwilling mind? Does the argument really amount to more than this, that the very fact of experience, its very texture carries with it its own authenticity? Experience is self-validating and needs no support or demonstration *ab extra*. Experience is unintelligible, void of worth and significance if it be ultimately deceptive, unless it be grounded in some more-than-human source and transcendental Object. But what is this more than the ancient ontological argument? Von Hügel accepted Kant's criticism of the ontological argument as ordinarily stated, but he himself interpreted it as consisting of 'an infinitely multipliable tracing of the Religious Knowledge in all our ordinary knowledge, and of the ceaseless elevating operation of this Religious Knowledge within our human lives', and as such he regards it as the one step which philosophy can contribute on the threshold of theism. The ontological argument, nevertheless, does not cease to be an argument from essence to actuality because it is embedded in

terrace after terrace of levels of experience. It has been condemned by the Church as well as by the Kantian criticism, and it has been described by Professor Clement Webb as the 'very heart' of rational theology. But if, as von Hügel says, it is not so much a simple deduction as an infinitely multipliable tracing of the Religious Knowledge in all our ordinary knowledge, is he not himself arguing from the analysis of experience to the experience of analysis? Because experience is so analysed by him as to appear to reveal at every level a transcendental Given, culminating in God as Given, does it really follow that experience itself, *unanalysed*, yields this immediate apprehension of such a Given, such a God? Not so much a more-than-human Object is revealed at every level of experience as a more-than-private, more than individual interpolation of an object therein; and if we say that this indubitable more-than-private given is in reality a more-than-human, an utterly Other Given, is indeed a Given God, are we not in reality inferring God rather than immediately experiencing Him? If, therefore, the Given God alleged in the Baron's constant train of thought be not Given in the sense of immediately apprehended, but rather inferred, how is that adoration which he regards as the fundamental act in religion at all possible? Who wants God if he be a mere deduction? Who can adore an inference?

Greatly then, as in common with every reader of his books, I respect and admire the Baron's teaching in all its impressive architecture, I find myself unable to perceive that he has really established for the estranged faces the presence, the givenness of the many-splendoured thing. It may be that what seems to be a fundamental weakness in his treatment of this vital preliminary question would have been removed had he been able more fully to treat of that subject-object relation which he somewhat summarily refers to in the essay on *Religion and Reality*. He is so much absorbed with asserting the givenness of objects in experience that he allows too little to the selective power of attention in the subject. The constructive, the almost creative part played by the mind itself in organizing the givens in experience is fundamental to the Kantian

philosophy, but it is inconspicuous in the Hügelian. It may be said that the first step in the realization of the presence is taken by the Given itself; that God Himself gives Himself and that it is only by reason of this giving by the Given that adoration is possible. Nevertheless, there remains for the subject the power of choice, and if the subject does not choose to attend, will he perceive the Given at all? The subject-object relation is not only a relation of object to subject, of a given to a receiver, but also a relation of a subject to an object, of a receiver to the received.

Suppose, then, that the receiving subject exercises its power of attention like a searchlight upon the surging waters of the presentation-continuum. Then in the ceaseless play of the searchlight, now this, now that object in the continuum will be revealed (and presently obscured again). The searchlight will be directed and controlled by our subjective interests, and these will enable us to fixate the light upon associated and kindred groups of objects within the continuum. Hence some parts of the continuum will be more frequently illuminated than others, some parts more vividly illuminated than others, some parts more closely scrutinized. We may even adjust the lens in order to define more sharply some selected object in the continuum.

Yet we cannot, if we are to safeguard that transcendence of the Supreme Object which von Hügel so steadily maintains, we cannot say that the searchlight of attention when turned upon the presentation continuum reveals a Given God. For a God Who is only one amongst a myriad of presentations may indeed be revealed to be immanent but not transcendental. We dare not say that He is located at a definite point in the space-time presentation continuum. So, then, God is not given therein.

We are not, however, limited to the illustration of the searchlight of attention as if that searchlight, that subject directing it were itself outside the continuum. We may develop our analogy further. Suppose the subject to be himself located upon the inner surface of a hollow and transparent sphere and to find that the act of attention reveals to him illuminated tracts upon that sphere. Will he

not presently be drawn to seek the ultimate source of that illumination? Will not the Light so shine as presently to attract him in such a way that he diverts his searchlight from the limited and finite tracts upon the hollow transparent sphere to the circumambient and unbounded Source of the diffused radiation? Will he not find indeed that the hollow sphere owes all its illumination, all its transparency, and he all his powers of receiving that illumination to a Source other than itself, a circumambient Light he cannot limit or define but in Whose light he sees light, and seeing must adore? That Light indeed is the source of life. Now indeed is the immanent illumination diffused throughout man's little sphere seen to derive from an utterly Other Source of circumambient transcendental Light, and when so sad man cannot sadder, then upon his so sore loss

Shall *shine* the traffic of Jacob's ladder  
Pitched betwixt Heaven and Charing Cross.<sup>1</sup>

Religion, then, is the act of attention directed upon God: the act of attention directed upon the circumambient Light that diffuses its radiancy throughout our otherwise dark and all too hollow sphere. We do attend: the act of attention were impossible without an object to which to attend, were impossible without the power to illuminate and to be illuminated; the ultimate Object thus given in the very fact and act of selective attention is in its ultimacy the very Source of all our day, Light of Lights and Life of Life.

### iii. *The Analysis of Religion*

But if the Givenness of God is thus cardinal to the Baron's theology, no less cardinal to his reading of the history of religions is his analysis of the three elements. In the historical and institutional element are the power houses of spirituality, the reserve forces accumulated by successive generations of attention. In the credal and speculative, the intellectual element are the formulae that express the constituents of power but are never the power itself; necessary formulae, which if wrongly read or mutilated may lead

<sup>1</sup> F. Thompson, *In No Strange Land*. [Italics mine.]

to disastrous short circuiting of power. In the mystical and sacramental element are the individual batteries and fuse boxes without which power can be neither transmitted nor transformed. The analysis stands out as in some respects the most original and most fruitful part of his work. Salt, seasoning, and savour are all requisite to a hungry man's wholesome meal: the three constituents are the salt, seasoning, and savour of a wholesome religious life of practice, thought, and feeling. The analysis is capable of application indeed elsewhere than in religion: it is fertile and suggestive in its application to all social groups, to philosophy of state as well as to philosophy of religion.

Yet illuminating as it is, this great second chapter of the *Mystical Element* seems when read and re-read (and re-read as it must be) to be, as it were, too neat, too schematic, even a little mechanical. Triads of thought, trinities of tendencies, the number three seem to exercise an irresistible fascination for the mind and what at first sight seems based largely if not solely upon psychological consideration appears subsequently to be a somewhat arbitrary and too *a priori* analysis. And indeed it is doubtful whether the general psychology which he employs to justify it in the main is really adequate. Modern psychology does not appear to be quite content neatly to measure out the mind into packets of thought, parcels of will, and piles of feeling. The pre-conscious and unconscious of modern psychology will not so easily yield to such analysis, and if always a great part escapes us in the analysis of mind, so also a great part escapes us in the analysis of societies, of fellowships, of organized religion in its organized relationships. The instincts immature and the purposes unsure refuse to be classified, and what is ignored by the analyst may perhaps be worth more to God whose wheel the pitcher shapes. Scarcely does the aesthetic factor in religion receive full recognition in the analysis. It cannot be extruded, yet it cannot be properly subsumed under the institutional nor under the credal, while it is not safe to identify it with or simply include it in the mystical. Beauty is impatient of analysis, though it is not impatient of appreciation, and the way of beauty is its own way and not merely

the way of thought, nor the way of mystic feeling, nor the way of will merely externalizing impressions. It is its own way, and through the Lamp Beauty we may see the Light God.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that with a little ingenuity, perhaps, the three elements may be regarded as roughly corresponding to the terminology of the new psychology which speaks of the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious, but it is a doubtful task to assign the intellectual to the conscious, the institutional to the preconscious, and the mystical to that abode of dreams the unconscious (but for an interesting anticipation and application of this see J. A. Stewart's discussion of mysticism and the dream-state in his *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*). Yet the very fact that we are largely ignorant of the constituents of the unconscious forbids us to regard the analysis as exhaustive. More particularly, that central feature of religion upon which von Hügel lays such stress, namely, adoration, is surely only with great difficulty brought within his threefold analysis of the elements. If we resume our former illustration, we may say that the subject in the act of attention withdrawn from its fellow occupants, fellow presentations in the continuum of the hollow sphere and directed towards the circumambient source of Light and diffused radiation of Life finds there, in that circumambient Light and only there a quality, an essential quality not integral to things though irradiated to them, a quality of holiness, the only adorable. It is this circumambient Light which alone is Awful, *mysterium tremendum*, utterly other, fascinating, holy. Thus it is that religion is the act of attention directed upon God perceived as holy and therefore adorable. The experience of the numinous thus connected with the experience of the luminous is not, I think, properly subsumed within the threefold analysis of the elements as set forth in Chapter II of the *Mystical Element*. An ethical society, like any other human society, will exhibit its characteristic form or institutional marks, its credal or critical notes designed primarily for conduct, and its intuitive quasi-mystical notes in its affirmed intuitions of moral order and of fellowship, but it will not include in its hymnody

<sup>1</sup> Francis Thompson, *Essay on Shelley*.

the 'thrice-holy' of religion and the 'thrice-holy' is an essential constituent not, I would suggest, adequately provided for in any of the three elements described in Chapter II. 'The experimental or mystical,' says von Hügel, 'is felt rather than seen or reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analysed, is action and power rather than either external fact or intellectual.' This does not seem to me necessarily to cover the experience of the numinous with its resultant adoration. Indeed, it is somewhat startling to find (*M. E.*, p. 57) that while the first two elements in knowledge, the sensational and the rational, are according to von Hügel direct experiences, the third, which he now calls the ethico-mystical, is not directly experienced at all. Yet could anything be more profoundly experiential, subjectively subjective than the fact of adoration, an experience evoked only by the presence of the Holy? Von Hügel the philosopher should here have listened to von Hügel the prophet.

*iv. Mysticism*

If, then, there appears to be some uncertainty as to the mode of validation of God as Given, and some inadequacy in the threefold analysis of religion, some inadequate expression of Adorableness, are we to infer that the Baron's mind was, in Miss Petre's words, 'contrary to the truly mystical temper'? In a paper which I have been privileged to read she expresses the view that he was too cautious, too sanely harmonious in his analyses and balanced convictions ever fully to enter into the very heart of the mystic experience: that he was habitually apprehensive lest the soaring speculations of St. John of the Cross should cut away the ground for continuance within the institutional and sacramental ways. In respect of his abiding sense of spiritual realities and conformity of his life thereto, Miss Petre says that not many could possess such mysticism more abundantly. But she doubts whether he was as much at home in the unitive way as in the illuminative, as much at home with John outstripping Peter to the sepulchre as with Peter warming his hands at the fire. It would almost seem as if in his anxiety to establish the transcendental character of God he was compelled to

deny or to stop short of a transcendental character in mysticism. And yet in mystical experience supremely 'a man's reach must exceed his grasp'. In the Baron's analyses the Otherness of the Object in the subject-object relation is so stressed as almost to prohibit the mystic from essaying the mystic's one great task, to obliterate the distinction between subject and object, to be so rapt towards Eternity that there is no more near nor far; to see in God God's deep but dazzling darkness, and therein to live invisible and dim. Experience which stops short of union, even though that union be effected but momentarily, or but transiently recollected and sustained, that experience stops short of the truly mystical. Religion is the act of attention directed towards God, but mysticism is the act bursting the bounds of act and become absorption, attention ceasing to be self-directed and particularized and become attraction; the mystic experience is the absorption in the attraction towards that ultimate Object Who is also ultimate Subject of all experience. The act of attention directed towards God the Given gives way to God's attention towards the soul drawing, attracting, fascinating, absorbing it within Himself:

Naked I wait Thy Love's uplifted stroke.

The very massivity of von Hügel's mind and work seems to make the lyric note of such pure mystical soarings strange to him. His humility is such that he refrains when

Some strange thoughts transcend their wonted themes  
And into glory peep.

But does it follow that because this is so, because he treats St. John of the Cross with high respect but not with ardent affection his own temper is therefore not truly mystical? Surely not. Exclusively mystical he is not, and will not be, truly mystical he cannot help but be. Apocalypse is not necessarily overwhelming, sudden, strange; is there no revelation in the little things, the sweet things, the familiar things at home? Bright shoots of everlastingness are felt within the fleshly dress as well as within the spirit of man. If Jacob's

ladder be pitched betwixt Heaven and Charing Cross it is pitched because of traffic there, because of angels descending as well as ascending. If the mystic be impatient of the facts of history and all the obligations which those facts entail, so much the worse for the mystic. The disciple cannot run to the sepulchre unless there be an event awaiting him at the sepulchre, and unless that tomb of revelation be on the ground and not lost in the sky. We do not say that St. John of the Cross has not the truly mystical temper because he coolly annotates and analyses his own intense stanzas on the *Living Flame of Love*. Von Hügel was no poet, but there is revealed in his *Letters* an ardent spirit corresponding to his cool analyses in his *magnum opus*, as do the stanzas of St. John of the Cross to the *Dark Night of the Soul*, and those who heard his utterances when alive, felt his prophetic fire, cannot doubt the reality of the mystic experience in him, an experience lived not in some lonely cell in Spain, but here in London, that city on the Thames where he might with the poet say,

Yea, in the Night, my Soul, my Daughter,  
Cry, clinging Heaven by the hems,  
And lo, Christ walking on the water,  
Not of Gennesareth, but Thames!

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
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
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